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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, we evaluate consumer purchase behaviour from the perspective of heuristic 
decision making. Heuristic decision processes are quick and easy mental shortcuts, adopted 
by individuals to reduce the amount of time spent in decision making. In particular, we 
examine those heuristics which are caused by framing – prospect theory and mental 
accounting, and examine these within price related decision scenarios. The impact of price 
framing on consumer behaviour has been studied under the broad umbrella of reference 
price, which suggests that decision makers use reference points as standards of comparison 
when making a purchase decision. We investigate four reference points - a retailer's past 
prices, a competitor's current prices, a competitor's past prices, and consumers' expectation 
of immediate future price changes, to further our understanding of the impact of price 
framing on mental accounting, and in turn, contribute to the growing body of reference 
price literature in Marketing research. We carry out experiments in which levels of price 
frame and monetary outcomes are manipulated in repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Our results show that where these reference points are clearly specified in 
decision problems, price framing significantly affects consumers' perceptions of monetary 
gains derived through discounts, and leads to reversals in consumer preferences. We also 
found that monetary losses were not sensitive to price frame manipulations.  
 
Key words: heuristic, reference price, price framing, reference points, mental accounting, 
prospect theory 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a background to our research. Firstly, we introduce the 
concept of reference price, which is the most important building block for our 
study, and describe the theoretical rationale behind reference prices that helps 
guide this present research and the resulting studies. Secondly, we present the 
motivations for our study and explain the research objectives. Lastly, an overview 
of the structure of this research wraps up our introductory presentation.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Literature on consumer behaviour suggests that consumers make purchase decisions from 
both actual and perceived price points of view known as reference price (Kalyanaram and 
Winer, 1995). The concept of reference prices can be illustrated using the simple example 
below: 
Laura plans to stop by the store to pick up some apple juice. She had seen an advert 
during the week promoting the store brand. Although she is open to any particular 
brand, the price of the store brand seems like a good deal to her. She hopes the sale 
price in store is the same as in the advert because she plans to pay no more than the 
previously advertised price.  
Researchers have varied in their conceptualizations of reference prices. Most studies 
assume that reference price is based on memory of past prices and consequently modelled 
reference prices as a weighted average of past prices (Lattin and Bucklin, 1989; 
Kalyanaram and Little, 1994; Krishnamurthi, Mazumdar and Raj, 1992; Mayhew and 
Winer, 1992). Other papers assume that reference price is a function of past prices and 
contextual factors such as deal proneness of the consumer, frequency with which the brand 
is sold on discount (deal), store characteristics and price trend (Kalwani et al. 1990; Winer, 
1986). An alternative view is that because most people may find it difficult to remember 
past prices paid for products, reference prices are formed at the point of purchase based on 
current prices of particular brands (Hardie, Johnson and Fader, 1993; Rajendran and Tellis, 
1994).  Notwithstanding, the conceptualization most commonly accepted of reference price 
views it as brand-specific based on a summary of a brand’s past prices (Briesch et al. 
1997). These diverging views of reference prices show that reference price is a ‘complex, 
multi-faceted construct that no single conceptualization can fully capture in its entirety’ 
(Chandrashekaran, 2012).   
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There have been a considerable number of studies on reference prices ranging from topics 
of interest such as reference price formation, how reference prices affect consumers’ 
purchase decisions, and specific price cues that affect reference prices. In most of these 
studies, reference prices have been broadly grouped into two categories: internal reference 
prices (IRPs) and external reference prices (ERPs). The former, refers to price comparisons 
consumers utilize during purchase decisions, which are stored within the memory, and are 
based on a consumer’s perception of an actual price, or some other pre-identified price 
concept such as:  aspiration price (Klein and Oglethorpe, 1987); previously paid price 
(Kalwani et al. 1990; Mayhew and Winer, 1992; Rajendran and Tellis, 1994); fair price 
(Thaler, 1985); recalled price (Gabor and Granger, 1964); reservation price (Scherer, 1980; 
Bearden et al. 1992); expected price (Winer, 1986; Raman and Bass, 1987; Lattin and 
Bucklin, 1989); expected future price (Jacobson and Obermiller, 1990); normal market 
price (Urbany and Dickson, 1991); highest and lowest prices (Biswas and Sherrell, 1993); 
and contextual prices (Rajendran and Tellis, 1994).  
External reference prices, on the other hand, have been described from a contextual point 
of view as other prices in the store which are in the same product category at the particular 
time of purchase (Rajendran and Tellis, 1994). Mayhew and Winer (1992), likewise, 
pointed out that ERPs were provided by stimuli present within the purchase environment. 
These stimuli could be point of purchase shelf tags containing information about 
‘suggested retail price’, or the actual unit price of another product against which the price 
of a similar good is compared.  
 
 
1.1 RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
a) A review of the literature on reference prices shows that most of the research has 
focused more on IRP than ERP. In a recent research by Grewal and Lindsey-Mullikin 
(2006) on search intentions, they found that one of the factors affecting searches on 
shopping bots was the number of competitors in the marketplace offering similar products, 
and that where there was a platform providing product and pricing information for 
numerous competitors, individuals were likely to limit the quantity of product searching. 
Although empirical evidence suggests that ERP decreases search behaviour (Blair and 
Landon, 1981), an evaluation from a retail/advertising point of view has not received much 
attention. We considered the possibility that the introduction of competitor prices and the 
availability of alternative vendors in purchase scenarios would influence how consumers' 
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perceived changes in prices and would induce a higher perception of value or of having 
made a good ‘deal’.  
Of particular interest is the general consensus based on empirical evidence which suggests 
that ERP plays a more significant role in price evaluations than IRP (Mayhew and Winer, 
1992). However, to the extent that both IRP and ERP played reasonable roles in purchase 
behaviour, neither one alone is capable of explaining consumer purchasing behaviour as 
both could together. Thus, our study extends prior related research on reference prices by 
looking at both IRP and ERP within a retail pricing context. We examine which of these 
two types of reference prices has the most impact on consumers’ perceptions of gains 
(derived from price discounts) and losses (associated with price increases). This is done 
using experiments to evaluate the relative attractiveness or unattractiveness as the case may 
be, of changes in prices (retailer's and competitors' prices) presented in absolute terms 
(British pounds) versus percentage terms.   
b) It is important to position this current research against three relevant studies: Chatterjee, 
Heath, Milberg and France (2000), Heath, Chatterjee and France (1995), and Mazumdar 
and Jun (1993). Whilst there have been a number of studies’ investigating price promotion, 
as far as we know, only the afore-mentioned three studies have empirically investigated the 
effect of reference prices in decision scenarios involving single and multiple price changes, 
and in relation to decision heuristics. Decision heuristics are those mental shortcuts 
employed by individuals in the process of decision making to enable them arrive more 
quickly at a solution.  
The specific heuristic investigated in the previously mentioned studies above is mental 
accounting, and it is attributed to Thaler (1985). Mental accounting refers to the tendency 
for decision makers to mentally segregate or compartmentalize their resources or money 
based on pre-defined categories such as the intent or use. The key defining characteristic of 
mental accounting decision making is the lack of transferability between mental accounts. 
For example, money could be spread across several types of mental accounts such that 
money in one account cannot be substituted for that in the other.  It is pertinent to note that 
of these papers, only the studies by Heath et al. (1995) and Chatterjee et al. (2000) 
considered the tendency for the framing of ERPs to change consumers purchase 
preferences based on Thaler's (1985) proposed principles of mental accounting. These 
mental accounting principles (MAPs), which we discuss at greater length in the following 
chapter, provide suggestions on how decision makers prefer to experience different 
combinations of monetary gains and losses. 
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Mazumdar and Jun (1993) investigated price changes within a product bundle versus single 
purchase type scenario. They examined the differences in consumer evaluations of single 
price gain and loss against multiple price gains and multiple losses. They also considered 
the impact of the relative magnitude of product prices on consumer evaluations of changes 
in prices. Heath et al. (1995) looked at mixed losses, mixed gains, multiple gains and 
multiple losses within the context of a retailer's past prices.  They utilized percentage 
frames in evaluating their hypothesis that Thaler's (1985) MAPs were frame dependent. 
Chatterjee et al. (2000) investigated the impact of decision makers’ varying need for 
cognition in mixed gains and mixed losses pricing scenarios.  Empirical results from the 
last two papers pointed to the possibility that MAPs were frame dependent and the authors 
were of the opinion that there might be a need to re-evaluate the sensitivity of Prospect 
Theory's value function
1
 to the way in which deviations from reference points are framed. 
In particular, Heath et al. (1995) as a proposed extension to their research suggested 
looking into price constructs other than retailer's past prices, in order to proffer an 
expanded perspective of how consumers perceive information relating to changes in price. 
This proposed extension forms the basis for this current research.  
We carry out experiments to test the robustness of Heath et al. (1995) results and in turn, 
MAPs. In addition, we also extend prior related research (Chatterjee et al. 2000; Heath et 
al. 1995; and Mazumdar and Jun, 1993) on external reference pricing, mental accounting 
and consumer decision making. More definably, we provide extensions in two different 
ways. The first innovation is that, we address an important gap in the literature on 
reference prices in general and in the study by Heath et al. (1995) in particular by 
providing a more elaborate look into the impact of reference points on price perception. 
We tested four price constructs which served as the reference points against which 
retailer’s current prices are evaluated. They are - retailers’ past prices, competitors’ current 
prices, competitors’ past prices, and expected prices. Chapter 4, which is the first of our 
three core chapters, investigates reference prices from the perspective of a retailer's past 
prices. In the remaining two core chapters 5 and 6, we present our extension to extant 
literature. In Chapter 5 we consider competitors' current and competitors’ past prices while 
Chapter 6 considers consumers' expectation of price changes and its effect on mental 
accounting principles. 
                                                          
1
 Prospect Theory is attributed to Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The value function is used to reflect the 
desirability of decision outcomes under prospect theory. We discuss this in greater detail in the following 
chapter. 
5 
 
The second extension is that our study evaluates the frame dependence of reference 
dependence
2
. To investigate this, we conduct experiments to determine how the framing of 
changes in prices in absolute versus percentage terms influences consumers’ perception of 
price. In the current context, suppose that negative deviations of a retailer’s prices are 
perceived as losses (price increase) and positive deviations as gains (price decrease), we 
analyse the impact of price framing on consumers’ perceptions of changes in prices and 
their resultant purchase decisions. Changes in prices are described using absolute, dual and 
relative price frames. The results we obtain are indicative of the importance of price 
promotion framing in purchase decisions. 
 
 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Whilst our study objectives are related to that of Heath et al. (1995), they are distinctly 
different. The broad objective of this thesis is to empirically investigate the impact price 
framing and reference points have on mental accounting principles (MAP) as defined by 
Thaler (1985), and consumers’ ensuing purchase decisions. We examine four reference 
points namely: retailer's past prices, competitor's current prices, competitor's past prices 
and consumer's expected prices. In our analysis of expected prices, we consider decision 
scenarios where consumers' expectations of changes in prices are explicitly stated as well 
as scenarios where expected changes in prices are implicit. 
 
 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF RESEARCH 
The rest of this research is arranged into chapters as follows. In Chapter 2 we provide a 
review of the four streams of literature which form our research and explain how they are 
linked. These are literature on reference pricing, literature on mental accounting, 
literature on reference dependence, and literature on framing effect. Chapter 3 presents our 
research methodology, the within-subjects design of experiments employed in this thesis, 
and the structure of questionnaires developed for all the experiments carried out. In 
addition, we also present the specificity of our research objectives and our research 
hypotheses. In Chapter 4 we consider our first reference point, retailer's past prices. 
Chapter 5 investigates our second and third reference points - competitor's current and 
                                                          
2
 Reference dependence (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) proposes that individuals’ do not make decisions 
from an absolute wealth perspective but in terms of gains and losses relative to a reference point which is 
defined over a value function. 
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competitor's past prices. Chapter 6 explores the effect of consumers' explicit and implicit 
expectations of changes in prices on price perception and consumer preferences. Finally, 
we round up with conclusions and limitations in Chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In this chapter, we present the four main concepts which are the building blocks for this 
thesis.  These are reference prices, reference dependence, mental accounting and framing 
effects. A brief discussion on price promotion and popular price signal cues employed in 
advertising follows; thereafter, we explain the connection between the four concepts above 
and this present research.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2.1 BACKGROUND TO STUDY 
There are four streams of literature pertinent to our research: literature on reference price, 
which identifies internal reference price and external reference price as the two main types 
of reference prices; literature on mental accounting, which suggests that consumers’ tend 
to separate their activities, which could be financial or non-financial, into accounts that are 
non-transferable; literature on reference dependence, which states that consumer choice 
alternatives are evaluated in terms of gains and losses, against a common reference point, 
and that changes in the reference points often result in preference reversals; and literature 
on framing effect, which examines how different re-descriptions of equivalent decision 
scenarios could produce changes in consumer choice preferences.  
This chapter is organized as follows. We begin by examining reference prices from a wider 
viewpoint. To start off, we explain the theories associated with reference price and the 
fundamental frameworks developed for reference price. This is followed by a brief 
discussion on the empirical research on reference prices and the effects of reference prices. 
We round off our presentation on reference prices with a summary of Thaler’s (1985) 
transaction utility theory and explain how it is influenced by reference prices. Next, we 
consider the concept of mental accounting and Thaler’s (1985) proposed principles for 
combining monetary outcomes. Thereafter, we highlight Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
prospect theory, value function and reference dependence. Framing effect is addressed next 
followed by a general discussion of research on price promotion. We conclude this 
literature review with an exposition on the link between our study and the four key 
concepts discussed. 
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2.2 THEORIES ON REFERENCE PRICE RESEARCH  
A generally accepted conceptualization of reference prices views reference prices as the 
past prices of a brand (Briesch et al. 1997; Kalwani et al. 1990; Kalyanaram and Winer, 
1985).  This conceptualization also forms the basis for one of the theoretical frameworks 
on reference prices
3
.  Further to this premise, Rajendran and Tellis (1994) proposed that 
reference prices can be temporal or contextual. Temporal reference price indicates that 
consumers find a way to ‘assimilate or adapt’ past prices of brands leading to an 
expectation of ‘lower discounted prices’ from a store that is prone to frequently 
discounting its prices. In contrast, contextual reference price refers to the tendency for 
consumers to evaluate product prices by making comparison with other products in the 
store.  
Reference prices have been categorized into two main types namely, internal and external 
reference prices. Internal reference prices (hereafter, IRPs) are those standards of 
comparison stored within a consumer’s memory and are derived from a consumer’s past 
purchase experiences (Biswas and Blair, 1991; Monroe, 1984; Urbany, Bearden and 
Weilbaker, 1988). External reference prices (hereafter, ERPs) on the other hand are other 
prices in the store which are in the same product category at the particular time of purchase 
(Mayhew and Winer, 1992; Rajendran and Tellis, 1994).  
Research on ERPs has been focused within a retail advertising context. Studies vary from 
that of Blair and Landon (1981), Liefeld and Heslop (1985), Urbany, Bearden and 
Weilbaker (1988) which found evidence that ERP ‘decreases search behaviour, increases 
estimates of retailers’ regular prices and increases the perceived values of the offering’, to 
that by Inman et al. (1990), Dickson and Sawyer (1990), Grover and Srinivasan (1989), 
and Guadagni and Little (1983) which found that consumers reacted more strongly to the 
promotional signal of ERPs than to the size of the actual discount or amount saved. 
Overall, research on reference prices has focused more on IRPs than ERPs.  
 
 
2.2.1. Theoretical frameworks on Reference Price 
Four different theoretical frameworks were developed so far for the general concept of 
reference price: Range Theory by Volkmann (1951), Adaptation Level Theory (ALT) by 
                                                          
3
 This framework is known as Adaptation Level theory. 
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Helson (1964), Assimilation-Contrast Theory (ACT) by Sherif and Hovland (1964) and 
Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).   
Range Theory is based on sensory perception and it proposes that the range of values from 
which a stimulus is judged will determine the perceived value of any one stimulus in range 
(Janiszewski and Lichtenstein, 1999). When applied to behavioural pricing, the theory 
suggests that people tend to remember prices paid for products and they use the range of 
these remembered prices to set upper and lower boundaries based on their price 
expectations. The perception of a market price is therefore based on where it falls within 
this range. Although range theory has received very little attention in literature, there is 
considerable evidence (Nunnally, 1978; Sherif and Hovland, 1971) that the range of 
stimulus values influence price judgements and perceptions.  
Adaptation Level theory suggests that a stimulus is evaluated based on past and present 
stimulation and all forms of new judgments are perceived relative to an adaptation level or 
reference point (Kalyanaram and Winer, 1995). The adaptation level for an individual will 
then be a ‘function of the frequency of the distribution of values for a specific category’, 
i.e. ‘a function of the magnitude of the series of stimuli, the range of stimuli, and the 
dispersion of stimuli from the mean’ (Ibid.). From a pricing context, prices are perceived 
as high, low or neutral based on the identified adaptation level price for that product. 
Monroe (1979) interpreted this theory to imply that consumers are constantly conscious of 
an adaptation level price for product categories against which current market prices are 
evaluated, and often, the reference price and sale prices are concurrently evaluated against 
one another. As such, an advertised reference price is evaluated by comparing it with 
internal standards, and its accompanying sale price.  
Assimilation-Contrast theory proposes that people tend to form ‘attitudinal’ frames of 
reference. Consumers internalize a range of prices also known as latitude of acceptance, 
and prices assimilated into this range are considered acceptable while prices outside the 
latitude of acceptance stand out. Biswas (1992) further expounded that ‘assimilation may 
result in shifts in internal reference prices toward the external reference price thereby 
affecting price perception.’  
The fourth framework known as Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
became very recently associated with reference price. Our analysis of reference prices in 
this current research employs this framework and will be discussed extensively later in this 
chapter.  
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2.2.2. Empirical research on Reference Price 
Two dominant research questions have yet to be satisfactorily resolved in literature on 
reference prices. 
1) How is reference price formed? 
2) What are the specific price cues that affect reference prices? Are reference prices more 
significantly affected by consumers’ memory of past prices paid (IRP) or by other prices in 
the same product category (ERP)? What are the ways IRP and ERP affect reference pricing 
decisions in general? 
Although a number of researchers have looked into these questions from varying angles, 
most of them have focused on the latter question. For example, Hirschman (1979) was of 
the opinion that the omission of mode of payment from research on reference prices was a 
possible variable of influence and its omission would give the wrong indication that there 
were no significant differences between modes of payment and reference prices and where 
any differences were evident, these were so negligible as to not influence consumer 
purchasing behaviour.  Heath et al. (1995) showed through their study that reference prices 
tend to be modified by the manner in which the consumer incorporates a discount. The 
study by Mayhew and Winer (1992) suggests that comparisons between prices and 
coupons affected reference price decisions.  
The following three points which capture the effects of reference prices on consumer 
choice were proposed by Kalyanaram and Winer (1995). These are known generally in 
marketing research as empirical generalizations on reference prices. They are: 
1) That reference price has a significant effect on consumer demand based on the 
comparison of current reference price to the current observed price. A number of studies 
evaluating the various conceptualizations of reference prices back up this generalization 
(Kalwani et al. 1990; Kalyanaram and Little, 1989; Kalyanaram and Little, 1994; 
Krishnamurthi et al. 1992; Lattin and Bucklin, 1989; Mayhew and Winer, 1992; Rajendran 
and Tellis, 1994; Raman and Bass, 1988; Rinne, 1981; Winer, 1989). 
2) That past prices is the means through which internal reference prices are channelled by 
consumers. For example, Kalwani et al. (1990) found that past prices were invaluable 
predictors of reference prices. Dickson and Sawyer (1990) however argued that consumers 
found it difficult to recall past prices paid in stores since most of the time multiple items 
are purchased. They carried out an experiment in a store which required consumers to 
recall the prices of items they had placed in their shopping baskets. 21% of the participants 
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could not recall prices in their shopping baskets while only 47% could recall the product 
prices. Despite theoretical studies to the contrary, significant empirical evidence shows that 
consumers consider past prices when reference prices are formed. For instance, Rajendran 
and Tellis (1994) compare contextual (current prices) and temporal (past prices) reference 
prices against choice models and posit that consumers' decisions and the choices they make 
are better explained by both types of reference prices as opposed to individually. Likewise, 
Briesch et al. (1997) compared choice models where reference prices are assumed to be 
formed by current prices and past prices alone and found the best-fitting model to be that in 
which reference prices were formed from previous encounters with brand prices.  
3) Reactions to increases or decreases in price vary relative to the reference price. The 
reaction to the former by consumers is stronger than to the latter. Based on the studies 
carried out (Bell and Lattin, 1993; Hardie et al. 1993; Kalwani et al. 1990; Kalyanaram and 
Little, 1989; Kalyanaram and Little, 1994; Krishnamurthi et al. 1992; Mayhew and Winer, 
1992; Putler, 1992), Kalyanaram and Winer (1995) discovered that prices above the 
reference price were perceived as losses while those below were perceived as gains.  
In a different direction, Rajendran and Tellis (1994) focused on an aspect of the first 
research question which had previously not been considered in reference price research. 
Were there factors independent of prices that influence the formation of reference price? 
As an extension to Hirschman (1979), Rajendran and Tellis (1994) further investigated the 
impact of mode of payment on reference prices. This was based on the hypothesis that 
since consumers had to choose among different possible methods of payment such as cash, 
check, debit or credit card, then mode of payment should influence the formation of 
reference prices. Empirical evidence from their studies showed that the mode of payment 
did influence the formation of reference prices - a consumer's perception of the fair price 
for a product was 'significantly higher' when payment was made with a credit card than 
when made with cash. Rajendran and Tellis (1994) concluded that reference prices was a 
lot more than the relationship between prices but rather, the relationship between prices 
and other price-related variables.   
It is important to note that although there is undeniable empirical evidence backing up the 
concept of reference prices, and extant literature on reference pricing has made extensive 
efforts to validate the idea of reference price formation, there is no clear evidence that 
consumers do form reference prices in purchase situations. Evidence from prior research 
only supports the notion that consumers behave like they form reference prices. 
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2.2.3. Effects of Reference Prices  
Recent research shows that there has been increased interest in the effect of reference price 
on brand choice. Kalwani et al. (1990); Kalyanaram and Little (1994); Mayhew and Winer 
(1992) and Winer (1986) conducted studies along this line of research by including a 
positive (gain) and negative (loss) difference between the reference price and the purchase 
price of a brand’ with the general consensus in literature suggesting that reference prices 
exert a huge influence on consumer brand choice.  
Notwithstanding, a few discrepancies relating to how consumers evaluate reference prices 
have been identified in literature. These are: a) discrepancy between past prices paid, 
expected prices
4
, fair prices and potential transaction prices observed in store, and (b) 
difference between posted regular prices and the potential transaction prices. Mayhew and 
Winer (1992) proposed from their study using scanner data that both discrepancies affected 
brand choice simultaneously and not as separate components which had previously been 
the perspective in literature.  
It is therefore not surprising that the effect of reference prices on price perception has been 
the subject of much debate. Critics of reference pricing argue that advertised reference 
prices are often inflated by retailers which contribute in distorting consumers’ perceptions 
of the savings actually being offered by the adverts as well as the general market price 
(Blair and Landon, 1981; Liefeld and Heslop, 1985). Berry et al. (1995) term the practice 
of these exaggerated reference prices “strawman pricing” and argue that they ‘destroy the 
meaning of regular prices, reduce consumer trust and invite government intervention’. 
Similar criticisms following this line of argument are that discount prices make consumers 
sceptical of sale prices because they perceive the lower selling price as opposed to the 
initial price as the “true price” of the product. Discounts have also been reported to 
undermine consumers’ perceptions of the quality of a product. 
On the other hand, those in support of reference prices argue that it increases perceptions 
of value (Compeau and Grewal, 1998) and provides useful information. They generally 
agree with the critics that reference pricing involves some inevitable form of exaggerated 
price promotion but that consumers have learnt to evaluate reference price claims and 
protect themselves from deception (Blair and Landon, 1981).  
                                                          
4
 In chapter 6 of this thesis we investigate the discrepancy between reference prices when conceptualized as 
expected prices compared with past prices. 
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These criticisms encouraged some experts to advocate the use of alternative strategies such 
as everyday low price claim (e.g. retail stores like Morrison’s in the United Kingdom) 
which are said to provide a straight forward means of conveying value to consumers and 
are less likely to undermine quality (Ortmeyer et al. 1991).  
In the following section, we consider Thaler’s (1985) Transaction Utility Theory (hereafter 
TUT). According to TUT, discounts provide acquisition utility or standard economic value 
because it lowers the amount consumers pay to receive the same product benefits. 
Discounts also provide transaction utility which is the perceived merits of a deal (Darke 
and Chung, 2005).  
 
 
2.2.4 Reference Prices and Transaction Utility Theory    
Two types of utility are associated with consumer purchase transactions (Thaler, 1985): 
acquisition utility and transaction utility. Acquisition utility represents the economic gain 
or loss derived from a purchase transaction and is equal to the difference between the 
utility of the purchased product and the price of that product (Lichtenstein and Bearden, 
1988). Thaler (1999) defines it as the value a consumer would place on a product if it had 
been received as a gift, minus the price paid for it.  
Transaction utility on the other hand is the difference between a product’s actual price and 
the consumer’s IRP for that product. That is, the consumer’s subjective regular price for 
that product. Therefore, to the extent that reference prices can be affected by contextual 
factors such as the purchase environment, transaction utility can also be modified.  
Price discounts are the primary source of TUT. Transaction utility in particular can be 
increased using price promotions. If the consumer's IRP is higher than the selling price of a 
product, then the consumer's transaction utility increases and this translates into a positive 
transaction utility which the consumer perceives as a gain; and where the selling price is 
higher than the consumer's reference price, it is perceived as a loss. The following 
example, adapted from Lichtenstein and Bearden (1988), shows the impact of reference 
price on TUT. If a consumer’s internal reference price for a car is £1500, and the retail 
price of the car is £1700, transaction utility theory predicts that the consumer would be 
unlikely to buy this car. If however the retail price is reduced, the consumer will be more 
likely to buy the car because the total utility of the consumer will increase as a result of an 
increase in acquisition utility.  
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From a different view point, Lichtenstein and Bearden (1988, p. 190) proposed that if the 
consumer were to increase his internal reference price while holding the retail price 
constant, the retail price will appear more attractive because there will be an increase in the 
total utility of the consumer due to an increase in the consumer’s transaction utility. 
Another example, adapted from (Ibid.), suggests that where a retailer advertises a product 
as ‘was £1,999 and now only £1,299, a potential buyer who initially had an IRP of £1,200 
would increase his reference price in the direction of the previous retail price of £1,999, 
thereby making the current price of £1,299 seem acceptable and lead to a higher 
willingness to pay. The same principle also applies where the consumer’s IRP is higher 
than the retailer’s current price (Ibid.).  
Thaler (1985) uses the following example to illustrate negative transaction utility.  
“You are lying on the beach on a hot day. All you have to drink is ice water. For the last 
hour you have been thinking about how much you would enjoy a nice cold bottle of your 
favourite brand of beer. A companion gets up to go make a phone call and offers to 
bring back a beer from the only nearby place where beer is sold (a fancy resort hotel) {a 
small run-down grocery store}. He says that the beer might be expensive and so asks 
how much you are willing to pay for the beer. He says that he will buy the beer if it costs 
as much or as less as the price that you state. But if it costs more than the price that you 
state he will not buy it. You trust your friend, and there is no possibility of bargaining 
with the (bartender) {store owner}. What price do you tell him?” 
Thaler tested two versions of the scenario above. In one scenario, the beer is available for 
purchase from a resort hotel while in the other, the beer is sold by a grocery store (see 
phrases in parentheses and brackets). The median results obtained ($2.65 for resort and 
$1.50 for the grocery store) show that consumers had a higher reference price for the beer 
from the resort compared with the beer from the grocery store. Transaction utility comes 
into play here because the consumer who is willing to pay a higher price for a resort beer, 
will derive negative transaction utility from the same brand of beer if the retail price at the 
grocery store was higher than the consumer’s reference price for it. 
A number of studies have examined the effect of price discounts based on Thaler’s (1985) 
TUT. For example, in the studies by Lichtenstein and Bearden (1989), and Urbany et al. 
(1988), the discount frame is manipulated using either the initial retail price or a suggested 
retail price. The current price is however held constant (e.g. retail price $29.99 versus ‘was 
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$39.99’). Darke and Chung (2005) describe this pricing manipulation as one in which 
acquisition utility is kept constant while the transaction utility is varied.  
The figure below adapted from Biswas and Blair (1991) shows the perceptual process of 
the effects of reference prices. It captures a typical consumer's mental evaluation of a price 
signal from the moment s/he enters the store to the final decision to make the purchase or 
for-go. We make assumptions regarding some of these processes in the course of this 
research and these will be expanded as we progress.  
 
 
Figure 2.1  
Perceptual processes of reference price effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Biswas and Blair (1991) 
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2.3 PROSPECT THEORY AND THE VALUE FUNCTION  
Prospect theory was proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as an alternative to the 
descriptive model of expected utility theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) due 
to its shortcomings in adequately predicting decision making under risky conditions. 
Values are assigned to gains and losses and not final wealth unlike expected utility theory.  
The value function (v*) (depicted in figure 2.2) defines value in terms of gains and losses 
in relation to a reference point (starting point) with a zero value (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981), and is defined over uni-dimensional and uniattribute outcomes. As a descriptive 
framework, prospect theory emphasises comparison between value and perceived changes 
in value. Three features are associated with the value function: 
1) The value function is defined in terms of gains and losses relative to a reference point. 
For example, someone who earns a current salary of £100,000 but whose salary next year 
will be £90,000 will view the salary difference of £10,000 as a loss i.e. a negative outcome 
relative to a status quo (reference point) and not as a salary of £90,000 i.e. a positive 
outcome in absolute terms. This shows that individuals are more sensitive to perceived 
changes in reference point than absolute levels. This characteristic of the value function is 
known as reference dependence and is a focal point of our study.   
2) It is S-shaped with the concave area defined for gains and the convex for losses and gets 
progressively flatter the higher the amount of gains gets and progressively flatter as losses 
increase. The nearer gains or losses are to the status quo, the more sensitive people are and 
the farther equal gains and losses are from the status quo, the less sensitive people are. For 
example, the difference between a gain of £0 and £100 is more significant than the 
difference between a gain of £500 and £600. This characteristic is termed as diminishing 
sensitivity.  
3) It is steeper for losses than gains and this is because a loss is assumed to have higher 
impact than a gain of the same magnitude. For example, the loss of £100 is more hurtful in 
comparison to the pleasure derived from a gain of £100. This is also known in literature as 
loss aversion. 
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Figure 2.2  
A Hypothetical value function 
 
 
 
Source: Levy, M and Levy, H (2002, p. 1336) 
 
2.3.1 Stages in the decision making process 
Based on prospect theory, two phases are identified in decision making (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed 
the term 'decision frame' to describe a decision maker's construction of problems involving 
choice. Each decision problem comprises the acts, outcomes and contingencies leading to a 
definite choice. They further suggested that the decision frame depends partially on how 
the problem is presented, and partially on the 'norms, habits and personal characteristics of 
the decision maker'.   
The first phase is the framing or editing phase. In this phase, the acts, outcomes and 
contingencies relating to a decision problem are re-described or reframed into a simpler 
format (Rowe and Puto, 1987). The framing of problems in form of acts implies 
alternatives from which a choice is made; outcomes are choices described as positive or 
negative deviations from a neutral reference point or status quo. The framing of outcomes 
usually follows after problems have been framed into acts. Contingency framing links the 
implications of outcome framing to act framing. In other words, contingency framing is 
dependent on both acts and outcome framing.  
18 
 
Reference dependence is the central feature of the editing phase. Decision makers make 
comparisons between simplified problems or the outcomes they face with deviations of 
these outcomes from a given reference point. This reference point is sometimes known 
only to the decision maker. The coding of the outcome as a gain or loss therefore depends 
on how it compares with the status quo (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).   For the purpose 
of this study, our analysis of decision making in a price related context deals with the 
framing of outcomes.  
The evaluation phase is the second stage in decision making and it is made up of two 
stages. In the first stage, the decision maker evaluates the problem using the value function 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Here, the decision maker assigns values to the reframed 
problems or outcomes based on the difference between the reference point and the size of 
the positive or negative deviations from it, and makes a choice based on which has the 
largest value.   The S-shape of the value function then implies that after the second phase 
has been completed and a value has been assigned, the decision maker is more inclined to 
be risk averse for outcomes coded as gains and risk seeking for outcomes coded as losses 
i.e. decision makers would prefer to go out of their way to avoid a predictable loss by 
taking greater risks, than go out of their way to achieve a predictable gain.  
In the second stage of the evaluation phase, decision weights are applied to assess the 
consequence of events on the value previously assigned to each outcome using a weighting 
function (figure 2.3 illustrates this). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) emphasize the fact that 
these decision weights are not probabilities which strictly add up to one but are derived 
from choices individuals make between outcomes. Prospect theory further predicts that 
decision makers tend to irrationally overweight outcomes with low probabilities and 
underweight certain outcomes. For example, an individual whose probability of having a 
terminal illness in his lifetime moves from 0% to a 1% likelihood of this outcome 
occurring would assign a higher weight to this outcome than if his probability of having a 
terminal illness increased from 50% to 51%.   
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Figure 2.3  
A hypothetical weighting function 
 
Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 283) 
 
 
2.3.2 Reference Dependence 
Earlier, we explained the two phases of decision making under prospect theory. For the 
purpose of this research, we focus on the first phase which involves the framing of decision 
outcomes and implies the dependence of a decision maker’s perceptions of value on 
deviations from his status quo. This is known as reference dependence.  Based on this 
definition, reference dependence is necessitated by the inclusion or suggestion of a 
reference or starting point within a decision problem.  
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) paper, in which they developed prospect theory as an 
alternative model for decision making under risk, employed decision problems with 
explicit and definitive reference points. Where a reference point is unknown or open to 
interpretation, framing effects are evident in the choices made by the decision maker. 
Furthermore, extant literature on framing effects provides significant empirical evidence of 
the importance of reference points in the evaluation of consumer choice (Hack and 
Lammers, 2011). 
In their analysis of decision making in the absence of risk, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) 
make the assumption that a decision maker’s reference point was synonymous with his 
reference state which is normally consistent with his ‘current position and affected by 
aspirations, expectations, norms and social comparisons’.  
Literature on reference points encompasses interest areas such as factors that constitute a 
reference point; how individuals adapt their reference points dynamically and the 
conditions that influence this adaptation; shifts in the location of reference points (Bolton 
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and Ockenfels, 2000; Heath et. al. 1995; Hoeffler et. al. 2006; Koszegi and Rabin, 2007; 
Puto, 1987), to mention a few. However, there is limited research available on how 
reference points are formed.  
 
2.4 MENTAL ACCOUNTING AND CONSUMER DECISION MAKING  
The concept of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985) has to do predominantly with framing. 
Decision makers mentally ‘frame’ their money, resources, problems, transactions, to 
mention a few, such as to derive what they perceive as maximum level of satisfaction or 
utility, or the minimization of loss. Research shows that decision makers tend to mentally 
segregate or compartmentalize items, resources, or money based on pre-defined categories 
such as the use of such items or its purpose. For example, money could be spread across 
several types of mental accounts such that money in one account cannot be substituted for 
that in the other. A decision maker could have numerous mental accounts for the uses of 
money such as groceries, entertainment, or transportation. Based on these 
compartmentalizing, a consumer may spend £30 on tickets to a concert when the money is 
taken out of the groceries account and not the entertainment account. Mental accounting 
violates the normative economic principle of fungibility which implies ease of 
transferability or substitutability of one thing for another.  
Thaler (1985) applied Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) value function to mental 
accounting to describe how decision makers code or perceive outcomes involving gains 
and losses in decision making. Thaler’s MAPs were made possible by introducing price as 
an attribute into the value function. Where price becomes the reference point, it serves the 
same function as reference price. As it applies to consumer choice, decision problems are 
perceived in terms of monetary gains and losses relative to a reference point. He described 
decision makers as pleasure seekers who tend to look for the best ways to combine their 
activities to generate the most happiness. Working with joint outcomes, x and y, he came 
up with four principles with which a decision maker with a value function would code or 
frame combinations of x and y to get maximum utility/value. These have come to be 
known generally in literature as mental accounting principles (MAPs). 
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2.5 THE FRAMING OF OUTCOMES 
Outcomes are the end result of any action. Thaler (1985) applied the concept of mental 
accounting to consumer choice to investigate how decision makers code their monetary 
gains and losses. He applied the value function to joint or combined outcomes and by 
extending the reference point characteristic of the value function to include price, he 
proposed four ways decision makers prefer to frame combinations of outcomes. These are 
known as mental accounting principles (hereafter, MAPs). 
According to Thaler (1985) a decision maker faced with two joint outcomes ‘x’ and ‘y’ 
would choose combinations of x and y that provides the highest level of utility. Such an 
individual then has to choose between a joint evaluation of x and y given as v (x + y) and a 
separate evaluation given as v (x) + v (y).  In the first alternative where the outcomes are 
jointly evaluated, such an individual is said to have integrated outcomes and in the second 
option, the outcomes are said to be segregated.  
Given the preceding, Thaler’s (Ibid.) are derived as follows:  
a) A multiple monetary gain is where x>0 and y>0. These would be combined such 
that v (x) + v (y) > v (x + y). Faced with such an outcome, an individual will prefer 
to segregate multiple gains.  
b) A multiple monetary loss involves 2 outcomes –x and –y, where – x>0 and – y>0 (-
x and –y both remain positive)5, and would be combined as v (-x) + v (-y) < v {- (x 
+ y)}. Here, integration of losses will be preferred since the utility derived is 
greater.  
c) A mixed gain given as x and –y such that x > y. This would be coded as a net gain 
and combined such that v (x) + v (-y) < v (x - y) and integration is the preferred 
choice.  
d) A mixed loss given as x and –y with x < y. This is coded as a net loss. Where the 
loss is larger than the gain, the outcomes will be combined such that v (x) > v (x – 
y) – v (–y) and the choice will be to segregate. Thaler (1985) termed this ‘the silver 
lining principle’. However, where the loss is small relative to the gain (e.g. £30, –
£40), then the decision maker would prefer integration because gaining £30 will be 
valued less than having the loss reduced from £40 to £10 since the loss is almost 
cancelled out by the gain.  
                                                          
5
 This description of monetary loss is not considered in terms of negative prices. Rather, in terms of negative 
monetary deviations from a specific reference point. For example, a 5% decrease in one’s annual income 
following a bad economy will be considered as a loss in comparison with the previous income.  
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Figures 2.4a and 2.4b further illustrate the preferences to integrate or segregate mixed 
losses. Figure 2.4a shows the preference for integration when the loss is small relative to 
the gain. However, where the loss is larger than the gain, segregation will be preferred as 
shown in figure 2.4b.  
 
In summary, Thaler's (Ibid.) mental accounting principles (MAPs) are:   
a) Multiple Gains (2 gains of same or different magnitudes) should be segregated.  
b) Multiple Losses (2 losses of same or different magnitudes) should be integrated. 
c) Mixed Gains (a large gain + a small loss) should be integrated.  
d) Mixed Losses (a large loss + a small gain) should be segregated. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4a  
The value function indicating preference for integration of mixed losses. 
 
 
 
        Source: Thaler (1985, p. 203) 
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Figure 2.4b  
The value function indicating preference for segregation of mixed losses (silver lining) 
  
 
 
   Source: Thaler (1985, p. 203) 
 
To summarize our presentation so far, we have looked at reference prices, prospect 
theory’s value function, reference dependence, and mental accounting principles. There 
have been numerous studies on consumers’ perceptions of gains and losses in decision 
scenarios involving risk using Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory as a 
foundation. This is due mainly to the close link between prospect theory and decision 
frames. Building on prospect theory and the associated literature presented in this current 
chapter, the goal of this thesis is to present an empirical analysis of the way consumers 
evaluate reference prices in relation to their purchase decisions in the absence of risk. More 
specifically, we examine the impact of both internal and external reference prices on 
decision makers’ perception of monetary gains and losses in riskless choice. Internal and 
external reference prices serve as our reference points. 
In the next section we look at the last stream of literature – framing effect, and examine 
how it relates to prospect theory.  
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2.6 FRAMING EFFECT 
The term ‘Framing Effect’ or equivalency (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1986) is attributed 
to Tversky and Kahneman (1981). It refers to the general tendency for decision makers to 
change their choice preferences based on the description of decision scenarios. There has 
been considerable research interest in understanding framing effects because it indicates 
that slight differences in the way decisions, events or outcomes are presented could affect 
the final choices that decision makers take. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) suggest that 
framing effect is evidence of irrationality in individuals’ decision making because it 
violates the normative principle of invariance which states that one's decision should be 
independent of the particular way a problem or situation is described.  
In literature, framing effect has been portrayed in two ways. The first deals with the same 
re-descriptions of pairs of problems and the second to different descriptions of pairs of 
problems that are economically equivalent. The following example from Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) is regarded as a classic in studies on framing effect and it illustrates the 
second way framing effect has been presented in literature.  
Problem 1: You pay $10 for a ticket to see a play. When you get to the theatre, you 
discover that you have lost your ticket. The seat was not marked and the ticket cannot be 
recovered. Would you buy a new ticket? 
 
Problem 2: You go to see a play that costs $10 per ticket. When you get to the theatre, 
you discover that you have lost a $10 bill. Would you buy a ticket? 
 
When presented to subjects, a higher percentage indicated their willingness to buy tickets 
in problem 2 rather than problem 1. Although both problems are not exact re-descriptions 
of the same problem, an equivalent monetary value ($10) is involved in both scenarios. We 
see framing effect reflected in the choices of respondents due to their dissociation of the 
lost $10 from the lost ticket. There has been no wide criticism of this principle in literature 
(Frisch, 1993). Rather, there has been an increased need for understanding the underlying 
processes of consumer decision making because according to Tversky, Sattath and Slovic 
(1988), ‘if different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options,’ 
individual preferences of decision makers would be lacking in precision.  
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2.6.1  Framing effect versus reflection effect 
It is important to note the distinction between framing effect and reflection effect. Framing 
effect refers to the tendency for decision makers to reverse their preferences as a result of 
the re-editing of the decision problem. Outcomes in framing conditions are either positive 
(gains) or negative (losses) and more importantly, the final outcomes presented in the 
decision frames are exactly the same. Also, in framing effect, a loss condition (or gain) 
could be framed to seem like a gain (or loss) but the reframing of the condition does not 
change it from being a loss (or gain) {Fagley, 1993}. Otherwise stated, the loss (gain) 
outcome remains the same. The decision problem is only phrased so as to give the 
impression that the other domain 'gain (loss)' is involved. An example of this can be seen 
in the theatre ticket illustration from Tversky and Kahneman (1981) presented above in 
which the lost ticket costs $10 and a $10 bill was also misplaced.  
In reflection effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), the preferences of decision makers are 
also reversed but as a result of differences in the outcomes of the decision problem. In 
other words, the outcomes are framed to actually involve the other domain (gains versus 
losses and vice versa) but having the same relative size (Fagley, 1993). To illustrate, 
imagine decision problems in which a decision maker is faced with a gamble of a certain 
gain of $40 over a two-third chance of gaining $60 and a certain loss of $40 over a two-
third chance of losing $60. Here, we see the decision problem framed in terms of gains 
versus losses and a difference in the signs of the outcomes (+$40 versus -$40). In studies 
evaluating examples similar to the one just given, majority of the subjects preferred a two-
third chance of losing $60 over a certain loss of $40. In the gains domains, subjects also 
preferred a certain gain of $40 over a two-third chance of gaining $60. Reflection effect, 
like framing effect is explained using prospect theory's value function. From the example 
of reflection effect above, the subjects indicate preferences showing risk seeking for losses 
and risk aversion for gains. They would rather choose a two-thirds chance of losing 
nothing as opposed to a certain loss of money.  
To recap, framing effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) presents a decision problem 
involving a loss (or a gain) as though it were a gain (or a loss), and which in essence 
describes reference dependence. Reflection effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) on the 
other hand, includes both the gain and loss outcomes within the decision frame. As an 
extension to Thaler's transaction utility theory (see page 13), the framing of a possible 
purchase in terms of gains or losses and which conveys utility when perceived as a gain 
and disutility when seen as a loss is framing effect. 
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2.6.2 Types of framing effects  
The existence of framing effects has been documented in literature on medical and clinical 
decisions, perceptual judgements, and bargaining behaviours, to mention a few. Despite 
this breadth of application, the search for a deeper understanding of the processes that 
underlie framing effects has been limited (Levin et al. 1998).  
Different types of framing effects have been considered from the broad umbrella known as 
Valence Framing. Valence framing refers to the use of a descriptive frame in casting the 
same critical information in either a positive or negative light. It is often treated as a 
relatively homogenous set of processes which are usually explained using Kahneman and 
Tversky's (1979) prospect theory.  
Studies on framing effects have used different underlying mechanisms related to valence 
framing with three being most predominant in literature: risky choice framing, attribute 
framing and goal framing. Risky choice framing introduced by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981) is the most closely associated form of framing effect. Research that has ensued over 
the years on risky choice framing have been modelled following the original example of 
the Asian disease problem by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) in which respondents were 
told to choose between options framed in terms of lives saved (gains) or lives lost (losses) 
with both options having a risky and riskless component. The risk level to the options was 
defined in terms of probability of success or failure of proceeding with that choice while 
the riskless option was a definite guarantee of success or failure. The Asian disease 
problem by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) is illustrated below. The numbers in 
parenthesis indicate the number of subjects who chose that option. 
Problem 1(N = 152) {Gains Frame}  
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs 
are as follows: 
 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. (72 percent) 
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 
probability that no people will be saved. (28 percent) 
 
Which of the two programs would you favour? 
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Problem 2 (N = 155) {Loss Frame} 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs 
are as follows: 
 
If Program C is adopted 400 people will die. (22 percent) 
If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability 
that 600 people will die. (78 percent) 
Which of the two programs would you favour? 
Tversky and Kahneman found a reversal in the choices of respondents between the two 
problem frames. Where the choices were framed as gains, majority choice showed a risk 
aversion because saving 200 lives was more favourable than the risky option of equal 
expected value (a 1/3 chance of saving 600 lives). In the loss frame however, the majority 
of respondents were risk taking. 400 people dying was not acceptable compared with a 2/3 
probability that everyone will die. They concluded that decision makers tend to be risk 
averse in gains and risk taking in losses. This finding, though consistent with the second 
phase (evaluation) of decision making as proposed by prospect theory’s value function 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), shows inconsistency in the choices of decision makers 
between the 2 equivalent problems when defined over gains and losses.  
The second category of studies under valence framing is attribute framing. Under attribute 
framing, a characteristic of an object or event serves as the focus of the framing 
manipulation and is presented either positively or negatively. The final classification of 
valence framing, goal framing, involves the framing of the goal behind an action or 
behaviour either in terms of the advantages or disadvantages of participation in the action 
or behaviour under evaluation. These three categories of valence framing have been 
differentiated in framing manipulation studies based on methodology as follows a) what is 
framed b) what is affected by the defined frame and c) how framing effects are measured. 
The table below from Levin et al. (1998) summarizes the classification of valence framing 
based on research methodology in literature. 
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Table 2.1 
Summary of methodology on valence framing  
 
Frame 
type 
What is framed What is affected Measurement of 
effect 
Risky 
choice 
Set of options with 
different levels of risk 
Risk preference 
of decision 
makers 
Comparing choices for 
the risky options 
Attribute Attributes or 
characteristics of an 
event or object 
Evaluation of 
items 
Comparing the ratings 
of item attractiveness 
Goal Consequence or goal of 
a behaviour 
Impact of 
persuasion 
Comparing adoption 
rate of the behaviour 
 
 
2.6.3 Preference reversals in decision making 
Empirical research on framing effect has shown that the evidence of framing effects in 
decision making often leads to reversals of preferences or choices which is as a result of 
shifts or changes in reference points. Preference reversals lead to changes in perceptions of 
value (Chen et. al. 1998) and consequently, somewhat irrational preferences. 
Preference reversals in decision making have generated a considerable number of 
empirical interests with studies focusing on framing decision problems in terms of gains 
and losses or in a positive or negative light (e.g., McNeil et al. 1982; Neale and Bazerman 
1985; Schelling, 1981; Thaler, 1980; Toland and O’Neill 1983; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981, 1987).  
There have also been considerable criticisms of framing effect studies. The predominant 
one is the claim that in the studies carried out, the decision frames are enforced on the 
subjects (Elliott and Archibald, 1989). They opined that in evaluating decision problems in 
the real world, decision makers formulate or choose the alternative frames on their own 
because the relevant alternatives available are often unknown to them.  Elliott and 
Archibald (1989) further argue that not only does allowing decision makers the 
independence to choose on their own encourage independent problem resolution as well as 
foster imaginative decision making, but also, their eventual choices may differ from similar 
experimental conditions in which the decision frames are imposed on them. We are 
however of the opinion that the rationale for the above criticism defines framing effect. 
This is because the deliberate manipulation of re-descriptions of the same decision frames 
elicits preferences that are different from those in which the alternative decision frames are 
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realistically and cognitively generated. Given that there are countless possible alternative 
decision frames available to the decision maker, then it is difficult to predict how any 
individual will frame any given decision or choice. Consequently, the final choice of the 
decision maker will be context dependent.     
Since their 1981 classic example describing framing effect, there have been a number of 
studies on risky choice framing designed to evaluate the choice reversal in Tversky and 
Kahneman’s Asian disease problem. The typical framing manipulation follows the use of 
hypothetical decision scenarios describing two problems as either riskless (a sure gain/loss) 
and the other as a risky choice based on specified chances of occurrence (probability). The 
methodology employed in some of these studies on framing has been a comparison of the 
proportions of choice (mode) across the frames utilized. Other studies conducting 
experiments within a pricing context have looked at means and still others have proffered 
new descriptive models to explain the impact of reference prices on price perceptions.      
It has been argued that Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) Asian disease problem from 
which framing effect was first proposed, and Thaler’s (1985) experiments from which 
mental accounting principles were formulated, were only partially presented and tended to 
be ambiguous. Researchers investigating framing effect are of the opinion that where 
decision problems are more clearly defined and unequivocally presented, the framing 
effect reported and Thaler’s (Ibid.) proposed MAPs could possibly change or be reversed 
(Kuhberger, 1995) and suggested that prospect theory was lacking as a descriptive theory 
of cognitive decision making. In particular, Heath et al. (1995) were of the view that 
reference states were omitted from the experiments from which Thaler’s (1985) MAPs 
were formulated with the term reference states synonymous with the previously explained 
term reference points.  
 
2.7 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND ON PRICE PROMOTION 
There has been considerable research interest directed at how product prices influence 
consumer price judgements and choice decisions. Most of such studies have focused more 
on how consumers evaluate the price of a single product, while a few (Mazumdar and Jun, 
1993) have evaluated prices of multiple products in some decision scenarios. In general, 
price has been found to be one of many factors responsible for purchase decision as 
consumers choose to buy products based on other standards such as brand, colour, 
packaging, size etc. the organization of which is determined by each individual's 
perceptual processes (Gupta and Cooper, 1992; Monroe, 1973).  
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Along this line of research, some studies have shown that purchase decisions made in the 
store were often based on the prices of other products in consumers' "mental shopping 
baskets" and not just on the price of a single product (Gupta and Cooper, 1992). Other 
papers claim that since consumers tend not to evaluate the product prices individually, a 
particular store may be visited frequently from a consumers’ perception of total savings 
from that store as opposed to individual savings. Mulhern and Leone (1991) term this as 
‘viewing a retailer as a bundle of products’. 
Other research also suggests price certainty or uncertainty as a significant factor affecting 
consumers’ perception of what acceptable prices of products under consideration should 
be. Where price uncertainty tends to raise consumers reference prices by increasing the 
upper limit of the acceptable range of prices, price certainty has the opposite effect 
(Mazumdar and Jun, 1993). They asserted that price uncertain consumers were likely to 
view a price increase in an unfamiliar product as a small loss and any corresponding 
reduction in the value of the product from its price increase would be viewed as small. This 
is however not the case for price certain consumers. Their results showed that price 
uncertainty will have a higher impact on multiple price changes on a specific product than 
a single price change of the same equivalent amount would. The rationale for this being 
that price influences purchase decisions because it indicates the cost of purchase and when 
used as a criterion for assessing quality or value, price may serve either to make the 
product more or less attractive (Monroe, 1973).  
Two problems confront the retailer in the process of price promotion. The first problem is 
by how much to decrease prices i.e. the size of the discount. The second difficulty the 
retailer faces is how to communicate that there has been a decrease in prices. Olson (1973) 
(quoted in Bitta et al. 1981) suggested two signal cues utilized in advertisements. Cues are 
those stimuli within the consumer’s purchase environment and which the consumer is 
conscious of. These signal cues are: price cues and semantic cues. The use of reference 
prices versus discounted prices comes under price cues while semantic cues are the ways 
the price discounts are communicated to the consumer for example, 5% off, £15 off, now 
half price, was £35.99, now £30.99.    
The retailer may communicate the value of the price discount being offered in form of the 
relative savings to the consumer (usually through percentage frames) or the absolute 
savings (currency denominated) (Berkowitz and Walton, 1980). Studies have shown that 
decision makers make product quality judgements from product prices (Monroe, 1979). 
Therefore, if a price discount is too big, consumers may become sceptical about the quality 
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of the product; on the other hand, if the discount is too low, consumers see very little 
difference between the discounted prices and the ERP. In that instance purchase decision 
may be affected by other factors such as product design, size, colour, purpose, brand 
familiarity and brand loyalty. 
A few other studies consider consumers' perceptions of price and price discount to be 
significantly affected by brand name. Dickson and Sawyer (1984) were however of a 
different opinion. They suggested that a well-established product brand name is generally 
perceived to be a high quality by consumers and this perception will not be affected by the 
size of a price discount. They were of the opinion that such individuals will be more open 
to accepting regular price claims of a name brand as well as any discount on it as opposed 
to that for a store brand. The reason according to them being that store brands are generally 
evaluated differently and when a store brand is discounted, its perceived price as well as 
perceived quality goes down in a consumer's evaluation. 
From an alternate howbeit parallel view point, Jacoby and Olson (1977) opined that price 
has both objective external properties and subjective internal representations both of which 
are derived from price perception and which has various meanings to consumers. Based on 
this, a £35 calculator might be coded cognitively as expensive by some consumers and 
relatively inexpensive by others. Similarly, Chen et al. (1998) found from studies 
conducted that consumers' perceptions of price differed between high priced and low 
priced products. A price reduction in absolute terms for high priced products was perceived 
as more significant than when framed in relative or percentage terms. For example, a price 
discount captured as £50 off as opposed to 25% off. The reverse was also found to be true 
for the lower priced products as price reduction in percentage terms seemed more 
significant. Their results provided evidence that store advertisements and price promotions 
were deliberately designed to affect individuals' perceptions of price. For example, a local 
appliance store would advertise price reduction on a refrigerator in absolute terms and in 
percentage terms for a radio.  
 
 
2.8 RESEARCH ON PRICE PERCEPTION AND MENTAL ACCOUNTING 
Earlier in chapter one, we presented a brief summary of the three studies relevant to our 
current research (Chatterjee, Heath, Milberg and France, 2000; Heath, Chatterjee and 
France, 1995; and Mazumdar and Jun, 1993). In this section we discuss these studies in 
greater detail with a view to emphasizing the main contributions of our present research.  
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The study by Mazumdar and Jun (1993) was the first of the three papers and it utilized a 
product bundle versus single purchase type scenario. They investigated the differences in 
consumer evaluations of single price gain and loss against multiple price gains and 
multiple losses. They also investigated the impact of the relative magnitude of product 
prices on consumer evaluations of changes in prices. They found evidence supporting the 
robustness of MAP in their study. 
The second study is by Heath, Chatterjee and France (1995). They examined mixed losses, 
mixed gains, multiple gains and multiple losses in past price decision scenarios.  Their use 
of percentage frames was designed to capture the frame-dependent tendencies of MAPs. 
They found evidence supporting the robustness of MAPs in the absolute frames of mixed 
gains and mixed losses. In the percentage frames of the same outcomes however, they 
found that MAPs were reversed. Where MAPs predicted integration of mixed gains and 
segregation of mixed losses, subjects in their study preferred segregating mixed gains and 
integrating mixed losses. In the multiple gains and multiple losses scenarios they tested, 
they found that percentage frames increased the tendency to segregate multiple gains and 
integrate multiple losses as predicted by MAPs. These suggested that MAPs were 
reinforced in the percentage frames of the multiple gains outcomes. Overall, they found 
that the use of price frames where prices were stated in non-absolute terms either reversed 
MAPs or reinforced them.   
The last study is by Chatterjee, Heath, Milberg and France (2000). They investigated the 
impact of decision makers’ varying need for cognition on the principle of desired wealth in 
mixed gains and mixed losses pricing scenarios.  They found that while MAPs tend to hold 
generally, MAPs also tend to be reversed across situational and individual contexts.  For 
example, they found that in individuals who apply low cognitive efforts to decision 
making, MAPs was reversed in the percentage frames. This suggests that MAPs were 
affected by the contexts surrounding a decision frame. 
Based on these results, Heath et al. (1995) and Chatterjee et al. (2000) both suggested that 
there might be need to re-evaluate the sensitivity of the value function to the way in which 
deviations from reference points are framed. 
Consequently, further research is necessary to understand the impact of frame 
manipulation on MAPs. As our main contributions to these papers therefore, first we 
investigate the robustness of MAPs based primarily on the results of Heath et al. (1995). 
Then, we examine 2 additional contextual variables within a price-related environment.  
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The impact of external reference price discrepancy on price perception and MAPs, which 
we review in chapter 5, and in chapter 6, we analyse the discrepancy in IRPs based on 
conceptualisation and evaluate how frame manipulation affects consumer perception based 
on these conceptualisations. Thus, this thesis extends the previous studies and addresses a 
gap in past research.  
 
 
2.9 LINK BETWEEN EMPIRICAL LITERATURE AND OUR STUDY 
In this chapter we have discussed the four streams of literature relevant to this research. To 
recap, we will re-emphasize the following important points from our presentation so far.  
1) Prospect theory suggests that decision makers are risk averse in monetary outcomes 
involving gains and risk seeking in those involving losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). A characteristic of the value function known as reference dependence. 
2) In formulating the MAPs, Thaler (1985) extended his analysis of mental accounting 
to incorporate compound outcomes measured in the unit of their prices. As a 
consequence, he introduced reference price as an attribute in the value function and 
from that evaluation, proposed the transaction utility theory (TUT). This implies 
that reference dependence underlies mental accounting and TUT. 
3) Built into reference dependence is the underlying principle that changes in 
reference points leads to preference reversals. Furthermore, a shift in the reference 
state/point of a decision frame can reverse a decision maker’s preference in favour 
of gains over losses and vice versa.   
4) The use of reference points permits framing effect to affect choices. Hence, the 
framing of a problem usually involves the suggestion of a particular reference 
point. 
Our focus in this present analysis is to investigate the applicability of prospect theory’s 
reference point analysis to consumers’ purchase decisions within a retail advertising 
context by looking directly at reference dependence. We evaluate reference prices along 
the same dimensions as Thaler (1985) and apply the concept of reference dependence to 
joint outcomes. In addition, we investigate the impact of price frames on consumers’ 
perceptions of price and determine whether framing effects are elicited in terms of 
reversals of Thaler's (1985) mental accounting principles, and how these would affect 
consumers’ purchase intentions.  Otherwise stated, we evaluate to what extent consumer 
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preferences in price related scenarios are reversed when faced with mixed gains, mixed 
losses, multiple gains and multiple losses decision scenarios. 
Our analysis of framing effect is from a riskless choice perspective as opposed to the risky 
choice view which permeates the literature on framing effect. Two reasons are identified 
for our riskless choice analysis: 1) we agree with Levin et al. (1988) that the inclusion of 
risk to a decision frame increases the difficulty and complexity of evaluating the actual 
effect that frame itself (alone) has on choice, and 2) our research objective of contribution 
to the literature on framing effect. This is due mainly to the observation that in so far as 
there have been many studies on framing effect in riskless choice, we also noted that they 
have not been as extensive as those evaluating framing effect in risky choice.  
Internal and external reference prices, which we previously discussed, serve as reference 
points and are framed as: consumers' recall of retailers' past prices, and also as increases 
and decreases in competitors' product prices. Price increases indicate losses while price 
decreases indicate gains and these are captured using three price frames. These changes in 
prices are conveyed in our experiments through the use of ‘percentage-off’ price frames 
across all decision outcomes. A review of literature shows that this manner of framing 
price discounts is commonly used in research (Chen, Monroe, and Lou, 1998; Heath, 
Chatterjee, and France, 1995). We expected that percentage frames will affect MAPs by 
either reversing preferences or increasing the tendency to choose a preference. We term the 
latter preference reinforcement.  
Accordingly, the objective of this study is to investigate the frame dependence of reference 
dependence, mental accounting principles and price perception in the domains of mixed 
gains and losses, and multiple gains and losses. 
In the next chapter we present our specific research objectives and discuss our 
methodology.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter we discuss our research methodology. We begin with a more detailed look 
into our research objectives and the corresponding hypotheses connected to each 
objective. Thereafter, we present the design of our experiments, data collection and 
analysis. Overall, our goal is to employ methodology carefully structured to facilitate 
comparison with previous research and evaluate the effect of varying price frame on the 
robustness of MAPs. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The overarching objective of this research is to empirically investigate the impact of both 
price framing and reference points on mental accounting principles (hereafter MAPs) as 
defined by Thaler (1985), and evaluate consumers’ ensuing purchase decisions. These are 
investigated within hypothetical purchase scenarios involving price changes. Price increase 
on a product is defined as a loss while price discount on a product is coded as a gain. 
In order to investigate price framing effects we incorporated three price frames
6
 into our 
survey questions. These were absolute, relative and dual frames where the latter two 
frames expressed price change in terms of percentages and with the only difference 
between them being the omission of the final price after the price change in the relative 
frame.  
Three concepts are central to our analysis of the framing of price deviations from reference 
points. They are: reference states, reference prices (internal and external) and expected 
future prices
7
. It is important to note that this current chapter considers in particular, the 
methodology employed in two of our three core chapters, chapters 4 and 5.  Chapter 4 
examines internal reference prices (hereafter IRPs), and chapter 5, which is an extension of 
chapter 4, discusses external reference prices (hereafter ERPs). In our investigation of price 
expectation in chapter 6, although we utilized Thaler's (1985) concept of reference 
outcomes to model our conceptualisation of expected prices, we also adopted a slightly 
different approach from previous studies (Jacobson and Obermiller, 1990), which is that 
                                                          
6
 These three price frames are utilized only in the questionnaires for chapters 4 and 5. Consumers' 
expectations of future prices are examined based on either expectation of lower/higher prices. We examine 
these across two price frames in decision scenarios: absolute frame and relative frame. 
7
 Our evaluation of price expectations is based on the claim that researchers may possibly have 
misrepresented one of the conceptualisations of internal reference prices, (fair prices), as expected prices to 
consumers (Rajendran, 2009). 
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we consider expected future prices as immediate in time and place. This topic and the 
methodology employed are presented more extensively in our final core chapter. 
In addition, we did not conduct any test on ambiguity. However, in the pilot tests carried 
out, respondents were asked to indicate if they found the questions complex, easy to 
understand and lacking in obscurity. Responses suggested were incorporated into the 
questionnaires used in the main experiments.  
Specifically, our set research objectives are: 
1) To identify the impact of percentage price frames on MAPs. 
2) To show that reference states and reference prices significantly affect consumers’ 
perceptions of price and the value consumers place on price promotion.  
3) To examine the effect the framing of internal reference prices (hereafter, IRPs) as 
expected prices would have on consumers’ perceptions of gains versus losses. In 
addition, we identify which of our two conceptualisations of IRPs, a retailer’s past 
prices and expected prices, had the most significant impact on price perception 
relative to price frame. 
These key areas of interest are presented in table 3.1 below. 
Table 3.1 
Main areas of interest 
 
Areas of interest 
Framing 
Effects 
                                Reference Points 
 Frames   Reference States Reference Prices 
Absolute 
Relative 
Dual 
 
 
 
A Retailer’s Past Prices 
A Competitor’s Current 
Prices 
A Competitor’s Past Prices 
External 
 
A Competitor’s 
Current Prices 
 
A Competitor’s 
Past Prices 
 
Internal 
 
A Retailer’s Past 
Prices 
 
Expectations 
 
Non - expectations 
Expectations 
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3.2 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
This current study presents the results from four experiments designed to test the 
robustness of MAPs under price framing conditions. Our goal is to evaluate to what extent 
consumer preferences and purchase decisions are affected by the use of percentage frames. 
Thaler’s (1985) MAPs to segregate or integrate monetary outcomes are grounded on what 
combinations of monetary outcomes produces greater utility (for gains), or the most 
minimization of disutility (for losses). Consumers are proposed to respond to perceived 
changes/deviations from a reference point.  
Research Objective 1: The impact of percentage price frames on MAPs. 
The theoretical rationale behind hypotheses 1 and 2 are based on the following: 
a) Extant literature suggest that in some purchase decisions, the indication that there has 
been a promotion (promotion signal) and not the actual size of the discount itself could 
significantly affect consumer choice. For example, Dickson and Sawyer (1988) carried out 
a poll of shoppers in a supermarket immediately after these consumers had each placed a 
promoted product in their shopping baskets. They found that less than 15% of the 
participants knew the actual amount of the associated price cut (see also Guadagni and 
Little, 1983 and Grover and Srivivasan, 1989).  
In a different study, Mckechnie (2007) showed that while the size of a discount had a non-
significant effect on consumers' perceptions, semantic cues on the other hand had a 
significant effect on utility.  Similarly, Krishna et al. (2002) also found that where 
discounted prices are presented in percentages and consumers do not calculate the exact 
value of the discount, percentage frames lead to an increased perception of value and 
stimulates consumer choice. These studies provide evidence for the important impact 
semantic cues have on consumers' price perceptions.  
Accordingly, to the extent that consumers respond to promotional signals and not the 
actual size of a discount, and percentage frames affect consumer choice, it should also 
affect perceptions of current product prices and Thaler's (1985) predicted MAPs. We 
therefore propose that framing changes in prices in relative terms, where the actual size of 
the price change is omitted, will affect the MAPs for gains and lead to an increased 
tendency to segregate gains. For mixed gains, we expect that the relative price frame will 
enhance the perception of value by signalling a price promotion, and lead to the tendency 
to maximize utility, not by cancellation as proposed by MAPs, but by a reversal of the 
predicted MAP of integration to segregation. In addition, we expect the tendency for 
segregation to increase in multiple gains and for consumers to respond to the multiple 
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price promotion signals (i.e. number of discounts) thereby, increasing the tendency to 
segregate and reinforce the MAP for multiple gains. 
b) Previous research also indicates that the manner in which consumers both assess and 
process price promotions affects their perceptions of the discount value offered (Chen, 
Monroe, Lou, 1998; Grewal et. al. 1996). Common to this perspective is the general 
agreement that using percentages to convey a price promotion tends to enhance the size of 
a price discount especially in lower priced products (Heath et al. 1995; Chatterjee et al. 
2000) and percentage frames also make price increases comparatively small (Heath et al. 
1995). Similarly, Mckechnie et al. (2007) found that consumers derive significantly higher 
levels of utility when price promotions are expressed in percentage for large sizes of 
discount. 
Other related studies posit that discount sizes have a positive effect on perceptions of value 
(Berkowitz and Walton, 1980, Compeau and Grewal, 1998, Grewal, Monroe and Krishnan, 
1998, Bearden and Weilbaker, 1998). For example, Krishna et al. (2002) found that 
framing could affect how consumers evaluate the value/size of a price discount and in turn, 
the subsequent purchasing decision. 
Therefore, to the extent that percentage price frames affect perceptions of the size of a 
discount or changes in prices, it should also affect the perceptions of the products current 
price and Thaler's (1985) predicted MAPs for combinations of monetary outcomes. 
Accordingly, we propose that MAPs will be significantly affected when price changes are 
framed using the dual frame which communicates the percentage discount and the 
corresponding value of the discount. More specifically, since, the actual value of the price 
change will be evident from the price frame, we propose that for mixed losses, percentage 
frames will make the loss seem small relative to the gain thereby, reducing the utility 
derived from the gain, and increase the tendency to minimize the unpleasantness of higher 
prices through integration and not segregation as predicted by MAPs. Likewise, for 
multiple losses, percentage frames should make the losses seem smaller thereby negating 
the need to pool losses (making them a larger whole) and lead to a reversal of the MAP for 
multiple price increases.  
Nonetheless, although we expect these underlying factors to alter MAPs, we do not 
examine MAPs based on individual differences and situational factors and these are held 
constant throughout our study.   
Based on the above discussion, the following hypotheses are proposed:   
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𝐻1: Percentage frames will reverse MAP for mixed gains and losses. 
𝐻2: Percentage frames will reinforce MAP for multiple gains and reverse multiple losses. 
 
In summary, we propose the following changes to MAPs: 
a) Mixed gains would be segregated.  
b) Mixed losses would be integrated. 
c) Multiple gains would be segregated. 
d) Multiple losses would be segregated. 
 
These hypotheses are tested across all three of our reference points: a retailer’s past price 
(chapter 4), competitors’ past and competitors’ current prices (chapter 5), and expected 
prices (chapter 6). 
 
Research Objective 2: The impact of reference states on consumers’ perceptions of price. 
The basic assumption of reference dependence is that decision makers utilize some form of 
reference point in evaluating a choice and that deviations from said reference point often 
leads to reversals of preferences. 
In Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) analysis of reference dependence under riskless 
choice, they used reference states and reference points interchangeably. As such, we 
inferred that reference states and reference points are synonymous and we utilized both 
concepts in our study. 
We addressed the research question - where reference states are clearly stated, would 
Thaler’s (1985) mental accounting principles still hold? This research question is based on 
the study by Heath et al. (1995) 
8
 which suggests that the reference states were not clearly 
stated in the experiments from which the mental accounting principles were derived and 
that the inclusion of unambiguous reference states could affect MAPs.  
Applying the above assumption to price related scenarios, we analyse the effects of price 
framing on consumer purchase decisions where reference points and reference states are 
interchangeably described to represent deviations from the status quo. In our experiments, 
we classified reference points into two broad categories: reference states and reference 
                                                          
8
 See chapter 2 for the discussion of the study by Heath et al. (1995).  
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prices
9
. We investigate differences in individuals' perceptions of price when faced with 
previous prices of a retailer they are familiar with and the retailer's sale prices at the time 
of purchase. Consumer’s familiarity with the retailer’s product is incorporated into the 
questionnaire. More of this will be discussed in the section for research design.  
We propose that when consumers evaluate a given retailer's selling price, their perceptions 
would be influenced when they compare that price with the retailer’s past price(s) (see 
chapter 4). We also investigate the impact of reference states further in chapter 5 by 
comparing the differences between consumers’ perceptions when they utilize competitors’ 
current prices and competitors’ past prices as standards of comparison. This leads to the 
test of the following hypotheses: 
𝐻3: Comparison of a retailer’s current prices with a retailer’s past prices will affect the 
consumer’s perception of prices. 
𝐻4: Comparison of a retailer’s current prices with a competitor’s current prices will affect 
the consumer’s perception of prices. 
𝐻5: Comparison of a retailer’s current prices with a competitor’s past prices will affect the 
consumer’s perception of prices. 
 
Research Objective 3: The impact of expectations on consumers’ perceptions of price 
A different conceptualisation of internal reference prices is the focus of our final research 
objective. We consider the effect of expected prices on price perception. Previous studies 
show that a decision maker’s expectation of a price change and the actual change in price 
obtained could influence how gains and losses are coded (Puto, 1987; Thaler, 1985).  
Price discounts are generally recognised as the predominant form of price promotion, a fact 
which consumers are not only aware of, but often expect. Where such price promotions fail 
to meet up with consumers’ expectation, they could have a negative impact on their 
purchase decisions (Hardesty and Bearden, 2003). Thaler (1985) describes the effect of 
expectations on decision making as a reference outcome
10
.  
As previously indicated, chapter 6 of this thesis considers the impact of price expectation 
on consumers’ perceptions of price as predicted by MAPs. For the purpose of further 
comparison, we define all responses based on expected prices as the ‘expectations frame’. 
                                                          
9
 The literature review chapter discusses reference prices in greater detail. 
10
 This is covered in Chapter 6 of this research. 
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Similarly, responses from questionnaires used in chapter 4 are collectively defined under 
the broad frame, ‘non-expectations frame’. Results from these two frames are then 
analysed to identify which conceptualisation of IRP has a more significant impact on 
MAPs.  
Furthermore, in order to investigate the impact of percentage frames on MAPs, we design 
questionnaires with a retailer’s future prices as the reference point. Deviations from this 
reference point are incorporated into the questionnaires as the consumer’s expectation of 
changes in the retailer's prices. Consequently, we evaluate to what extent MAPs are 
affected when changes in the retailer’s prices and the consumer’s expected prices are 
presented in percentages terms.  
Lichtenstein and Bearden (1988) propose that external reference prices (ERPs) are able to 
adjust consumers’ IRPs up or down such that a retailer’s current prices could be perceived 
as acceptable or non-acceptable. Although the internal reference price (IRP) evaluated in 
their paper was not expected prices, we anticipate that similarly, the suggested retailer’s 
prices would affect consumers’ IRPs when defined as expected prices. Therefore, to the 
extent that percentage frames are able to affect MAPs, and ERPs can adjust IRPs, we 
expect MAPs to hold across the gains and losses outcomes of our experiments. With this 
background, we propose that expected prices will neutralise the impact of percentage price 
framing and overall, consumers’ perceptions of price changes will be consistent with 
Thaler’s (1985) MAPs.  
This distinction allows the test of our sixth hypothesis:   
𝐻6: Expected prices will have a neutralising effect on percentage frames such that MAPs 
will not be significantly affected.  
 
 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION 
A common approach to the study of heuristics and irrationality in consumer decision 
making is the use of hypothetical decision scenarios within questionnaires. In particular, 
previous research on mental accounting from a price-related perspective have asked 
respondents to imagine being in a hypothetical scenario where they make choices based on 
how they would respond in the event of a real life situation.  Empirical justification for the 
use of hypothetical scenarios shows that most people behave in the manner hypothesized in 
these surveys. As Kuhberger et al. (2002) suggest, 'the core process of real decision 
42 
 
making consists of imagining and evaluating hypothetical options, and this core process is 
the same for hypothetical decisions.' In essence, a prerequisite to decision making lies in 
the rational resolution of hypothetical decisions.  
In keeping with the aforementioned approach, we replicate the classic decision scenarios 
adopted by Thaler (1985) which evaluate the framing effect in multiple events. We use 
decision scenarios similar to Thaler's (1985) original approach in which 2 hypothetical 
men face financially equivalent situations. One of the men makes one purchase decision 
while the other makes two decisions. For the purpose of comparison across studies, our 
study adopted the ‘couch and chair’ purchase scenario from Chatterjee et al. (2000), and 
Heath et al. (1995).  
Post graduate students in the Adam Smith Business School at the University of Glasgow 
were offered cash-prize incentives to participate in the study. Three hundred post graduate 
students participated in the survey. We carried out three studies
11
 with four experimental 
conditions in a repeated-measures design. Respondents were then randomly assigned to 
four conditions based on outcome type (Mixed Gains, Mixed Losses, Multiple Gains and 
Multiple Losses) and reference point (Retailer’s past prices, competitor’s current and past 
prices). The survey was completely anonymous and no information was collected based on 
name, gender, age or ethnic background. Of the 300 respondents, 247 useable responses 
were collected.  
 
 
3.3.1 Design 
Independent Variables. Our hypotheses revolve around how the manipulation of price 
presentation affects consumer purchase decisions and perceptions of price. To examine 
this, we present changes in prices across each of the reference points
12
 and each outcome 
type using 3 price frames with “frame” as our independent variable as shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 This applies only to studies in chapters 4 and 5. The specific design for chapter 6 is discussed in that 
chapter. 
12
 For the independent variable ‘expectations’ we examine price presentation across just 2 frames: absolute 
and relative. By taking out the dual frame, we hoped absence of the final price after the change in price and 
the inclusion of the reference outcome would further encourage the elicitation of preference reversals.   
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Figure 3.1 
Specification of variables 
 
 
                          Reference Points and Outcome Type 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variables. Each of the reference points was varied based on outcome type and 
with “outcome type” as dependent variables. These are shown in table 3.2 below. 
 
Table 3.2 
Structure of research 
 
Reference Point Outcome Type 
Mixed Multiple 
Retailer’s Past Prices Gains 
Losses  
Gains 
Losses 
Competitor’s Current Prices Gains 
Losses 
Gains 
Losses 
Competitor’s Past prices Gains  
Losses 
Gains 
Losses 
Expectations Gains 
Losses  
Gains 
Losses 
 
In each of our studies, we employ two conditions: the control conditions and the treatment 
conditions. In the first condition, we replicated the decision scenarios from Thaler’s (1985) 
experiments which evaluated combinations of joint monetary outcomes. We chose these 
scenarios because a) they led to the origination of Thaler’s (1985) MAPs, b) according to 
Heath et al. (1995), the reference states were ambiguous, and c) prices frames were not 
manipulated.  
Consequently, we introduce reference states into our treatment conditions and evaluate the 
impact of varying price frames. Each respondent is assigned to 2 control conditions (one 
Frame 
Absolute 
Relative 
Dual 
44 
 
for gains and one for losses) and 3 forms of price presentation (frame) for each outcome 
type. The questionnaires were grouped based on the structure in table 3.3 below. 
 
 
         Table 3.3 
Classification of questionnaires 
 
Group/no of 
respondents 
Outcome Type Reference State 
A (48) Mixed Gains 
Mixed Losses 
Retailer’s past prices  
B (45) Multiple Gains 
Multiple Losses 
Retailer’s past prices  
C (33) Mixed Gains 
Mixed Losses 
Competitor’s current prices 
D (38) Multiple Gains 
Multiple Losses 
Competitor’s current prices 
E (39) Mixed Gains 
Mixed Losses 
Competitor’s past prices 
F (44) Multiple Gains 
Multiple Losses 
Competitor’s past prices 
 
Table 3.3 shows the distribution of our participants across all the outcome types 
investigated. Respondents were randomly assigned to each group such that the same 
respondent was evaluated based on one form of outcome gain or outcome loss but not all 
four outcomes.  
 
3.3.2 Questionnaire 
In order to examine the generalizability of possible effects from Heath et al. (1995) in 
comparison with the proposed MAPs, we presented subjects with decision problems which 
were equivalent formally and in arrangement to those employed by Heath et al. (1995) and 
Chatterjee et al. (2000) but slightly different in content with particular regards to the size of 
discount, prices of the retailer across outcomes and the decision problems utilized in the 
studies evaluating competitor prices.  
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The questionnaire was constructed such that each decision scenario could be as easily 
understood as possible by each respondent. This was in a bid to reduce fatigue and practice 
effects due to the within-subjects design. Instructions were also given before the 
commencement of the survey and participants were encouraged to ask questions as needed.  
From the 2 pilot studies done, each questionnaire takes approximately 15 minutes to 
complete. In addition, respondents from the pilot studies had indicated the lack of 
complexity to the questionnaires but with the suggestion to make the survey questions 
slightly more interesting. We endeavoured to accommodate this suggestion as best we 
could.  
Respondents were asked to determine which of 2 hypothetical men in hypothetical decision 
scenarios they thought would be relatively happier (Gains) or unhappier (Losses). The 
purchase of the couch alone represents a single outcome indicating the MAP of integration 
while the purchase of the chair and couch represents two outcomes indicating segregation. 
In the following section, we present some decision scenarios from our questionnaires to 
illustrate price presentation across the 3 price frames. Scenario A shows the change in 
price in absolute terms, B shows the price change using the dual frame, and C utilizes only 
the relative frame. All the decision scenarios used in our experiments are presented in 
detail in the Appendixes.   
 
 
3.3.3 Measures 
Subjects were given booklets containing 8 scenarios. The first four scenarios described the 
gains outcome while the last four presented the losses outcome. The control condition was 
the first of each set of four scenarios. Participants were asked to evaluate each scenario on 
a 15-point scale as follows: 
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is happier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of happiness).  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is unhappier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
unhappiness).  
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally happy.  
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally unhappy.  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is happier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of happiness). 
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is unhappier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
unhappiness).  
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 Scenario A (Absolute frame) 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair. On getting to the 
store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1300 couch has been reduced to £1250; Mr. B 
finds that the originally priced £300 chair has been reduced to £200 while the price of the 
couch which had originally been £1000 had been increased to £1050. 
 
Scenario B (Dual frame) 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair. On getting to the 
store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1300 couch has been reduced by 4% to 
£1250; Mr. B finds that the originally priced £300 chair has been reduced by 33% to £200 
while the price of the couch which had originally been £1000 had been increased by 5% to 
£1050. 
 
Scenario C (Relative frame) 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair. On getting to the 
store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1300 couch has been reduced by 4%; Mr. B 
finds that the originally priced £300 chair has been reduced by 33% while the price of the 
couch which had originally been £1000 had been increased by 5%. 
 
 
3.3.4 Evaluation of expectations as a reference point 
Respondents in groups A and B only received an additional booklet containing four 
scenarios, 2 for each outcome type. There were no control conditions and price changes 
were presented using 2 frames.
13
 The same instructions discussed above applied to these 
scenarios.  
 
 
 
3.4 DATA ANALYSES 
In order to investigate the impact of price framing on MAP and consumers’ purchase 
decisions, descriptive analysis and a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted using SPSS 21. Additionally, pairwise comparison was done to show exactly 
which pairs of levels differed where the test results were significant.  
                                                          
13
 See chapter 6 for a more elaborate discussion. 
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We take the  mean of the 15 point scale (1-15) for each decision scenario as the indicator 
of consumer preference for the coding of all monetary outcomes (mixed gains, mixed 
losses, multiple gains and multiple losses) in the experiments conducted. 
Although the between-subjects design is peculiar to studies on framing effects, our 
decision to use a within-subjects design to manipulate price frame is twofold. 
First, the practice of decision makers using price as an indicator of choice is arguably best 
studied conceptually by a repeated measures approach over several prices (Monroe and 
Dodds, 1988). This is because the experimental situation created is analogous to 
purchasing encounters in the real-world where several different choices are examined at 
various prices. As a result, within-subjects designs will continue to have an important role 
in consumer behaviour research. 
Finally, although the use of a repeated measures design has been criticized as being 
'potentially artifactual as subjects responding to several prices sequentially may guess the 
true intent of the researcher and respond accordingly' (Sawyer, 1975), one significant 
advantage it has over the between-subjects design is that it controls for variability due to 
individual differences, and is thereby more likely to produce larger effects than between-
subjects designs. For these reasons therefore, we adopt a within-subjects approach as a 
complementary analysis to existing literature.  
However, with these identified limitations in view, this research also adopted the linear 
mixed model (LMM) and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (paired samples) for data analysis.  
 
 
3.4.1 Assumptions 
No measures were used to check manipulations on the dependent variable or the depth of 
price changes. We also did not test the measures of brand familiarity which is an integral 
constituent of our studies. Rather, we assumed based on the general consensus in literature, 
that since three groups of people are generally affected by price promotion, the retailer 
making the changes in prices, the consumers who patronize the store and the retailer’s 
competitors, that ‘store patronage’ was synonymous with brand familiarity. As such, brand 
familiarity can be said to be experiential.  In view of this, store patronage/brand familiarity 
was incorporated into our questionnaires.   
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3.4.2 Limitations 
Although numerous empirical studies on marketing and consumer decision making 
increasingly justify the use of hypothetical decisions, the use of which is similarly 
replicated in our present study, our results may not be generalizable. Further research is 
needed to extend the empirical work on this literature.  
Further, due to the within subjects experimental design of our study, and the associated 
evaluation of consumer price perception using both the dual and relative price, it is entirely 
possible that subjects will be able to identify that the overall gains and losses across the 
percentage frames do not vary and hence, adjust their preferences based on what they think 
the researcher is investigating.       
 
 
3.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The objectives of this current research were to: a) investigate the impact of percentage 
price frames on MAPs, b) show that reference states and reference prices significantly 
affect consumers perceptions of price and the value consumers’ place on price promotion, 
and c) examine the effect the framing of internal reference prices as expected prices would 
have on consumer’s perceptions of gains and losses. 
Six hypotheses are evaluated across our 3 core chapters as follows: hypotheses 1 and 2 in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6; hypothesis 3 in chapter 4, and hypotheses 4 and 5 in chapter 5; and 
finally, hypothesis 6 is tested in chapter 6. 
Price frame manipulation using percentage frames were expected to influence MAPs 
thereby resulting in reversals of the MAPs for mixed gains, mixed losses, and multiple 
losses. We also expected percentage frames to reinforce the MAP for multiple gains.  
Data were collected primarily using questionnaires and the results were analysed using 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Linear mixed model analysis and 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test were performed to further assess the aforementioned objectives. 
In the following chapter, we discuss our first reference point, a retailer’s past prices.   
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CHAPTER 4 
THE IMPACT OF FRAMING CHANGES IN A RETAILER'S PRICES ON  
MENTAL ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES  
In this chapter, we introduce our first reference point, a retailer’s past prices.  We 
consider retailer's past prices as an internal reference standard employed by the consumer 
and against which the retailer’s selling prices are evaluated prior to purchase. We 
replicate the previous study by Heath et al. (1995) although our study is based on a 
different set of assumptions and research hypotheses. We experimentally examine the 
robustness of their results and in turn the generalizability of MAPs. For this present 
analysis, we assume that the internal reference price of the consumer is based on recall of 
the retailer’s previous prices and that decision makers are familiar with the retailer's 
prices based on past price cues from visiting the store. By presenting negative and positive 
deviations of the retailer's past prices as gains (price decrease) and losses (price increase) 
respectively based on Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) Prospect Theory, we evaluate the 
impact of price framing on consumers' perceptions of value. Our results provide 
justification for the importance of price framing in marketing. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The concept of internal reference price is a multidimensional construct which has however 
also been unanimously described as ambiguous (Gabor, 1977). This is due to the numerous 
conceptualisations of internal reference price (hereafter IRP) proposed in marketing 
literature based on definition and application (see table 4.1).  Examples of such definitions 
of reference prices are: last price paid, a weighted average of past prices, aspiration price, 
expected future price etc. It is however largely accepted that internal reference prices are 
individual-specific, not stimulated by the environment and are memory based.   
A few studies have looked into how consumers form reference prices (Biswas and Blair, 
1991; Kalwani et al. 1990; Klein and Oglethorpe, 1987; Rajendran and Tellis, 1994; Rowe 
and Puto, 1987; Puto, 1987). In some of these papers, reference price was defined in terms 
of the past prices paid by consumers, with particular emphasis on the timing of the last 
purchase and the ability of the consumer to recall the price at the time of the purchase. This 
is because as previous research has shown, the most recent experience of price a consumer 
has is much more significant than a long past in-store experience (Klein and Oglethorpe, 
1987; Mazumdar et al. 2005). Mazumdar et al. 2005 were also of the opinion that past 
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prices observed or encountered by consumers played the most significant role in the 
formation of IRP. Nevertheless, empirical evidence is yet to account for how reference 
prices are formed precisely.  
Table 4.1 
Conceptualizations of internal reference price in research 
 
Study Main 
conceptualization 
Other 
conceptualizations 
Theoretical 
framework 
Chandrashekaran, 
2001 
Normal price Fair price, 
reservation price 
None associated 
Alford and 
Engelland, 2000 
Lowest, average and 
highest price 
- Social judgement 
Janiszewski and 
Lichtenstein, 1999 
Expected price to pay, 
most and least willing 
price to pay 
- Adaptation level 
versus Range 
theory 
Slonim and 
Garbarino, 1999 
Expected price to pay, 
most price willing to 
pay 
Fair price Adaptation level 
theory 
Chandrashekaran et 
al. 1996 
Price most would pay, 
normal price 
Fair price None associated 
Bearden et al. 1992 Normal, expected 
average prices 
Fair price Transaction utility 
theory 
Biswas and Blair, 
1991 
Lowest, highest, 
average price 
- Adaptation level 
theory and 
Assimilation 
contrast theory 
Lichtenstein et al. 
1991 
Lowest and normal 
prices 
Fair price Adaptation level 
theory and 
Assimilation 
contrast theory 
Lichtenstein and 
Bearden, 1989 
Lowest and normal 
prices 
Fair price Adaptation level 
theory and 
Assimilation 
contrast theory 
Urbany et al. 1998 Lowest and normal 
prices 
- Adaptation level 
theory and 
Assimilation 
contrast theory 
Liefeld and Heslop, 
1985 
Ordinary price - None associated 
Thaler, 1985  Fair price Prospect theory 
 
Studies on internal reference price formation have been addressed from two main 
perspectives.  One stream of research has focused on modelling the formation process 
using consumer panel data (Briesch et al. 1997; Gurumurthy and Winer, 1995; Winer, 
1986), while the other takes a behavioural approach and uses experimental data from 
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laboratory studies to assess reference price in relation to price promotion (Alba et al. 1999; 
Kalwani and Yim, 1992; Kalwani et al. 1990; Mazumdar et al. 2005; Mayhew and Winer, 
1992; Urbany, Bearden, and Weilbaker, 1988).   
It is important to position our research against two relevant studies within the behavioural 
stream of research: Chatterjee et al. (2000) and Heath et al. (1995). The first study 
investigated the impact of IRP on purchase decision given decision makers’ varying levels 
of need for cognition. Heath et al. (1995) showed through their study that internal reference 
prices tend to be modified by the manner in which the decision maker incorporates a price 
discount and that price framing affects consumers’ purchase decisions. 
We are interested in experimentally evaluating the discrepancy between the actual product 
price and the price the consumer had previously observed in the store and thus expects to 
pay (implicitly). More specifically, we define internal reference price as past prices of a 
retailer derived from a consumer’s most recent visit to the store. We incorporate a context 
dependent perspective to our studies in the form of percentage price frames which capture 
the changes in the retailer’s prices. This allows us to evaluate IRP from the theoretical 
framework of prospect theory and mental accounting principles (MAPs).  
In this present chapter, we analyse the robustness of MAPs by evaluating the previous 
findings of Chatterjee et al. (2000) and Heath et al. (1995). We take another look at the 
impact of price frame manipulation on MAPs in order to assess the generalizability of the 
results from the aforementioned studies. In the next two chapters, we provide extensions to 
research on reference prices, reference dependence and price framing by considering two 
contexts not addressed by extant literature: the impact of external reference prices (ERPs), 
specified in terms of competitor's prices, on consumers’ purchase decisions in chapter five, 
and in chapter six we investigate the differences between consumers’ purchase decisions 
when their internal price standards are defined as expected future prices and when 
described as past prices. In other words, we compare two IRPs and the discrepancies in 
their effects on consumers’ purchase decisions based on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
prospect theory, and also examine the implications for MAPs.  
 
 
4.2 RESEARCH ON RETAIL PRICE PROMOTION AND CONSUMER  
BEHAVIOUR 
The use of sales promotion is an undeniable tool utilized in marketing and employed by 
most retailers. Sales promotion has been defined as those temporary methods utilized by 
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firms, retailers and companies to increase their profitability by making their goods and 
services more appealing to consumers through the provision of some form of incentive, or 
by encouraging the expectation of some additional benefit to the consumers as a result of 
their purchase decisions (Boddewyn and Leardi, 1989).   
The most universally accepted classification of sales promotion is based on three 
categories (see figure 4.1): retail promotion, trade promotion and consumer promotion. 
Retail and trade promotions are those between businesses who trade with one another. 
Both types of promotions are very similar because they could be targeted at retailers and 
manufacturers who do business together; while those aimed at encouraging the consumer 
to purchase particular products are consumer sales promotions. 
 
Figure 4.1 
Natural typology of sales promotion 
 
Source: Pierre Chandon (1995) 
Some of the ways sales promotions have been done vary from price-tailored promotions 
such as price discounts, coupons, vouchers and rebates to non-price promotions like 
premiums, sweepstakes, free offers, prizes etc. For the purpose of this research our focus 
will be on consumer sales promotions with particular emphasis on price discounts from 
which consumers derive monetary savings (transaction utility).   
Two dominant promotion strategies are employed by companies: a pull strategy and a push 
strategy (see figure 4.2). Pull strategies are employed when companies promote their goods 
or services in order to ‘pull’ customers to make purchases. A push strategy, on the other 
hand, is where businesses promote their products to other businesses thereby using them as 
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the means to create awareness for their products or ‘push’ their products to the final 
consumer. A push strategy could be between manufacturers and retailers using price 
discounts with the expectation that the retailer will push the manufacturer’s products to the 
final consumer. A product is being promoted using price discounts when it is offered for 
sale at a temporary price which is lower than its ‘normal’ price. Often, these price cuts are 
communicated to the consumers either through price signalling cues in-store, or through 
newspaper advertising or retailer-specific newsletters.   
Studies on brand choice (Blattberg, Eppen, and Liebermann, 1981; Gupta, 1988; Neslin, 
Henderson and Quelch, 1985; Shoemaker, 1979; Ward and Davis, 1978; and Wilson, 
Newman, and Hastak, 1979) provides evidence to show that price discounts are usually 
linked with increases in product purchases, and often times, switching of brands. In 
particular, consumers who are ‘deal-prone’ have been found to exhibit very little loyalty to 
brands in their quest to achieve the highest levels of utility (Montgomery, 1971; Schneider 
and Currim, 1990; and Webster, 1965).  
 
Figure 4.2 
Outline of a push versus pull strategy 
 
 
 
 
Source: Tanner and Raymond (2011). Marketing Principles  
54 
 
At the same time, price discounts do not always lead to increase in sales. Retailers have to 
decide just how much to reduce prices because consumers frequently associate price 
promotion with the quality of a product. Where the price discount is too high and perceived 
as questionable, consumers infer that the promoted product is of low quality which 
discourages purchase especially with brand-conscious consumers. Etgar and Malhotra 
(1981), Monroe and Petroshius (1981), Olson (1977), Rao and Monroe (1988), all found 
that the tendency for relatively low prices to be perceived as indicative of low product 
quality was even more pronounced with price uncertain consumers who had to rely only on 
the price information available to make a purchase decision. The reverse is however 
obtainable where high quality is inferred from high retailers’ prices. For consumers who 
derive affective reactions from prices, higher prices would be indicative of high product 
quality particularly where price is the means of making comparison. Where alternative 
information is available in making a purchase decision however, empirical evidence 
suggests that the price-quality inference is less pronounced (Rao and Monroe, 1988).   
Most of the experiments conducted on price promotion have employed price discounts 
between 10% and 40% with 20% being the ballpark of most discounts (see figure 4.3).  
 
 
Figure 4.3 
Distribution of price discounts in sales promotions 
 
 
Source: Simon-Kucher & Partners (2011) 
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Uhl and Brown (1971), and Della Bitta and Monroe (1980) suggest that, within this range, 
it is not unusual to expect a concave relationship between the expected retailers prices and 
levels of price discounts.  
Retailers could also target price promotions at non-users of some of their products. 
Accordingly, consumers who are not familiar with a specific brand and are not brand-
conscious could be encouraged to make a purchase. Bultez (1975) found that price 
decreases generally motivate consumers to buy products they will not necessarily have 
purchased for the purpose of ‘building up their home inventories’. However, such 
consumers’ may be unlikely to continue buying that product at the end of the price 
promotion as this would imply higher prices. As empirical evidence shows, consumers 
react differently to increases and decreases in prices of products. Uhl and Brown (1971) 
found that where price changes (increases and decreases) varied from 5% to 15%, 
consumers were significantly more sensitive to increases in prices.  
Conversely, Bultez (1975) suggested that because consumers were more sensitive to 
decreases in prices, they tend to frequently purchase certain brands which they then 
become familiar with and they tend to be loyal to. As a result, increases in prices will not 
have a huge impact on their purchase decisions.  
Figure 4.4 shows a conceptual model of how consumers’ perceptions of monetary savings 
are formed based on reference prices and the potential sales prices.  
 
Figure 4.4 
Conceptual framework of the formation of perceived savings through discounts 
 
Source: Pedrajaiglesias & Yagüe Guillén (2000) 
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From figure 4.4, Pedrajaiglesias and Yagüe Guillén (2000) describe the process of 
consumers’ perception of a price discount as beginning at the point of encountering a 
retailer’s discounted selling price which could be through the use of price signalling cues 
or promotional advertisements. A few other factors are considered to affect consumers’ 
perceptions of a price promotion and partly determine if the resultant discounted price 
would be judged as high or low pre-comparison with reference prices. These are: semantic 
cues that indicate the price discount for example 5% off, £15 off, now half price, buy 3 for 
2 (Lichtenstein, Burton and Jarson, 1991); the individual characteristics of the consumers 
(Sorce and Widrick, 1991); and time available to search for other prices of products within 
the same category (Park, Iyer and Smith, 1989).  
 
 
4.2.1 Short and long term effects of sales promotions 
The debate on the short term and long term effects of temporary price cuts is an ongoing 
one in marketing literature. On one side, the research shows that price promotions 
considerably increase retailers' sales leading to increase in profit margins, and encourages 
the switching of brands between top brand and low brand products (Blattberg et al. 1995; 
Bronnenberg and Wathieu, 1996). On the other side, the research shows the possible 
differences in the impact duration of price discounts. In this regard, Dekimpe et al. (1999) 
found that the long-run benefit derived from sales promotion had more to do with cost-
related factors.  
Studies on brand switching view brand loyalty as the main determinant of long-run 
profitability since for established brands, the increase in sales as a result of sales promotion 
would only be temporary since consumers are encouraged to make immediate purchase 
decisions and so in the long-run, there are seldom permanent effects of promotions on sales 
(Ailawadi and Neslin, 1998).  
Additional research along this line indicates that where a consumer’s prior purchase of a 
product was due to a promotion, the chances of continued purchase of that brand by the 
consumer was very low (Guadagni and Little, 1983; Shoemaker and Shoaf, 1977). The 
most obvious explanation for this finding though, arguable, is that the consumer’s 
evaluation of the brand post promotion is lower than when the promotion was ongoing.  
Research into post promotion low brand evaluation suggests that a consumer who makes a 
purchase during a sales promotion would attribute that purchase to the on-going deal as 
opposed to brand loyalty (Dodson, Tybout, and Stemthal, 1978; Doob et al. 1969; Scott, 
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1976).  Where the purchase is made at full price however, the attitude would be different. 
Where companies carry out sales promotion for the predominant purpose of targeting new 
customers, the above explanation would be a cause for concern to them as the new 
customers would only take advantage of buying at reduced prices before returning to their 
preferred brands.  
In a different study by Luxton (2002), sales promotions are effective in the long term 
because they afford retailers the opportunity to counter the strategies employed by their 
competitors. Where sales promotions are targeted at existing consumers, it could have 
detrimental impact on the brand in the long run since the existing customers make 
purchases at both reduced and normal (higher) prices and they may become more price-
sensitive. It is left to the retailers then to justify their higher prices and brand image 
through advertising and manipulations of the retail environment within the store. For 
example, display tactics of not placing premium brands in close proximity with those 
associated with lower quality (Wakefield and Inman, 1993).  
Furthermore, when sales promotions are too frequent, consumers learn to anticipate future 
price cuts. As a result, they might choose to delay making purchases when retailers’ prices 
are back to ‘normal’ and wait instead until prices are promoted again as expected. Given 
the foregoing, we see the effect of consumers’ past experiences on their future purchase 
decisions and which affect the retailers’ profitability in the long-run. Notwithstanding, 
promotions have a substantial effect on purchase decision and sales. 
 
 
4.3 RETAIL PROMOTION AND PRICING STRATEGIES  
Three retail pricing strategies are prominent in the retail sector. Frequent discounting - 
small, regular price discount offers targeted at consumers; depth discounting - involves 
large discounts offered occasionally; and everyday low pricing (EDLP) - where retailers 
consistently offer products at low prices and consumers do not have to wait for sales 
promotions.  
Drawing specific attention to frequent discounting, a recent sector-based survey on the best 
retail pricing strategies indicates discounts were the most popular under this category with 
price bundling and below competition strategies coming in close behind followed by 
manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) and odd pricing strategies (see figure 4.5).  
Price discounting is a core focus of the literature on reference prices. 
58 
 
Figure 4.5 
Pricing strategies in the retail sector 
 
 
Source: Schrantz, 2015 
 
4.4 INTERNAL REFERENCE PRICE AS A REFERENCE POINT 
Based on the preceding discussion on price discounting, we draw from past research on 
price framing and the impact of frame on mental accounting principles. Previous studies in 
this area of research argue that the experiments from which Thaler’s (1985) MAPs were 
derived lacked explicitly stated reference points and that the inclusion of some form of 
reference could possibly alter some of these proposed principles.  
As it relates to our present paper, these arguments suggest that the ways in which decision 
makers prefer to code their perceived monetary savings from price discounts could be 
dependent not just on mental accounting principles, but also from the context surrounding 
the decision frame. We specify context in terms of the price frames which show changes in 
prices as deviations from the consumer’s reference point.  
The reference point considered in this chapter is internal reference price which we define 
as a retailer’s past prices observed in the store from the consumer’s most recent visit. This 
conceptualisation is based on Mazumdar et al. (2005) finding that the strongest 
determinants of a consumer‘s IRP are the prior prices observed or prices encountered on 
recent purchase occasions. We posit that both the discount sizes and/or the promotion signal 
subject to the reference point, would significantly affect MAPs since most decision makers 
will respond either to the number of times prices changed, or will only consider the size of 
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the discount. Consequently, we expect that percentage frames would enhance the 
perceptions of monetary savings and increase the tendency to segregate gains as well as 
minimize the disutility perceived from an increase in prices based on the premise that a 
price increase appears comparatively small when expressed in percentage. We therefore 
also propose that decision makers would also prefer to segregate multiple losses contrary 
to the prevailing MAP. This reasoning forms the three primary hypotheses investigated in 
this chapter. 
𝐻1: Percentage frames will reverse MAP for mixed gains and losses. 
𝐻2: Percentage frames will reinforce MAP for multiple gains and reverse multiple losses. 
𝐻3: Comparison of a retailer’s current prices with a retailer’s past prices will affect the 
consumer’s perception of prices. 
 
 
4.4.1 Experiment 1  
To promote comparability with previous related research, we replicate the decision 
scenarios adopted by Chatterjee et al. (2000) and Heath et al. (1995) which evaluates 
framing effect in multiple events and is based on Thaler’s (1985) original approach. Where 
Thaler’s (1985) experiments are however lacking explicit reference points, the experiments 
by Chatterjee et al. (2000) and Heath et al. (1995) adopted the ‘couch and chair’ purchase 
scenarios which  shows two hypothetical men faced with decision frames involving 
financially equivalent situations and have to make a choice between purchasing only a 
chair or the two items together.  
As it relates to the prevailing MAPs, the purchase of the couch alone represents a single 
outcome indicating the MAP of integration while the purchase of the chair and couch 
represents two outcomes indicating segregation.  
Subjects were asked to indicate on a scale of 1-15 which of two men in hypothetical 
decision scenarios would be relatively happier (Gains) or unhappier (Losses). The mean of 
the scales (1-15) ‘8’ was taken as the indicator of indifference for combinations of 
outcomes. Means below 8 suggest the MAPs of integration and means above 8 indicate 
segregation. Furthermore, in the gains outcomes, higher numbers indicated by the subjects 
on the scale, show the levels of relative happiness of either Mr. A who bought an item or 
Mr. B who bought two items; and in the losses domains, higher numbers show the levels of 
relative unhappiness of either Mr. A who bought one item or Mr. B who bought two items. 
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In carrying out this experiment, we ignored the effects of psychological processes such as 
price certainty and uncertainty, affective reactions to price change; situational factors such 
as the specific brand in which changes in prices occur, or information in the market place; 
and individual differences such as product preferences, or level of cognition. We however 
incorporate some level of memory for previously observed past prices into the 
questionnaires to indicate a degree of familiarity with the brand or patronage of that 
particular store.   
 
4.4.2 Design of experiment 1  
We carry out four experimental conditions in a repeated-measures design based on 
outcome type and with the retailer's past prices as the reference point. Although the 
between-subjects design permeates studies on framing effect, we use a within-subjects 
design to manipulate price frame. Our reasons for employing this design are: a) to take 
advantage of the elimination of the subject to subject variation associated with between-
subjects experiments, b) to adequately detect an effect of our independent variable, and c) 
to highlight the generalizability of our results to real life situations.  
We also utilize the differences between the means as a medium of analysis across each 
frame and evaluate how these relate to each other. A major concern however was the 
possibility that respondents would remember their previous choices and not deviate from 
them, thereby making their responses consistent across most frames. This would result in 
the reduction of any framing effect observed. 
Respondents were post graduate Economics students in the Adam Smith Business School 
of the University of Glasgow, United Kingdom. There were 247 respondents in total, and 
93 of them were randomly assigned to the four experimental conditions. Forty-eight 
subjects were randomly assigned to two levels of the dependent variable (mixed gains and 
mixed losses outcome types) and thirty-five were assigned to the other two levels (multiple 
gains and multiple losses). 
Each respondent is assigned to three treatment levels which represent decision scenarios 
with explicitly stated reference points and one control level based on Thaler’s (1985) 
original experiments which have been described as lacking reference points. The 
experiments were designed such that the same respondent assigned to the control and 
treatment levels in the mixed gains domains, was also assigned to that in the mixed losses 
domain but not to the other two outcome types. This in effect implies that one group of 
respondents had questionnaires evaluating mixed outcomes and another group, multiple 
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outcomes.  The 3 levels of the independent variable are absolute, relative and dual. The 
absolute frame presents the price change in absolute monetary terms. The relative frame 
describes the price change in percentage terms and omits the final price (after applying the 
change in price), while the dual frame indicates both the percentage discount and the final 
discounted price. Overall values of changes in prices across all outcomes and treatment 
levels are presented in table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 
Value of price change across frame and outcome type 
 
 
OUTCOME 
 
FRAME 
VALUE 
Absolute Percentage 
Mixed Gains: 
 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
£50 
£50 
£50 
  ─ 
─ 
─ 
3.84% 
3.84% 
Mixed Losses: 
 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
£150
14
 
£50 
£50 
  ─ 
─ 
─ 
4% 
4% 
Multiple Gains: 
 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
£100 
£100 
£100 
  ─ 
─ 
─ 
7.69% 
7.69% 
Multiple Losses: 
 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
£100 
£100 
£100 
  ─ 
─ 
─ 
8% 
8% 
 
 
 
4.4.3. Assumptions 
We made implicit assumptions that the buyer is familiar with the retailer’s prices based on 
past purchase experiences at the store. We also assumed that the purchase intent of the 
consumer was to buy products from that retailer subject to finding prices consistent with 
the consumer’s IRP.  
 
 
                                                          
14
 Control groups are the classic decision scenarios from Thaler's (1985) experiments and we replicated the 
same values used in his experiments. The overall gains and losses across frames in each outcome type are 
however the same. 
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4.5 RESULTS FROM PILOTS 
Thaler’s (1985) MAPs are based on which of the two preferences (integration or 
segregation) will produce greater utility. This is easily interpreted in the decision scenarios 
involving gains as opposed to those for losses.  
We carried out two pilot tests prior to the actual study (tables 4.3 and 4.4). From table 4.3 
in the mixed gains domains, the relative frames (percentage frames) in both tests showed 
preference reversal from the proposed integration to segregation which is evidence of 
framing effect. 
In the control condition for mixed losses, the results are consistent with the MAP to 
segregate. The indicated preference of integration suggests that subjects considered Mr A. 
and not Mr. B to be unhappier given the specific decision frame. As such, the preference to 
integrate does not minimize the disutility experienced from mixed losses so segregation is 
preferred. However, the MAP for mixed losses does not hold in the treatment frames. The 
preference to segregate in both dual and relative frames shows that subjects considered Mr. 
B to be unhappier. This implies that integration is preferred for minimizing disutility and 
shows evidence of the framing effect. 
 
Table 4.3 
Results from pilot tests (Mixed outcomes) 
 
 
 Frame Results from tests MAPs hold?  
 1        2 1 2 
Mixed gains 
(Integration) 
Control 
 
Segregation Indifference No No 
 Absolute 
 
Integration Segregation Yes No 
 Dual 
 
Integration Segregation Yes No 
 Relative 
 
Segregation Segregation No No 
    
Mixed losses 
(Segregation) 
Control Integration Integration Yes Yes 
 Absolute 
 
Integration Segregation Yes No 
 Dual 
 
Segregation Segregation No No 
 Relative 
 
Segregation Segregation No No 
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Table 4.4 
Results from pilot tests (Multiple outcomes) 
 
 
 
4.6 DISCUSSION ON MODAL PREFERENCES 
From table 4.5
15
 we see a representation of the most frequent choices picked by our 
respondents. We will begin by reviewing results from the control conditions.  
In the mixed gains outcome, 75% of the respondents made choices consistent with Thaler's 
(1985) original experiments with the decision to integrate a small loss with a larger gain. 
For mixed losses, the modal preference (52%) indicates that integration maximizes 
disutility and hence, segregation is preferred. For multiple gains however, the choice to 
integrate, (33%) is inconsistent with the MAP for that outcome. Results for multiple losses 
are also consistent with MAPs. Subjects indicated that segregation did not minimize 
unhappiness and as such, integration is preferred.  
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Control conditions where we replicated the scenarios from Thaler’s (1985) original experiments are 
highlighted in bold texts to emphasize consistency or lack of with MAPs. 
    
 Frame Results from tests MAPs hold? 
1 2 1 2 
Multiple gains 
(Segregation) 
Control 
 
Indifference Integration No No 
 Absolute 
 
Segregation Integration Yes Yes 
 Dual 
 
Segregation Segregation Yes Yes 
 Relative 
 
Segregation Segregation Yes Yes 
     
Multiple losses 
(Integration) 
Control 
 
Segregation Segregation Yes Yes 
 Absolute 
 
Segregation Integration Yes No 
 Dual 
 
Segregation Integration Yes No 
 Relative 
 
Segregation Integration Yes No 
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Table 4.5 
Presentation of modal preferences across all outcomes 
Outcome type Frame Modal preferences 
I S MAPs hold? 
Mixed gains 
(integration) 
Control 75% 21% Yes 
Absolute 33% 40% No - reversal 
Dual 25% 63% No - reversal 
Relative 27% 63% No - reversal 
Mixed losses 
(segregation) 
Control 52% 38% Yes 
Absolute 35% 40% No - reversal 
Dual 33% 52% No - reversal 
Relative 27% 60% No - reversal 
Multiple gains 
(segregation) 
Control 33% 22% No 
Absolute 11% 60% Yes - reinforced 
Dual 9% 69% Yes - reinforced 
Relative 11% 67% Yes - reinforced 
Multiple losses 
(integration) 
Control 22% 51% Yes 
Absolute 27% 47% Yes 
Dual 16% 67% Yes 
Relative 13% 69% Yes 
 
In our treatment conditions where we evaluate the impact of varying price frames and 
familiarity with the retailers' past prices (IRP), 63% of the respondents changed their 
preferences and chose to segregate mixed gains in both of the percentage frames, compared 
to the percentage who preferred to integrate. Similarly, we find evidence of framing effect 
in the absolute frame with a higher percentage (40%) preferring to segregate than integrate.  
This finding is very similar to what we obtained in the pilot tests. This suggests that 
consumers' perceptions of monetary gains are not always consistent but could deviate 
based on how it is described. In other words, the modal preferences we obtained are 
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indicative of the frame dependence of reference dependence.  Furthermore, since the 
location of a reference point makes framing effect possible, we are of the opinion that the 
reference point investigated, IRP, affected decision makers' perceptions of price discount.   
In the mixed losses outcome, we found evidence of framing effect. Both treatment frames, 
show that subjects preferred integration rather than segregation. Similarly, the inclusion of 
IRP alone also led to a preference reversal as we hypothesized. 
Preferences for multiple gains also show evidence of frame dependence and support our 
hypothesis that MAPs for multiple gains would be reinforced by varying price frame. This 
is evident in the increase between the number of respondents who chose to segregate 
multiple gains in the absolute price frame (60%) and in the dual (69%) and relative (67%) 
frames.  
With multiple losses however, modal preferences are consistent with the mental accounting 
principle to integrate and showed no evidence of framing effect in the percentage frames. 
In addition, we also found no evidence that IRP alone in the absence of percentage frames 
influenced price perception in the multiple losses outcome (absolute frame).  
Overall, our results from the control conditions were mostly consistent with MAPs with the 
exception of multiple gains. Similarly, in the treatment conditions, only multiple losses 
indicated preferences consistent with Thaler’s (1985) MAPs. Nevertheless, framing effects 
were observed in the other three outcomes. Results from modal preferences suggest that 
consumers are very sensitive to the context relating to their decision frames.  
 
 
 
 
4.7 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Table 4.6 shows the means obtained from experiment 1. The consistencies of our means in 
each monetary outcome with Thaler’s (1985) MAPs are also indicated in table 4.6. The 
results are analysed using a frame by outcome type repeated measures ANOVA where 
frame is the independent categorical variable and outcome type is the dependent variable 
measured on a scale of 1-15. The means from all conditions are tested against the scale’s 
mid-point ‘8’ which represents indifference between integration and segregation. The 
computer software used carried out the Mauchly’s test of the sphericity and also made 
corrections where there were any violations.  
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Table 4.6 
Means from all experiments tested against mean 8 
 
Monetary Outcome 
and Price Frame 
 
n 
 
Mean 
predicted
16
: actual
17
 
 
Actual 
mean  
 
Consistency with predicted 
MAPs  
Mixed Gains 
(Mr. A is happier) 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
 
48 
48 
48 
48 
 
 
<8: 6.16 
<8: 8.02 
  8: 8.81 
  8: 8.85 
 
  
6.16 
8.02   
8.81  
8.85  
 
 
Mr. A is happier. MAP holds 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reversed 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reversed 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reversed 
     
Mixed Losses 
(Mr. A is unhappier, 
Mr. B is preferred) 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
 
 
48 
48 
48 
48 
 
 
 
>8: 7.27 
>8: 7.70 
  8: 8.70 
  8: 8.95 
 
   
 
7.27 
7.70 
8.70 
8.95 
 
 
 
Mr. A is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. A is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP reversed 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP reversed 
     
Multiple Gains 
(Mr. B is happier) 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
 
45 
45 
45 
45 
 
 
>8: 7.57 
>8: 9.48 
  8: 9.88 
  8: 9.75 
 
 
7.57 
9.48 
9.88 
9.75 
 
 
Mr. A is happier. MAP inconsistent 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reinforced 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reinforced 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reinforced 
     
Multiple Losses 
(Mr. B is unhappier, 
Mr. A is preferred) 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
 
 
45 
45 
45 
45 
 
 
 
<8: 9.24 
<8: 8.88 
  8: 9.80 
    8: 10.04 
 
 
 
9.24 
8.88 
9.80 
10.04 
 
 
 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP holds 
 
Prevailing mental accounting principles suggests that mixed gains will be integrated while 
mixed losses will be segregated. We hypothesized that percentage frames would alter 
consumers’ perceptions of price change and would increase their tendency to maximize 
value by reversing the mental accounting principles for mixed gains and mixed losses, that 
is, segregation of mixed gains and integration of mixed losses. Based on this hypothesis, 
                                                          
16
 Where MAP suggests integration, predicted mean will be less than 8 which is the scale's midpoint and 
greater than 8 in segregation in the control and absolute frames. The treatment frames however indicate our 
prediction based on our hypothesis.  
17
 These are means obtained from our experiments and which are tested against the scale's midpoint.  
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we expect that at least one or both of the dual and relative frames would increase 
sensitivity towards maximizing value in the mixed gains and mixed losses conditions.  
Mental accounting principles for multiple gains and multiple losses also predict 
segregation of multiple gains and integration of multiple losses. We hypothesized that 
percentage frames would increase the tendency to segregate two or more discounts 
(multiple gains), but reverse the tendency to integrate multiple increases in prices (losses).  
In other words, we expect percentage frames to reinforce mental accounting principles in 
multiple gains but reverse it in multiple losses. This is however different from the findings 
of Heath et al. (1995) in that they hypothesized that percentage frames would reinforce 
MAPs across both the multiple gains and multiple losses scenarios. 
At first glance, the mean results in the mixed gains domain (from table 4.6) seem to 
support hypothesis 1 (percentage frames will reverse MAP for mixed gains and losses) 
because both treatment frames have means greater than 8 (8.81 and 8.85 in dual and 
relative frames) indicating segregation and which is contrary to the proposed MAP for 
mixed gains. The absolute frame likewise shows a slight tendency towards segregation 
(8.02) which suggests that where clearly specified, reference states alter MAPs. Based on 
these means alone, we could conclude that there’s been a preference reversal of the 
predicted preference to integrate. Further investigation shows that the statistical 
significance from our analysis justifies the means obtained.  Mauchly’s test of sphericity 
from repeated measures ANOVA indicated that the assumption had been violated 
(𝑋2(5) = 22.68 with 𝑝 < 0.001). Degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-
Geisser estimates of sphericity (𝜀 = 0.78). The results show that there was a statistically 
significant effect of frame on outcome type F (2.33, 109.43) = 9.51, p < 0.001. Post hoc 
analysis with pairwise comparison was conducted with a Bonferroni correction applied. 
We find significant mean differences at the 0.05 level between the treatment frames and 
the control frame and between the absolute and control frames. We therefore reject the null 
hypothesis.  
In the mixed losses domains, the means tested against the mid-point 8 shows evidence of 
framing effect in the treatment frames. Mean preferences indicate segregation which 
further implies that integration best minimizes disutility.  Mauchly’s test of sphericity 
indicated that the assumption had been violated (𝑋2(5) = 39.25 with 𝑝 < 0.001). 
Degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity 
(𝜀 = 0.67), F (2.02, 94.99) = 4.27 p = 0.016. However, Pairwise comparison with 
68 
 
Bonferroni correction shows non-significant mean differences between the frames and we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis as we find no significant evidence that price framing 
altered the MAP for mixed losses.  
For multiple gains, the means obtained in the absolute, dual and relative frames differ 
significantly from mid-point ‘8’, which suggests an increased tendency to segregate as 
predicted by MAP. This is consistent with our hypothesis that the preference to segregate 
would be reinforced for multiple gains. Mauchly’s test of sphericity shows that the 
assumption had been violated (𝑋2(5) = 34.59 with 𝑝 < 0.001). Greenhouse-Geisser 
estimates of sphericity (𝜀 = 0.74) was applied in correcting the degrees of freedom. The 
results show that there was a statistically significant effect of frame on outcome type F 
(2.21, 97.43) =9.32, p < 0.001. Pairwise comparison with Bonferroni correction shows 
significant mean differences between the treatment frames and the control group and we 
therefore reject the null hypothesis.  
In multiple losses, means tested against the scale’s midpoint ‘8’ from our treatment frames 
show a strong tendency towards segregation. This, in turn implies that respondents 
preferred to integrate multiple losses as predicted by MAP. Mauchly’s test of sphericity 
from repeated measures ANOVA indicated that the assumption had been violated 
(𝑋2(5) = 23.14 with 𝑝 < 0.001). Degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-
Geisser estimates of sphericity (𝜀 = 0.81). The results show that there was a non-statistical 
significant effect of frame on outcome type F (2.443, 107.41) =2.38, p < 0.087. Post hoc 
analysis with pairwise comparison was not necessary as we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis.  
In summary, we found that gains were more sensitive to frame manipulation than losses. In 
addition, although we found evidence of framing effect in mixed losses, it was non-
significant.  
 
 
4.7.1 Comparison of our results with previous related studies 
Heath et al. (1995) and Chatterjee et al. (2000) criticized Thaler’s (1985) MAPs with 
respect to the lack of explicit reference points within the decision frames of the 
experiments from which MAPs were investigated. They suggested that the specific 
reference points from which the deviations of gains and losses are evaluated could affect 
how consumers perceive monetary outcomes and further opined that the value function  
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Table 4.7 
Comparison of previous studies 
 
Study Conceptualization  
of IRP 
Outcome Hypothesis  Results 
Mazumdar 
and Jun 
(1993) 
No reference prices.  Multiple 
gains 
 
Single 
gain 
 
Single 
loss 
 
Multiple 
losses 
Preferable to 
single gain. 
 
Not preferable 
to multiple 
gains. 
 
Preferable to 
multiple losses. 
 
Less preferable 
to single loss. 
 
Confirmed 
MAPS of 
segregating 
gains. 
 
 
Confirmed 
MAPs of 
integrating 
losses. 
Heath et al. 
(1995) 
Retailer's original 
prices 
Mixed 
gains 
 
Mixed 
losses  
 
Multiple 
gains 
 
Multiple 
losses 
MAPs reversed 
 
 
MAPs reversed 
 
 
MAPs 
reinforced 
 
MAPs 
reinforced 
MAPs reversed 
 
 
MAPs reversed 
 
 
MAPs 
reinforced 
 
MAPs 
reinforced 
Chatterjee 
et al. 
(2000) 
Retailer's original 
prices 
Mixed 
gains 
 
Mixed 
losses  
MAPs reversed 
 
 
MAPs 
reinforced 
MAPs reversed 
 
 
No framing 
effect 
Current 
paper 
Experiment 
1 
Recently observed past 
prices of a retailer 
Mixed 
gains 
 
Mixed 
losses  
 
Multiple 
gains 
 
Multiple 
losses 
MAPs reversed 
 
MAPs reversed 
 
 
MAPs 
reinforced 
 
MAPs reversed 
MAPs reversed 
 
Confirmed 
MAPs  
 
 
MAPs 
reinforced 
 
Confirmed 
MAPs 
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(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) could possibly need to be re-evaluated so as to capture 
how deviations from the status quo are framed. This present study replicates the existing 
research by Heath et al. (1995) which considered a retailer's original prices, and we 
investigate to what extent MAPs will hold when reference states are introduced into 
decision scenarios.  
In table 4.7 we make a comparison between our results and the results obtained in related 
studies by Mazumdar and Jun (1993), Heath et al. (1995) and Chatterjee et al. (2000) 
which had examined the framing of prices in relation to Thaler’s (1985) prevailing MAPs. 
We recap the main ideas from these studies and distinguish between the results and ours.  
The first study by Mazumdar and Jun (1993) evaluated consumers' perceptions of multiple 
price changes in component products versus single price changes in a product bundle. 
More specifically, they compared the differences in the way consumers perceived multiple 
gains and a single gain (single discount) and multiple losses and a single loss (single 
increase in price). They did not evaluate mixed gains and mixed losses.  
Further to the finding by Thaler (1985) that decision makers derive more satisfaction from 
two or more gains than from one single gain and conversely, find two or more losses more 
unrewarding than just a single loss, they considered situations in which consumers were 
uncertain about the price and how this affected their perceptions of changes in prices. They 
also examined consumers' perceptions of price discount or price increase on a product 
bundle consisting of a low priced and high priced product. Previous studies show that 
consumers tend to be insensitive to changes in the price of the lower priced product 
(Monroe, 1990; Nagle, 1987) leading to a reduced effect in the overall change in price.   
Their methodology was similar to that utilized in existing studies (Thaler 1980, 1985) in 
which subjects are faced with hypothetical decision scenarios. In the study under 
discussion, participants were asked to evaluate on a scale of 1-11 having 6 as the midpoint 
the relative happiness or unhappiness of decision makers. Ratings above six indicated a 
favourable evaluation of multiple gains (losses) while ratings below six signified 
favourable evaluations of a single change in price (decrease and increase). Their findings 
indicated that multiple gains in form of decreases in prices were more gratifying than a 
single price decrease, and a single price increase was less painful than multiple increases in 
prices. Their study did not evaluate the impact of price frame on perceptions of price and 
in this way it differs from previous related studies and this current study. However, their 
results were consistent with MAPs of segregating gains and integrating losses.  
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Heath at al. (1995) investigated the impact of price frame on multiple and single changes in 
prices. They investigated the impact of price framing on consumers’ perceptions of gains 
and losses across all outcome types. In the absolute frame, their findings supported MAPs 
and were also consistent with the empirical findings of Mazumdar and Jun (1993). In 
contrast, results from the percentage frames showed that price perception was significantly 
affected. MAPs were reversed in mixed gains and losses and were reinforced in the two 
multiple outcomes of gains and losses. Their results also showed that the concept of 
reference dependence which says that the way gains and losses are perceived or coded are 
dependent on deviations from the reference points could be dependent on frame. 
They found that percentage frames reversed consumers' preferences between gains and 
losses thereby suggesting that the framing of the deviations from the reference point itself 
matters.  The possibility of frame dependent reference dependence is yet to be established 
theoretically. They concurred with the suggestion of Mazumdar and Jun (1993) that a 
'frame-sensitive' value function would be best suited for capturing the frame-dependence of 
reference dependence. 
The last study by Chatterjee et al. (2000) analysed the impact of price frame among two 
categories of individuals: Individuals with low need for cognition and those with a high 
need for cognition. Their application of cognition referred to the mental effort individuals 
applied in the processing of changes in prices. They expected individuals in the low 
cognition category to be more susceptible to preference reversal due to their unwillingness 
to exert intensive mental efforts. 
They investigated the impact of price frame on types of decision makers across the mixed 
gains and mixed losses outcomes with price framed in absolute dollar terms versus 
percentage terms and hypothesized that percentage frames would reverse the MAPs to 
integrate mixed gains among low cognition individuals and reinforce the preference to 
segregate mixed losses in the same group of individuals. Their study was similar to that by 
Mazumdar and Jun (1993) in that they only examined two out of the four monetary 
outcomes. They did not look into multiple outcomes.   Their results were consistent with 
empirical findings that the complexity involved in calculating the total savings where price 
discounts are described in percentage-based terms affects IRP of consumers. They found 
evidence of framing effects among the low cognition decision makers but only in the 
mixed gains outcome.  
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In the mixed losses outcome however, they found no evidence of framing effects across 
both types of decision makers with high cognition decision makers having preferences 
consistent with MAPs regardless of the price frame. They found among the low cognition 
decision makers that where gains were concerned, they were not so sensitive to price 
discount frames. This was however different with losses as they tended to exercise more 
caution in evaluating increases in prices. They were in agreement with Heath et al. (1995) 
on the need to modify the value function especially in the gains outcome which is more 
sensitive to the impact of frame than losses which have been found to extenuate sensitivity 
to frame.  
Our current study is more closely related to that by Heath et al. (1995). We examined the 
same reference state considered in their study however, based on slightly different research 
hypotheses as indicated in table 4.7. We evaluated the effects of price framing on MAPs 
and reference dependence based on the following expectations: a) in mixed gains, the MAP 
to integrate would be reversed to segregate, b) in mixed losses, the tendency for 
segregation would be reversed to integration, c) in multiple gains, the MAP to segregate 
will be reinforced, and d) in multiple losses, integration will be reversed to segregation.  
In the mixed gains and multiple gains outcomes where we tested the same hypotheses as 
Heath et al. (1995), our results provided empirical support for their claim that MAPs were 
frame dependent. However, in the losses domains, we found monetary losses less sensitive 
to frame manipulation. More specifically, for multiple losses, the MAP to integrate 
remained consistent with Thaler's (1985) predicted MAP and, although founded on 
different hypothesis, our results likewise, confirmed those by Heath et al. (1995) in which 
MAP was reinforced in their multiple losses outcome. Our results differed significantly 
from theirs in the mixed losses outcome. Where we found no evidence of framing effect, 
indicated by a reversal of the MAP to segregate, Heath et al. (1995) findings were 
otherwise.      
We found that with the reference state specified as a retailer’s past prices, consumers were 
less sensitive to the framing of losses compared with that of gains since the results 
obtained from our experiment were consistent with Thaler's (1985) predicted MAPs for 
mixed losses and multiple losses.  
We draw on the results from our study to make the following recommendations for 
marketing managers. Firstly, we propose that percentage price signals should be utilized in 
communicating price discounts to consumers. This is in conformity with existing studies 
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which show the importance of percentages in signalling discounts (Chen et al. 1998; Heath 
et al. 1995).  
Secondly, since consumers are less sensitive to frame manipulations of losses, marketing 
managers could emphasize key attributes of products as a means of justifying increases in 
product prices. This would draw attention to the qualities of the product itself and mitigate 
the negative feelings which could arise from perceptions of unfair prices.  
Thirdly, our results in the mixed losses outcome provide empirical support for Thaler's 
(1985) silver lining principle in which he proposed that consumers would prefer to separate 
a large gain from a small loss to maximize utility as opposed to cancelling the loss by the 
size of the gain. Jarnebrant, Toubia and Johnson (2009) also provide empirical support for 
the silver lining effect from their study evaluating nonmonetary and monetary conditions 
and propose that the silver lining principle is likely to occur universally. Therefore, since 
decision makers are invariably faced with mixed outcomes on a frequent basis, we propose 
that the silver lining effect could provide guidance for managers on how to communicate 
pricing strategies such that consumers perceive gains from overall perceptions of losses. 
Lastly, our results provide support for frequent discounting by retailers as a pricing 
strategy alternative to depth discounting which offers large discounts infrequently.  
 
 
4.7.2 Results from Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
A Wilcoxon signed-rank was used to ascertain the impact of price frame on monetary 
outcomes. We hypothesized that frame would have an impact on MAPs as follows. 
𝐻1: Percentage frames will reverse MAP for mixed gains and losses. 
𝐻2: Percentage frames will reinforce MAP for multiple gains and reverse multiple losses. 
From table 4.8, we see in the mixed gains outcome that the mean rank for the dual frame 
suggests the tendency to be better than the relative frame in affecting MAPs with the 
relative frame having a higher result. We also see a significant difference in the mean ranks 
of the price frames (𝑋2 = 7.248 with 𝑝 = 0.027). We conducted post hoc analysis 
(multiple comparisons of price frame) using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and applied a 
Bonferroni correction (0.05 / 3 = p < 0.017). Our results indicate that there were no 
significant differences between the dual and absolute frames (Z = -1.81, p = 0.071), the 
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relative and dual frames (Z = -1.26, p = 0.208) and between the relative and absolute frame 
(Z = -1.39, p = 0.166) and we therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
Likewise in mixed losses, we find significant differences in the mean ranks of the price 
frames (𝑋2 = 10.493 with 𝑝 = 0.005). A Bonferroni correction indicates that there was a 
significant difference between the relative and absolute frames only (Z = -2.873, p = 0.004) 
and we can therefore reject the null hypothesis. 
Contrary to our expectations, our results do not indicate any significant differences in the 
mean ranks of the price frames in the multiple gains outcome (𝑋2 = 3.185 with 𝑝 =
0.203). Hence, a Bonferroni correction was not necessary and we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis.  
Lastly, the results in the multiple losses outcome show a significant difference in the mean 
ranks of the price frames (𝑋2 = 9.596 with 𝑝 = 0.008).  However, from the Bonferroni 
correction applied we found no significant differences across all frames.  We therefore 
cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
In summary, contrary to our expectations, our findings from the Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
suggest that price frame manipulations had significant impact only in the mixed losses 
domains. We found no impact of framing effect in mixed gains, multiple gains and 
multiple losses outcomes.   
 
 
Table 4.8 
Outputs from Friedman Test 
 
Mixed gains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 48 
Chi-square 7.248 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.027 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.76 
Dual 2.04 
Relative 2.20 
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Multiple comparisons of frame (Based on negative ranks) 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - Dual Relative - Absolute 
Z 
Asymp.Sig. (2-tailed) 
−1.808b 
0.071 
−1.258b 
0.208 
−1.387b 
0.166 
 
 
 
 
Mixed losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple comparisons of frame (Based on negative ranks) 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - Dual Relative - Absolute 
Z 
Asymp.Sig. (2-tailed) 
−1.830b 
0.067 
−2.873b 
0.004 
−1.109b 
0.267 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple gains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.70 
Dual 2.06 
Relative 2.24 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 48 
Chi-square 10.493 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.005 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.84 
Dual 2.02 
Relative 2.13 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 45 
Chi-square 3.185 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.203 
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Multiple comparisons of frame (Based on negative and positive ranks) 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - Dual Relative - Absolute 
Z 
Asymp.Sig. (2-tailed) 
−1.133b 
0.257 
−.473b 
0.636 
−.139c 
0.890 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple comparisons of frame (Based on negative ranks) 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - Dual Relative - Absolute 
Z 
Asymp.Sig. (2-tailed) 
−1.836b 
0.066 
−2.373b 
0.018 
−.491b 
0.623 
 
 
 
4.8 GENERAL DISCUSSION  
In this chapter, we applied concepts from the field of Behavioural Economics to 
hypothetical consumer behaviour as a means of understanding how consumers react to 
different real life purchase decisions. Specifically, we investigated the impact of price 
frame on consumers' perceptions of changes in a retailer's prices based on Thaler’s (1985) 
proposed mental accounting principles, and identified key insights about the influence of 
price as a multidimensional construct on consumer decision making. Our findings are 
summarized as follows.  
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 45 
Chi-square 9.596 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.008 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.71 
Dual 2.10 
Relative 2.19 
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a) Price framing primarily influences how consumers perceive marketing price 
signals/promotions. Our results show that consumers perceive a greater sense of 
value when price discounts are described in percentage terms. This led to changes 
in their preferences from integrating mixed gains to segregating them, and 
reinforced their decisions to segregate multiple price discounts. This implies that 
experiencing the price discounts separately, for example on two or more items to be 
purchased, was more appealing when the discounts were framed in percentages, 
than if one discount had been applied to the total sum of purchases.  
b) It does not matter how you frame it, consumers are more sensitive to losses than 
gains of the same magnitude. We found that losses seem immune to price framing 
manipulations especially when anchored against past prices.  
A key factor which explains the evidence of preference reversals in our study is based on 
the empirical findings of Mazumdar and Papatla (2000). They found evidence supporting 
the claim that consumers utilize reference prices differently and it would be incorrect to 
assume that all consumers utilize the same number and quantity of reference prices. As yet, 
it is not possible to pinpoint the exact cognitive processes of reference price based decision 
making. It is entirely possible that people are more inclined to minimize losses and 
maximize gains. It is also possible that the reference point for people may vary and not be 
dependent on the experimenter’s formulated decision frame but on a different subjective 
frame. This would imply that decision makers could possibly still adopt their own frames 
which might differ from that intended by the researcher, leading to a difference in choices. 
Nonetheless, we are of the opinion that percentage price frames refocus consumers’ 
perceptions of changes in prices such that gains are good and losses do not hurt so much. It 
is therefore plausible to propose that in relation to discounts/price promotions, the 
discounted products are perceived as providing more acquisition utility due to the 
percentage frame used in communicating the change in prices. Percentage frames increase 
the sense of value or ‘deal’ attainment.  
With regards to consumers’ perception of losses, Harinck et al. (2007) and Kermer et al. 
(2006) found that when consumers were asked to indicate what they thought their 
responses would be after experiencing a negative event, respondents tended to put more 
emphasis on the impact they thought such an event would have. This could explain the 
tendency for losses to be consistent with MAPs regardless of frame manipulation. Tversky 
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and Kahneman (1981) provide empirical support for this through their findings that “losses 
loom larger than gains”18. 
An important caveat of our study is in relation to the design of the control conditions 
versus treatment conditions. The control conditions were not truly compatible with the rest 
of the study because although they are the original experiments from which MAPs were 
derived, and these MAPs are replicated in 3 out of 4 of our control conditions
19
, they differ 
in structure and content from the rest of the questions employed in our experiment. 
Consequently, we emphasize the need for care in extrapolating our results to real life 
situations subject to further studies to validate these findings and proffer alternative 
explanations.  
In terms of managerial implications, this study shows that pricing strategies employed by 
marketers should emphasize the use of percentages in communicating price discounts. In 
addition, since empirical research suggests that consumers are more sensitive to losses than 
gains, where prices of products have been increased, managers could draw attention to key 
attributes of the products in order to highlight why consumers should go ahead with 
making the purchase rather than switching to a lower priced brand.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Conversely, Harinck et al. (2007) also found from their study that in small sums of money, the utility 
derived from gains was greater than the disutility from losses. 
19
 In the control conditions, we replicated Thaler’s (1985) mental accounting principles in the mixed gains, 
mixed losses and multiple losses outcomes. The preference to segregate multiple gains was not replicated in 
the control conditions.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE IMPACT OF PRICE FRAMING AND REFERENCE POINTS ON 
CONSUMERS' PERCEPTION OF PRICES 
In this chapter, we discuss our second and third reference points: competitor's current and 
competitor's past prices. External reference prices have been described as those prices 
which are present within the purchase environment, provided by the seller, and against 
which the consumer makes price comparisons. External reference prices have also been 
described as retailers’ prices which are set slightly lower than those of competing products 
within the retailer’s product offerings.  Given this premise, we assume that the consumer is 
familiar with the retailer’s prices and the store environment, visits the store with the 
intention of buying from the retailer and compares the retailer’s current prices with the 
prices of competing products within the purchase environment. Our results provide 
justification for the importance of price framing and reference points in marketing. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Studies on branding suggest that individuals' perceptions of the prices of brands they are 
familiar with are defined by available information which is supplied by the retailer. For 
consumers who are not familiar with a brand on the other hand, their perceptions of price 
are formed based on available information within the purchase environment (Biswas, 
1992).  
Retailers frequently carry out price promotion on some of their products. These new prices 
are carefully targeted to affect consumers’ perceptions of the retailer’s ‘new prices’ and 
their desires to get a good ‘deal’.  The good ‘deal’ could be communicated to consumers’ 
in any number of ways for example, by making comparisons between a retailer’s past 
prices and a retailer’s new discounted prices; or comparison between a manufacturer’s 
prices versus a retailer’s prices, etc. These other ways of making price comparisons where 
the comparative price is provided by the retailer is known as external reference pricing 
(Biswas and Blair, 1991; Grewal, Monroe, and Krishnan, 1998; Lichtenstein and Bearden, 
1989; Lichtenstein, Burton, and Karson 1991; Urbany, Bearden, and Weilbaker, 1988) 
because the prices are exogenously supplied by the retailer whose overall aim is to achieve 
higher sales by influencing the consumer into perceiving the retailer’s prices as 
comparatively lower (Bitta et al. 1981). 
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Three groups of people are proposed to be affected by a price promotion: the retailers who 
adjust prices, the consumers who patronise the store, and the competitors or other 
competing brands. This is because often, consumer goods are sold through retailers who 
offer other competing products.  
A number of studies have examined how decision makers evaluate differences in prices 
expressed in relative terms among competing brands or products based on the concept of 
reference prices (Biswas and Blair, 1991; Jacobson and Obermiller, 1990; Lattin and 
Bucklin, 1989; Lichtenstein and Bearden, 1989; Putler, 1982; Urbany and Dickson, 1991). 
Other papers have looked into the effects of both internal and external reference prices as 
factors concurrently influencing price perception. The general consensus along this line of 
research is that consumers derive transaction utility from the purchases because external 
reference prices raise consumers’ internal reference prices thereby leading to favourable 
perceptions of price (Compeau and Grewal, 1998; Grewal and Compeau, 2007).  
Nevertheless, a form of reference pricing which has received little to no empirical attention 
is the external reference price (ERP) which occurs when retailers set prices slightly below 
those of other competing products or brands carried by the retailer (Ferrell and Hartline, 
2012).   
This current analysis evaluates external reference standards as two price constructs which 
are assumed to be present within the consumers’ purchase environment and are derived 
from the usual in-store display cues where the retailer’s products are arranged in close 
proximity to other competing brands to emphasise that prices are comparatively low. In the 
use of external reference prices, the store environment serves as the most striking frame 
that could impact the consumers’ decision making process.  
When choosing among brands, consumers evaluate prices not absolutely, but in 
comparison to some form of standard price, the reference price. The empirical studies 
reviewed previously support this premise, and at least two theoretical frameworks explain 
the logic: prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and mental accounting (Thaler, 
1985). These frameworks suggest that consumers do not make decisions in terms of 
absolute wealth but of losses or gains relative to a reference point. In the current context, 
this would imply evaluating brands by comparing their price with a reference price. 
Prospect theory and mental accounting show the importance of framing to decision 
making.  
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Using prospect theory and mental accounting principles, we present positive deviations in 
form of price discounts as gains and negative deviations in form of increases in the 
retailer’s prices as losses. Our goal is to evaluate the impact of price framing on 
consumers' perceptions of value in relation to the afore-mentioned frameworks. 
In essence, we present competitor’s current and past prices as reference points against 
which negative (price increase) and positive (price decrease) deviations of the retailer's 
prices are evaluated. We hold the competitor’s prices constant and only the retailer’s prices 
change (increases and decreases).  
 
 
 
5.2 EXTERNAL REFERENCE PRICES AND PRICE DISCOUNTING 
The sales strategy of frequent discounting is a popular method employed by stores/retailers 
to attract buyers. Although extant literature shows that price discounts usually fall within 
the 15% - 40% range, some retailers often offer higher discounts of 60% - 70% off their 
products. An important question resulting from this, and which has been addressed by 
researchers is whether consumers find these price discounts plausible. Results from studies 
investigating the effect of seemingly exaggerated reference prices (Urbany et al. 1988), 
show that decision makers do not find these discounts credible and tend to have a sceptical 
attitude towards them. As such, their perceptions of these discounts are generally less than 
what is suggested by the retailers (Blair and Landon, 1981; Fry and McDougall, 1974; 
Liefeld and Heslop, 1985; Mobley, Bearden and Teel, 1988; Sewall and Goldstein, 1979) 
and implies that consumers discount the price discounts offered by the retailers. For 
example, Blair and Landon (1981) found that consumers tended to discount retailer-
supplied prices by 25% and that even where the prices are implicitly advertised, consumers 
seemed to review the prices downwards.  Supporters of the use of price promotions 
applaud this practice of discounting discounts by claiming that it is a means consumers 
employ in protecting themselves (Blair and Landon, 1981).   
Another motive put forward in research for this practise is related to the credibility of the 
retailer/store offering the discount. Research suggests that consumers’ beliefs and 
behaviours are influenced by the price image of the retailer and store (Hamilton and 
Chernev, 2013) in terms of perceptions of fair prices, choice of store, decision to make 
purchase from specific stores or compare prices at other stores, etc. Barnes (1975) found 
that price discounts from premium stores tended to be more credible than price discounts 
offered by lower quality stores. Similarly, a study by Biswas and Blair (1991) suggests that 
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consumers tended to discount price promotions from discount stores more than those from 
non-discount stores.  
A different paper (Gupta and Cooper, 1992) carried out tests based on the premise that 
store image and frequent price discounts were negatively correlated. Their results indicate 
that price promotions from retailers who do not offer discounts frequently are more likely 
to be perceived as plausible since consumers’ past experience with frequent discounting 
retailers would immediately suggest that the selling price of a product after a price discount 
has been applied was not its regular price. Therefore, the implication of discounting the 
discount would be that the regular price of the discounted product would be perceived as 
lower than the discounted price offered.  
 
 
5.3 THE USE OF SEMANTIC CUES 
Retailers employ semantic price cues in communicating their comparatively lower prices 
to consumers. They could be within-store price cues which implies comparison of the 
prices of specific products offered by a retailer, to other prices available in the store and 
which our current paper investigates, or between-store cues which involves comparison of 
prices between competing stores (Grewal, Roggeveen and Lindsey, 2014).   
Several studies show that when consumers are uncertain about product prices, some form 
of prejudice may arise towards the store (see for example, Biswas and Blair, 1991; Biswas 
and Sherell, 1993; Gunnarsson, 2015; Yadav and Seiders, 1998). Where this occurs, 
consumers use non-price information in evaluating the value of price promotions. 
Examples of this non-price information employed in evaluating products are quality, 
design, size, colour and purpose or intended use. Where these attributes are perceived as 
similar or seen to overlap, it is easy for uncertain consumers to substitute one product for 
another regardless of any price discounts offered. Similarly, substitutability will be low 
where products are marginally related (Walters, 1991).    
Other factors influencing price perception in uncertain consumers include the physical 
attributes of the store, individual differences of consumers, etc.  
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5.3.1 Physical attributes of the store 
Consumers assess the interior and exterior designs of stores in making price judgements 
(Kirby and Kent, 2010). Ward, Bitner and Barnes (1992) found that consumers could 
describe a store as expensive or cheap based on the appearance of the store front. This 
could be from the logo of the store, its design, colours, building materials utilized, the 
fittings, shelves or ceiling (Verhoeven et al. 2009).  
Other studies suggest that the state of being spacious or cluttered lends to the perception of 
a store as expensive or cheap. Spacious stores with simple but high product displays could 
be viewed more as a warehouse than a store (Gunnarsson, 2015). On the other hand, a 
cluttered store could lead to a low perception of the retailer’s store and price image.   
Other features evaluated which could influence the consumer’s perception of a retailer’s 
prices are the sales volume or traffic within the store, lighting and easy access to the 
products (Esbjerg and Bech-Larsen, 2009; Leudesdorff and Schielke, 2012). These store 
assessments determine the perceptions of the store’s price image and if the price discount 
will be viewed as low, too low, high or too high or considered credible. 
 
 
5.3.2 Individual differences of consumers 
Decision makers differ on a lot of levels and these differences play a huge role in how 
prices are evaluated.  
Some consumers enjoy searching for price deals and comparing prices from different 
stores or retailers. Fox and Hoch (2005) and Schindler (1989) term this as ‘cherry picking’. 
Other consumers who prefer to buy only when products are undergoing sales promotions 
will depend to a large extent on external information supplied by the retailer and tend to be 
familiar with various retailers’ prices. Although consumers differ on the afore-mentioned, 
they are however faced with similar problems some of which include being able to 
consistently recall retailers’ past prices or persist in ‘deal’ searches. These factors make 
consumers susceptible to applying heuristics decision processes or adopting mental frames 
in their decision making leading to irrational purchase decisions (Gunnarsson, 2015) one of 
which is mental accounting (see chapter 2). Grewal and Compeau (2007) explain this 
tendency as being due to consumers’ desires to minimize cognitive efforts.    
Research also suggests that individuals exhibit differences based on their need for 
cognition. The need for cognition was initially defined by Cohen, Stotland and Wolfe 
84 
 
(1955) as an individual’s desire to understand his or her experiential reality.  It has since its 
original conception been applied to differing inclinations of decision makers to become 
involved in cognitive behaviour (Cacioppo et al. 1996) or ‘effortful, analytical thinking’ 
(Chatterjee et al. 2005). In its application to prices and price promotions, a number of 
studies have shown that some consumers could be more sensitive to external reference 
prices depending on their levels of need for cognition (Inman, McAlister and Hoyer, 1990).  
From a closely related context to the current paper, Chatterjee et al. (2000) investigated the 
impact of frame and the need for cognition in the processing of changes in prices.  They 
defined cognition as ‘thoughtful effort’ and classified subjects into two broad categories: 
decision makers who apply high cognitive efforts and those who apply low cognitive 
efforts in the processing of price. They employed two price frames, absolute and 
percentage frames, and hypothesised that in the percentage frame, low cognitive 
individuals will avoid the difficult task of calculating the final price after applying the price 
discount and that for mixed gains outcomes, the mental accounting principle to integrate 
will be reversed but remain consistent for high cognition subjects. Also, in the mixed 
losses domains, the tendency to segregate mixed losses will be reinforced in low cognitive 
individuals but not in the high cognitive ones.  
The study by Inman, McAlister and Hoyer (1990) supports their view as they suggest that 
low cognitive individuals are motivated by external reference price signals even in the 
absence of any actual price decreases, while high cognitive individuals on the other hand 
will be motivated to make the purchase based only on the relative size of the discount. 
Extant literature supports both views and indicates that framing price discounts in 
percentage-off terms have the tendency to result in promotions being consistently 
undervalued (Morwitz et al. 1998). This is because, in an attempt to calculate the product 
price less the discount, the resulting revised prices could be inaccurate thus, leading to a 
lower perception of the discounted price. For negative deviations in particular, Morwitz et 
al. (1998) associate this undervaluation with the difficulty in recalling the exact amount of 
the discount in absolute terms and suggest that consumers tend to recall lower prices when 
asked. 
The implication of this is that the internal reference prices (IRPs) of decision makers tends 
to be reviewed downwards leading to an expectation of lower sale prices. Kopalle and 
Mullikin (2003) describe this as a "boomerang effect" which is based on the posited 
inverted U-shaped relationship between external reference price discrepancy and 
consumers’ IRPs (Goldberg and Hartwick, 1990; Kopalle and Lehmann, 1995). Thus, if 
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the actual price post computation or at the checkout till is higher (lower) than a consumer 
expects, it could decrease (increase) chances of purchasing the promoted product (Papatla 
and Krishnamurthi, 1996; Winer, 1986). These price comparisons are consistent with 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) description of the role reference points play in reference 
dependence. 
In addition to the prospect theory framework discussed above, the inverted U- shaped 
effect of external reference prices on consumers' perceptions of prices has also been 
analysed using two of the previously mentioned frameworks of reference prices (see 
chapter 2). Lichtenstein et al. (1991) investigated this effect based on Helson's (1964) 
adaptation level theory and Sherif and Hovland's (1961) assimilation contrast theory. They 
found that when the difference between ERP and IRP was zero, it led to a little, though 
significant, downshift in IRPs. However, with a positive and increasing difference between 
ERP and IRP, IRP increased at a decreasing rate indicating that when price discounts are 
higher than the IRPs of consumers, they tend to discount the price promotion. It was only 
when the difference between the two was negative that the sales promotion by the retailer 
was perceived as credible. Empirical studies which have investigated the claim that 
consumers discount discounts based on the three previously reviewed theoretical 
frameworks are in support of this notion.   
 
 
5.4 EXTERNAL REFERENCE PRICE AS A REFERENCE POINT 
ERP has been conceptualized in several ways in the literature on reference pricing varying 
from the retailer’s selling price as at the time of purchase (Mayhew and Winer, 1992) to 
highest, lowest and mean brand prices of other competing products within the brand 
category (Rajendran and Tellis, 1994). 
Research on external reference price supports the claim that external prices play a more 
significant role on price perception than internal reference prices. Rajendran and Tellis 
(1994) found that the retailer-supplied prices for crackers had a higher impact on consumer 
choice in one of the markets they studied compared with internal reference prices. Gupta 
(1988) in an unrelated study found that consumers would rather switch between prices 
when faced with changes in prices than change their purchase decisions regarding when to 
buy or how much to buy.  
We apply the rationale behind the arguments above and investigate the role of external 
reference prices and the influence of price framing on MAPs and reference dependence. 
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We investigate two external reference prices operationalized as prices of other competing 
products offered by a retailer and which are within the purchase environment. The original 
study by Thaler (1985) forms the basis of our examination. 
We design experiments in which decision makers compare the actual price of a product 
with a retailer supplied external reference price. Consumers’ familiarity with the prices of 
the retailer is indicated by their internal reference prices. We however expect consumers’ 
reference prices and subsequent purchase decision to be affected not by the variations in 
the retailers’ prices alone but by comparison with the competing prices accessible to them.  
Price changes in the form of price discounts and increases in prices are the deviations from 
the status quo. We utilize three price frames, absolute, dual and relative in the two 
experiments carried out.  
Furthermore, we also expect that the complexity involved in computing changes in 
retailers’ prices presented by the percentage frames, subject to the reference point would 
significantly affect MAPs. We expect that percentage frames would enhance the 
perceptions of monetary savings and increase the tendency to segregate gains and at the 
same time to minimize the perception of loss by drawing attention to the value of changes 
in prices and not the number of times prices changed. Thus, we propose that decision 
makers would also prefer to segregate losses in contradiction to the prevailing MAPs for 
losses. We test the following hypotheses: 
𝐻4: Comparison of a retailer’s current prices with a competitor’s current prices will affect 
the consumer’s perception of prices. 
𝐻5: Comparison of a retailer’s current prices with a competitor’s past prices will affect the 
consumer’s perception of prices. 
𝐻4𝑎: Percentage-based frames will reverse MAP for mixed gains and losses. 
𝐻5𝑎: Percentage-based frames will reinforce MAP for multiple gains and reverse multiple 
losses. 
 
5.5 STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY 
As far as we know, no other study has empirically investigated the impact of framing 
competitor’s prices on MAPs and reference dependence across both streams of reference 
price research. In the research stream which centres primarily on modelling reference 
prices using consumer panel data, the operationalization of external reference prices from 
those studies is markedly different from ours. To mention a few, Rajendran and Tellis 
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(1994) model ERP as consumers’ lowest prices in specific markets; Mayhew and Winer 
(1992) model retailer-supplied ‘regular’ brand price as ERP; Hardie et al. (1993) model the 
current price of a product on a previous purchase occasion as ERP {see Mazumdar and 
Sinha, (2005) for a more extensive review}.  
The research by Kalwani and Yim (1992) is similar to our study in that they evaluated two 
hypothetical brands. They carried out a computer controlled-experiment involving two 
hypothetical brands of laundry detergents with four price discount levels of 10%, 20%, 
30% and 40%. Regular prices of the hypothetical brands were the same as actual retail 
prices from store data with the higher price used as a target while the lower was the 
control. 
Our study employs retailer-supplied prices of other competing products which the 
consumer is exposed to. We assume implicitly that the consumer is familiar with the 
retailers’ prices and goes to the store with the intent of purchasing the retailer’s brand and 
not the competing brand.  
 
5.6 CONTRIBUTION OF THE CURRENT RESEARCH WITH RESPECT TO 
EXISTING LITERATURE 
The impact of reference prices have been extensively evaluated in literature. Areas of focus 
vary from the impact of ERP on consumers IRP and price perception to using economic 
theory to formulate models of consumer choice using panel data. A gap in the literature on 
reference prices which as yet remains inadequately addressed is the empirical analysis of 
reference prices under controlled conditions.  
Rajendran and Tellis (1994) in particular draw attention to this point.  Although their study 
was based on scanner data, they urged researchers to conduct experiments on reference 
prices to look into further reference price related questions like the causes of reference 
prices in order to develop the theory on reference prices. Similarly, Chang, Siddarth and 
Weinberg (1999) were of the opinion that controlled laboratory experiments and data 
elicited from surveys would go a long way in explaining the process by which consumers 
form reference prices as although there is undeniable empirical evidence to support the 
concept of reference prices, there is as yet no clear evidence that consumers form reference 
prices or a model or theory explaining how they form reference prices. Extant literature 
only supports the notion that consumers behave like they form reference prices 
(Kalyanaram and Winer, 1995).  
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Thus, the contribution of this research is twofold. First, we address a gap in the 
methodology on reference prices by carrying out experiments through surveys and second, 
we evaluate external reference prices in a context not previously considered in literature.    
 
 
5.7 EXPERIMENT 1  
We employ decision scenarios consistent with Thaler (1985), Chatterjee et al. (2000) and 
Heath et al. (1995) which investigated framing effect in multiple events. While our control 
questions are based on Thaler’s (1985) original approach in which reference states/points 
were omitted, we explicitly incorporate external reference prices as reference points into 
our treatment questions.  
We adopt the ‘couch and chair’ purchase scenarios from experiment 1 in chapter four 
which  shows two hypothetical men faced with decision frames involving financially 
equivalent situations and have to make a choice between purchasing only a chair or a chair 
and a couch together.  
As it relates to the prevailing MAPs, the purchase of the couch alone represents a single 
outcome indicating the MAP of integration while the purchase of the chair and couch 
represents two outcomes indicating segregation.  
Subjects were asked to indicate on a scale of 1-15 which of two men in hypothetical 
decision scenarios would be relatively happier (Gains) or unhappier (Losses). The mean of 
the scales (1-15) ‘8’ was taken as the indicator of indifference for combinations of 
outcomes. Means below 8 suggest the MAP of integration and means above 8 indicate 
segregation. In addition, in the gains outcomes, higher numbers indicated by the subjects 
on the scale, shows the levels of relative happiness of either Mr. A who bought an item or 
Mr. B who bought two items; and in the losses domains, higher numbers show the levels of 
relative unhappiness of either Mr. A who bought one item or Mr. B who bought two. 
In carrying out this experiment, we ignored the effects of psychological processes such as 
price certainty and uncertainty, affective reactions to price change; situational factors such 
as the specific brand in which changes in prices occur, and information in the market place; 
and individual differences such as product preferences, and level of cognition.  
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5.7.1 Measures 
Subjects were given booklets containing 8 scenarios. The first four scenarios described the 
gains outcome while the last four presented the losses outcome. The control condition was 
the first of each set of four scenarios. Participants were asked to evaluate each scenario on 
a 15-point scale as follows: 
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is happier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of happiness).  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is unhappier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
unhappiness).  
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally happy.  
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally unhappy.  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is happier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of happiness). 
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is unhappier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
unhappiness).  
Decision scenarios from our questionnaires to illustrate competitor’s current prices and 
price presentation across the 3 frames are shown below. Scenario A shows price change in 
absolute terms, B shows price change using the dual frame, and C utilizes only the relative 
frame. All decision scenarios used in our experiments are presented in detail in Appendixes 
2 and 3. 
Scenario A (Absolute frame) 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair. At the store, Mr. A 
finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been reduced to £1250; a 
competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same store is priced at £1250. Mr. B 
finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set out to buy have been reduced 
to £100 and increased to £1150 respectively. A competitor’s chair and couch of the same 
quality and within the same store goes for £100 and £1150 respectively.   
 
Scenario B (Dual frame) 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair. At the store, Mr. A 
finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been reduced by 4% to £1250; 
a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same store is priced at £1250. Mr. 
B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set out to buy have been 
reduced by 50% to £100 and increased by 5% to £1150 respectively. A competitor’s chair 
and couch of the same quality and within the same store goes for £100 and £1150 
respectively.   
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Scenario C (Relative frame) 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair. At the store, Mr. A 
finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been reduced by 4%; a 
competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same store is priced at £1250. Mr. B 
finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set out to buy have been reduced 
by 50% and increased by 5% respectively. A competitor’s chair and couch of the same 
quality and within the same store goes for £100 and £1150 respectively.   
 
 
5.7.2 Assumptions 
We did not conduct any test on ambiguity as further information was not required from 
respondents in answering the survey. A few made notes on the questionnaires but these are 
negligible and no useful information could be extrapolated from these. 
 
5.7.3 Design of experiment 1  
We carry out four experimental conditions in a repeated-measures design based on 
outcome type varied across three price frames and with a competitor's current prices as the 
reference point.  
Respondents were post graduate Economics students in the Adam Smith Business School 
of the University of Glasgow, United Kingdom. There were 247 respondents in total, and 
71 of them were randomly assigned to the four experimental conditions. Thirty-three 
subjects were randomly assigned to two levels of the dependent variable (mixed gains and 
mixed losses outcome types) and thirty-eight were assigned to the other two levels 
(multiple gains and multiple losses). 
Each respondent is assigned to two treatment levels which represent decision scenarios 
with explicitly stated reference points and percentage-based price frames; one control level 
based on Thaler’s (1985) original experiments which do not have clearly stated lacking 
reference points, and an absolute frame in which prices are stated in currency denominated 
units only and with the reference state clearly stated. The experiments were designed such 
that the same respondent assigned to the control and treatment levels in the mixed gains 
domains, was also assigned to that in the mixed losses domain but not to the other two 
outcome types. This in effect implies that one group of respondents had questionnaires 
evaluating mixed outcomes and another group, multiple outcomes.  Overall values of 
changes in prices across all outcomes and treatment levels are presented in table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 (Competitor’s current prices) 
Amount of price change across frame and outcome type 
 
 
OUTCOME 
 
FRAME 
VALUE 
Absolute Percentage 
Mixed Gains: 
 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
£50 
£50 
£50 
  ─ 
─ 
─ 
4% 
4% 
Mixed Losses: 
 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
£150
20
 
£50 
£50 
  ─ 
─ 
─ 
4% 
4% 
Multiple Gains: 
 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
£100 
£100 
£100 
  ─ 
─ 
─ 
8% 
8% 
Multiple Losses: 
 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
£100 
£100 
£100 
  ─ 
─ 
─ 
8% 
8% 
 
 
 
 
5.8 RESULTS FROM PILOTS FOR EXPERIMENT 1 
Two pilot tests were carried out prior to the actual study (tables 5.2 and 5.3). Results from 
both tests were mixed. From table 5.2 in the mixed gains domains, both the dual and 
relative frames (percentage frames) in pilot 2 showed a preference reversal from the 
proposed integration to segregation which is indicative of framing effect. In pilot 1 
however, we found no evidence of framing effect across both treatment frames.  
Overall, results for the mixed gains outcome from both pilot tests were mixed. Where pilot 
2 shows a preference reversal, pilot 1 is consistent with MAPs to integrate mixed gains.    
 
                                                          
20
 Control groups are the classic decision scenarios from Thaler's (1985) experiments and we replicated the 
same values used in his experiments. The overall gains and losses across frames in each outcome type are 
however the same. 
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Table 5.2 
Results from pilot tests (Mixed outcomes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 
Results from pilot tests (Multiple outcomes) 
 
 Frame Results from tests MAPs hold? 
 1 2 1 2 
Multiple gains 
(Segregation) 
Control 
 
Segregation Integration Yes No 
 Absolute 
 
Integration Integration No No 
 Dual 
 
Integration Segregation No Yes 
 Relative 
 
Integration Segregation No Yes 
     
Multiple losses 
(Integration) 
Control Segregation Integration Yes No 
 Absolute 
 
Segregation Integration Yes No 
 Dual 
 
Segregation Segregation Yes Yes 
 Relative 
 
Integration Segregation No Yes 
 
 Frame Results from tests MAPs hold?  
 1        2 1 2 
Mixed gains 
(Integration) 
Control 
 
Segregation Integration No Yes 
 Absolute 
 
Integration Indifference Yes No 
 Dual 
 
Integration Segregation Yes No 
 Relative 
 
Integration Segregation Yes No 
    
Mixed losses 
(Segregation) 
Control Segregation Segregation No No 
 Absolute 
 
Integration Indifference Yes No 
 Dual 
 
Segregation Indifference No No 
 Relative 
 
Integration Integration Yes Yes 
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In the dual frame of the mixed losses domains for pilot 1, subjects indicated that 
integration was best suitable for minimizing disutility which is contrary to the MAP for 
mixed losses. The relative frame was however, consistent with MAPs. For pilot 2, although 
subjects were indifferent between preferences in the dual frame, the choice in the relative 
frame was consistent with MAPs.  
From table 5.3, we once again find results consistent with our hypothesis with both the 
dual and relative frames reinforcing the preference to segregate multiple gains in the pilot 2 
test. In pilot 1 however, we find no evidence of framing effect as results from both 
treatment frames showed preferences which were inconsistent with the MAP to segregate 
multiple gains.  
In the multiple losses domains on the other hand, the results were mixed. While the dual 
frames in both pilot tests were consistent with integration of multiple losses, the relative 
frame in pilot 1 showed a preference reversal.  
The control questions were not always consistent with MAPs. Results from both pilot tests 
were not reproducible in the mixed gains domains while the absolute frame was mostly 
consistent with the proposed MAPs. This finding was however not the same in the mixed 
losses outcome as the results from our control questions showed preferences inconsistent 
with segregation across both pilot tests, while in the multiple gains and multiple losses 
outcomes, preferences were mixed in the control conditions of both tests.   
 
 
5.9 EXPERIMENT 2  
Experiment 2 is very similar to experiment 1. Respondents were given the same 
instructions as in experiment 1 about the two hypothetical men with the only difference 
being the change in reference point. Our reference point in experiment 2 is ‘a competitor’s 
past prices’ as illustrated below. 
 
 
Scenario A (Absolute frame) 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair. At the store, Mr. A 
finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been reduced to £1250. He had 
visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within 
the same store had been priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and 
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£1100 couch he set out to buy have been reduced to £100 and increased to £1150 
respectively. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s chair and couch 
of the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £200 and £1100 
respectively.   
 
Scenario B (Dual frame) 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair. At the store, Mr. A 
finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been reduced by 4% to £1250. 
He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of the same quality 
and within the same store had been priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 
chair and £1100 couch he set out to buy have been reduced by 50% to £100 and increased 
by 5% to £1150 respectively. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s 
chair and couch of the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £200 and 
£1100 respectively.   
 
Scenario C (Relative frame) 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair. At the store, Mr. A 
finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been reduced by 4%. He had 
visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within 
the same store had been priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and 
£1100 couch he set out to buy have been reduced respectively by 50% and increased by 
5%. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s chair and couch of the 
same quality and within the same store had been priced at £200 and £1100 respectively.   
 
5.9.1 Design of experiment 2  
We carry out two experimental conditions in a repeated-measures design based on outcome 
type varied across three price frames and with a competitor's past prices as the reference 
point.  
Respondents were post graduate Economics students in the Adam Smith Business School 
of the University of Glasgow, United Kingdom. There were 247 respondents in total, and 
83 of them were randomly assigned to the four experimental conditions. Thirty-nine 
subjects were randomly assigned to two levels of the dependent variable (mixed gains and 
mixed losses outcome types) and forty-four were assigned to the other two levels (multiple 
gains and multiple losses). 
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Table 5.4 (Competitor’s past prices) 
Amount of price change across frame and outcome type 
 
 
OUTCOME 
 
FRAME 
VALUE 
Absolute Percentage 
Mixed Gains: 
 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
£50 
£50 
£50 
  ─ 
─ 
─ 
4% 
4% 
Mixed Losses: 
 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
£150
21
 
£50 
£50 
  ─ 
─ 
─ 
4% 
4% 
Multiple Gains: 
 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
£100 
£100 
£100 
  ─ 
─ 
─ 
8% 
8% 
Multiple Losses: 
 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
£100 
£100 
£100 
  ─ 
─ 
─ 
8% 
8% 
 
Each respondent is assigned to the same type of treatment levels and decision scenarios 
utilized in experiment 1. The experiments were designed such that the same respondent 
assigned to the control and treatment levels in the mixed gains domains, was also assigned 
to that in the mixed losses domain but not to the other two outcome types. This in effect 
implies that one group of respondents had questionnaires evaluating mixed outcomes and 
another group, multiple outcomes.  The 3 levels of the independent variable are absolute, 
relative and dual. The absolute frame presents the price change in absolute monetary terms. 
The relative frame describes the price change in percentage terms and omits the final price 
(after applying the change in price), while the dual frame is a combination of the other 2 
frames. Changes in prices across all outcomes and treatment levels are presented in table 
5.4. 
                                                          
21
 Control groups are the classic decision scenarios from Thaler's (1985) experiments and we replicated the 
same values used in his experiments. The overall gains and losses across frames in each outcome type are 
however the same. 
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5.10 RESULTS FROM PILOTS FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
We carried out two pilot tests prior to the actual study (tables 5.5 and 5.6). Results from 
both tests were mixed. From table 5.5 in the mixed gains domains for pilot 2, only one of 
the treatment frames (relative) showed a preference reversal. As for pilot 1, while we found 
evidence of framing effects only in the dual frame alone, subjects were indifferent between 
the two MAPs in the relative frame. 
In the mixed losses outcome, the dual frame in the two pilot tests supported our hypothesis 
with a reversal of the principle to segregate mixed losses. The relative frames on the other 
hand had mixed results from both tests. Pilot 1 showed no evidence of framing effect while 
we observe a reversal of preferences from segregate to integrate in pilot 2.  
 
Table 5.5 
Results from pilot tests (Mixed outcomes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Frame Results from tests MAPs hold?  
Mixed gains 
(Integration) 
1        2 1 2 
 Control 
 
Segregation Integration No Yes 
 Absolute 
 
Segregation Integration No Yes 
 Dual 
 
Segregation Integration No Yes 
 Relative 
 
Indifference Segregation No No 
    
Mixed losses 
(Segregation) 
Control Segregation Integration No Yes 
 Absolute 
 
Indifference Integration No Yes 
 Dual 
 
Segregation Segregation No No 
 Relative 
 
Integration Segregation Yes No 
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Table 5.6 
Results from pilot tests (Multiple outcomes) 
 
 Frame Results from tests MAPs hold? 
Multiple gains 
(Segregation) 
1 2 1 2 
 Control 
 
Integration Segregation No Yes 
 Absolute 
 
Segregation Segregation Yes Yes 
 Dual 
 
Segregation Segregation Yes Yes 
 Relative 
 
Segregation Segregation Yes Yes 
     
Multiple losses 
(Integration) 
Control Segregation Integration Yes No 
 Absolute 
 
Segregation Segregation Yes Yes 
 Dual 
 
Segregation Segregation Yes Yes 
 Relative 
 
Segregation Segregation Yes Yes 
 
 
From table 5.6, we find results consistent with our hypotheses with both the dual and 
relative frames reinforcing the preference to segregate multiple gains in pilot tests 1 and 2, 
thereby showing evidence of framing effects across both treatment frames.  
Finally, for multiple losses, results in the treatment frames of both pilot tests did not 
support our hypothesis and were consistent with the MAP to integrate multiple losses. 
Preferences for the control condition were mixed in both tests and across all outcome 
types.        
 
 
5.11 MAIN RESULTS 
Whilst our results from experiments 1 and 2 are unprecedented, they were consistent with 
our research hypotheses. We begin discussion of our main results with a review of the 
modal preferences from both experiments and thereafter go over the analysis of our results 
with a review of tables showing deviations from the mean. 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 highlight the modal preferences from both experiments while tables 5.9 
and 5.10 present the means.   
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Table 5.7 
Presentation of modal preferences (competitor’s current prices) 
 
Outcome type Frame Modal preferences 
I S MAPs hold? 
Mixed gains 
(integration) 
Control 79% 9% Yes 
Absolute 39% 39% No - indifference 
Dual 39% 39% No - indifference 
Relative 21% 61% No - reversal 
Mixed losses 
(segregation) 
Control 64% 24% Yes 
Absolute 48% 18% Yes 
Dual 50% 22% Yes 
Relative 34% 31% Yes 
Multiple gains 
(segregation) 
Control 50% 32% No 
Absolute 21% 34% Yes - reinforced 
Dual 3% 66% Yes - reinforced 
Relative 5% 68% Yes - reinforced 
Multiple losses 
(integration) 
Control 18% 63% Yes 
Absolute 26% 39% Yes 
Dual 18% 53% Yes 
Relative 13% 61% Yes 
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5.12 DISCUSSION OF MODAL PREFERENCES (competitor's current prices) 
From table 5.7 we see a representation of the most frequent choices picked by our 
respondents.  
Starting with the control conditions
22
, in mixed gains, we obtained results which are 
consistent with Thaler’s MAPs (79%).  Similarly, for mixed losses, 64% of the respondents 
preferred segregation of monetary losses in order to minimize disutility since they found 
the preference to integrate (Mr. A) more unpleasant than the choice to segregate (Mr. B). 
However, MAPs do not hold for multiple gains as rather than segregate, 50% of our 
subjects preferred to integrate. Lastly under the control condition, we found that MAPs 
were also consistent in the multiple losses outcome. 
For our treatment conditions where we evaluate the impact of varying price frames and the 
comparison of a retailer's prices with a competitor's current prices (ERP), 61% of the 
respondents changed their preferences and chose to segregate mixed gains in the relative 
frame. Results obtained from the dual frame were however inconclusive. Modal 
preferences also suggest that subjects were indifferent in their preferences between the 
absolute frame and the dual frame. Furthermore, we can infer that ERP alone in the 
absence of price framing did not have an impact on price perception.  
In the mixed losses outcome, modal preferences are consistent with the MAP to segregate 
and we therefore find no evidence of frame-dependence across the treatment frames and in 
the absolute frame.  
Nevertheless, the results from the multiple outcomes of gains are consistent with our 
research hypothesis that the impact of price frame will reinforce the preference to 
segregate multiple gains. This is evident in the increase between the number of respondents 
who chose to segregate multiple gains in the absolute price frame (34%) and in the dual 
(66%) and relative (68%). Furthermore, we do not find evidence that ERP alone affected 
perceptions of prices as modal preferences were consistent with MAPs to segregate 
multiple gains (34%) compared to 21% of the participants who chose to integrate.  
With multiple losses, our results are consistent with MAPs. All three frames (absolute, dual 
and relative) showed no evidence of preference reversals.  
                                                          
22
 Control conditions replicate the scenarios from Thaler’s (1985) original experiments. The consistencies of 
our modal preferences with the original MAPs are highlighted in bold texts throughout this chapter. 
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5.13 DISCUSSION OF MODAL PREFERENCES (competitor's past prices) 
Table 5.8 shows the modal preferences from experiment 2. Starting with the control 
condition,  
82% of the respondents in the mixed gains outcome made choices consistent with Thaler's 
(1985) original experiments with the decision to integrate a small loss with a larger gain. 
Similarly, in mixed losses, the preference to segregate was also consistent with MAPs. 
Multiple gains remained consistent with previous findings as we failed to confirm the 
MAP to segregate.  Notwithstanding, our results were consistent with MAPs for multiple 
losses.  
In the treatment conditions where we evaluate the impact of varying price frames and 
comparison of a retailer's prices with a competitor's past prices (ERP), both the dual and 
relative frames showed evidence of framing effect as indicated by the higher number of 
subjects who chose to segregate as opposed to integrate based on MAPs. 49% of the 
respondents preferred to segregate mixed gains in the dual frame compared with the 31% 
who chose integration. While in the relative frame, 46% preferred segregation. Moreover, 
we do not find evidence that ERP alone affected perceptions of prices in the absolute frame 
as modal preferences were consistent with MAPs to integrate mixed gains (46%) compared 
to 33% of the participants who chose to segregate. 
In the mixed losses outcome, we found mixed results. In the dual frame, we observed no 
evidence of framing effect while in our relative treatment frame, modal preferences were 
inconsistent with MAPs. Similarly, we found evidence that ERP alone affected perceptions 
of prices as MAPs did not hold in the absolute frame.  
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TABLE 5.8 
Presentation of modal preferences (competitor’s past prices) 
 
Outcome type Frame Modal preferences 
I S MAPs hold? 
Mixed gains 
(integrate) 
Control 82% 15% Yes 
Absolute 46% 33% Yes 
Dual 30% 49% No - reversal 
Relative 33% 46% No - reversal 
Mixed losses 
(segregate) 
Control 51% 41% Yes 
Absolute 28% 44% No - reversal 
Dual 36% 31% Yes 
Relative 36% 38% No - reversal 
Multiple gains 
(segregate) 
Control 45% 30% No 
Absolute 14% 57% Yes - reinforced 
Dual 21% 55% Yes - reinforced 
Relative 18% 64% Yes - reinforced 
Multiple losses 
(integrate) 
Control 9% 64% Yes 
Absolute 18% 48% Yes 
Dual 21% 61% Yes 
Relative 20% 64% Yes 
 
Results from the multiple outcomes of gains have been consistent across both experiments 
and also consistent with our research hypothesis that the impact of price frame will 
reinforce the preference to segregate multiple gains. This is evident in the increase between 
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the number of respondents who chose to segregate multiple gains in the absolute price 
frame (57%) and in the relative frame (64%). Preferences dipped ever so slightly in the 
dual frame to 55% but we can still conclude that percentage frames elicited framing effect. 
Furthermore, we do not find evidence that ERP alone affected perceptions of prices as 
modal preferences were consistent with MAPs to segregate multiple gains (57%) compared 
to 14% of the participants who chose to integrate.  
With multiple losses, modal preferences indicate that the MAP to integrate holds across all 
three outcomes (absolute, dual and relative).  
 
5.14 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENT 1 
Table 5.9 shows the means from experiment 1. The results are analysed using a frame by 
outcome type repeated measures ANOVA where frame is the independent categorical 
variable and outcome type is the dependent variable measured on a scale of 1-15. The 
means from all conditions are tested against the scale’s mid-point ‘8’ which represents 
indifference between integration and segregation. The computer software used carried out 
the Mauchly’s test of the sphericity and also made corrections where there were any 
violations.  
Prevailing mental accounting principles suggest that mixed gains will be integrated while 
mixed losses will be segregated. We hypothesize that percentage frames would alter 
consumers’ perceptions of price change and would increase their tendency to maximize 
value by reversing the MAPs for mixed gains and mixed losses: that is, segregation of 
mixed gains and integration of mixed losses. Based on this hypothesis, we expected that at 
least one or both of the dual and relative frames would increase sensitivity towards framing 
effects in the mixed gains and mixed losses conditions.  
Similarly, mental accounting principles for multiple gains and multiple losses predict 
segregation of multiple gains and integration of multiple losses. We hypothesize that 
percentage frames would increase the tendency to segregate gains but reverse the tendency 
to integrate losses. In other words, we expect percentage frames to reinforce MAPs in 
multiple gains but reverse it in multiple losses, thereby increasing the tendency to 
segregate multiple outcomes.  
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TABLE 5.9 
Means from all outcomes in experiment 1 tested against mean 8 
 
 
Monetary Outcome  
and Price Frame 
 
n 
 
Mean 
(predicted
23
: actual
24
) 
 
Actual 
mean 
 
Consistency with predicted MAPs 
Mixed Gains 
(Mr. A is happier) 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
 
33 
33 
33 
33 
 
 
<8: 5.33 
<8: 8.12 
  8: 8.09 
  8: 9.39 
 
 
5.33 
8.12 
8.09 
9.39 
 
 
Mr. A is happier. MAP holds 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reversed 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reversed 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reversed 
     
Mixed Losses 
(Mr. A is unhappier,  
Mr. B is preferred) 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
 
 
33 
33 
33 
33 
 
 
 
>8: 6.69 
>8: 6.42 
  8: 7.00 
  8: 7.96 
 
 
 
6.69 
6.42 
7.00 
7.96 
 
 
 
Mr. A is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. A is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. A is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. A is unhappier. MAP holds 
     
Multiple Gains 
(Mr. B is happier) 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
 
38 
38 
38 
38 
 
 
>8: 7.78 
>8: 8.28 
    8: 10.36 
    8: 10.55 
 
 
7.78 
8.28 
10.36 
10.55 
 
 
Mr. A is happier. MAP inconsistent 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reinforced 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reinforced 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reinforced 
     
Multiple Losses 
(Mr. B is unhappier,  
Mr. A is preferred) 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
 
 
38 
38 
38 
38 
 
 
 
<8: 9.63 
<8: 8.28 
  8: 9.36 
  8: 9.97 
 
 
 
9.63 
8.28 
9.36 
9.97 
 
 
 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP holds 
 
In the mixed gains domains, we found a small evidence of framing effect in the absolute 
frame. The mean result in this frame showed a slight tendency towards segregation (8.12) 
and was inconsistent with mental accounting prediction to integrate. The dual frame also 
showed a slight tendency towards segregation (8.09). However, the relative frame indicates 
a clear reversal of the MAP to integrate mixed gains with a mean of 9.39 which points to 
segregation. Mauchly’s test of sphericity from repeated measures ANOVA indicated that 
                                                          
23
 Where MAP suggests integration, predicted mean will be less than 8 which is the scale's midpoint and 
greater than 8 in segregation in the control and absolute frames. The treatment frames however indicate our 
prediction based on our hypothesis.  
24
 These are means obtained from our experiments and which are tested against the scale's midpoint.  
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the assumption had not been violated and was not significant i.e. the variances of 
differences were not significantly different but approximately equal (𝑋2(5) =
5.825 with 𝑝 = 0.324). As a result, no correction was made to the degrees of freedom. 
The results show that there was a statistically significant effect of frame on outcome type F 
(3, 96) = 14.01, p < 0.001. Post hoc analysis with pairwise comparison was conducted with 
a Bonferroni correction applied. Results shows significant mean differences at the .05 
confidence level between the treatment frames and the control frame and between the 
absolute and control frames. We therefore reject the null hypothesis.  
Ostensibly, mean results in the treatment frames of the mixed losses outcome provide 
support for MAPs and contradict our hypothesis that percentage frame will reverse MAP 
from segregate to integrate. Further analysis confirms that mixed losses are not frame-
dependent.  Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption had not been 
violated and the test statistic was non-significant (𝑋2(5) = 8.889 with 𝑝 = 0.114). No 
correction was made to the degrees of freedom. The results suggest that there was no 
significant effect of frame on outcome type F (3, 96) = 2.16 p = 0.098 and we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis. 
In the multiple gains outcome, again, we found a slight tendency towards segregation in 
the absolute frame (8.28) as predicted by MAPs. Means obtained in the treatment frames 
however differ significantly from ‘8’ which indicates evidence of framing effect with 
reinforcement in the MAPs to segregate (10.36 and 10.55 in the dual and relative frames). 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity shows that the assumption had been violated (𝑋2(5) =
28.39 with 𝑝 < 0.001). Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (𝜀 = 0.74) was 
applied in correcting the degrees of freedom. The results show that there was a statistically 
significant effect of frame on outcome type F (2.21, 82.09) = 9.87, p < 0.001. Pairwise 
comparison with Bonferroni correction shows significant mean differences between the 
treatment frames and the control frame; and between the absolute and treatment frames. 
We therefore reject the null hypothesis.  
At first glance, the results from the multiple losses outcome appear very similar to those in 
mixed losses. Mean results in the absolute, dual and relative frames showed that subjects 
preferred integration to segregation. We also found no evidence to suggest that ERP alone 
affected MAPs. Nevertheless, we obtained a significant effect of frame on outcome type. 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity from repeated measures ANOVA indicated that the 
assumption had been violated (𝑋2(5) = 13.896 with 𝑝 = 0.02). Degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (𝜀 = 0.78), F (2.35, 86.90) = 
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3.48, p = 0.03. Pairwise comparison with Bonferroni correction shows significant mean 
differences between the control and absolute frames, and between the absolute and relative 
frames. We therefore reject the null hypothesis.  
Overall, our results from the mixed gains and multiple outcomes of gains and losses 
suggest that competitor’s current prices and price frame manipulations affected prevailing 
MAPs. Only in the mixed losses outcome did we reject the null hypothesis. We can 
therefore conclude based on our findings in the afore-mentioned three domains that mental 
accounting principles and reference dependence depend on how deviations from the 
reference points are presented.  
 
 
 
 
5.15 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENT 2 
Table 5.10 shows the means from experiment 2. The results are analysed using a frame by 
outcome type repeated measures ANOVA where frame is the independent categorical 
variable and outcome type is the dependent variable measured on a scale of 1-15. The 
means from all conditions are tested against the scale’s mid-point 8 which represent 
indifference between integration and segregation. The computer software used carried out 
the Mauchly’s test of the sphericity and also made corrections where there were any 
violations.  
Prevailing mental accounting principles suggest that mixed gains will be integrated while 
mixed losses will be segregated. We hypothesize that percentage frames will reverse 
MAPs in both outcomes such that consumers would prefer to segregate mixed gains and 
integrate mixed losses. Based on this hypothesis, we expect that at least one or both of the 
dual and relative frames would increase sensitivity towards framing effects in the mixed 
gains and mixed losses conditions.  
Likewise, where mental accounting principles for multiple gains and multiple losses 
predict segregation and integration respectively, we hypothesize that percentage frames 
will increase the tendency to segregate gains but reverse the tendency to integrate losses. In 
other words, we expect percentage frames to sensitize decision makers to segregate 
multiple outcomes.   
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Table 5.10 
Means from all outcomes in experiment 2 tested against mean 8 
 
 
Monetary Outcome  
and Price Frame 
 
n 
 
Mean 
(predicted
25
: actual
26
) 
 
Actual 
Mean 
 
Consistency with predicted MAPs 
Mixed Gains 
(Mr. A is happier) 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
 
39 
39 
39 
39 
 
 
<8: 5.00 
<8: 7.51 
  8: 8.43 
  8: 8.38 
 
 
5.00 
7.51 
8.43 
8.38 
 
 
Mr. A is happier. MAP holds 
Mr. A is happier. MAP holds 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reversed 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reversed 
     
Mixed Losses 
(Mr. A is unhappier,  
Mr. B is preferred) 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
 
 
39 
39 
39 
39 
 
 
 
>8: 7.71 
>8: 8.20 
  8: 7.46 
  8: 7.76 
 
 
 
7.71 
8.20 
7.46 
7.76 
 
 
 
Mr. A is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP reversed 
Mr. A is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. A is unhappier. MAP holds 
     
Multiple Gains 
(Mr. B is happier) 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
 
44 
44 
44 
44 
 
 
>8: 7.57 
>8: 9.48 
  8: 9.88 
  8: 9.75 
 
 
7.57 
9.48 
9.88 
9.75 
 
 
Mr. A is happier. MAP inconsistent 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reinforced 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reinforced 
Mr. B is happier. MAP reinforced 
     
Multiple Losses 
(Mr. B is unhappier,  
Mr. A is preferred) 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
 
 
44 
44 
44 
44 
 
 
 
  <8: 10.47 
<8: 9.43 
  8: 9.50 
  8: 9.65 
 
 
 
10.47 
9.43 
9.50 
9.65 
 
 
 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP holds 
Mr. B is unhappier. MAP holds 
 
First, we found that means obtained in the absolute frame of the mixed gains domains were 
consistent with MAPs to integrate (7.51). Results from our treatment frames were however 
consistent with our hypothesis as we found the preference to integrate reversed in both 
frames (8.43, 8.38). This also shows evidence of framing effect. Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity from repeated measures ANOVA indicated that the assumption had not been 
violated and was non-significant i.e. the variances of differences were not significantly 
                                                          
25
 Where MAP suggests integration, predicted mean will be less than 8 which is the scale's midpoint in the 
control and absolute frames. The treatment frame however indicates our prediction based on our hypothesis. 
26
 These are means obtained from our experiments and which are tested against the scale's midpoint.  
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different but approximately equal (𝑋2(5) = 9.530 with 𝑝 = 0.090). As a result, no 
correction was made to the degrees of freedom. The results show that there was a 
statistically significant effect of frame on outcome type F (3, 114) = 12.58, p < 0.001. Post 
hoc analysis with pairwise comparison was conducted with a Bonferroni correction 
applied. Results show significant mean differences at the 0.05 confidence level between 
the treatment frames and the control frame and between the absolute and control frames. 
We therefore reject the null hypothesis. Significant mean differences between the control 
and absolute frames, point to the importance of reference states in MAPs. 
For mixed losses, mean results in the treatment frames show no evidence of framing effect 
and confirm MAPs. The absolute frame however, shows evidence of a slight reversal in the 
preference to segregate.  Upon further analysis, the statistical significance does not confirm 
our hypothesis that the MAP for mixed losses will be reversed so we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. Mauchly’s test of sphericity shows that the assumption had been violated 
(𝑋2(5) = 11.19 with 𝑝 = 0.048). Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (𝜀 = .85) 
was applied in correcting the degrees of freedom.  The results suggests that there was no 
significant effect of frame on outcome type F (2.56, 97.08) = 0.514 p = 0.65. 
In the multiple gains outcome, results in the absolute frame are consistent with the 
preference to segregate multiple discounts as predicted by MAPs. Means obtained in the 
treatment frames also indicate evidence of framing effect with reinforcement of the 
preference to segregate (9.43 and 9.81 in dual and relative frames). Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity shows that the assumption had been violated (𝑋2(5) = 13.43 with 𝑝 = 0.02). 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (𝜀 = 0.81) was applied in correcting the 
degrees of freedom. The results show that there was a statistically significant effect of 
frame on outcome type F (2.43, 104.84) =4.41, p=0.01. Pairwise comparison with 
Bonferroni correction shows significant mean differences between the relative frame and 
the control frame. We therefore reject the null hypothesis.  
For multiple losses, mean results in our treatment and absolute frames show that MAPs 
hold. Further analysis provides no support for our hypothesis that frame manipulation will 
reverse multiple losses.  Mauchly’s test of sphericity from repeated measures ANOVA 
indicates that the assumption had not been violated and was non-significant (𝑋2(5) =
6.774 with 𝑝 = 0.238). As a result, no correction was made to the degrees of freedom. 
Our results show that there was no statistical significant effect of frame on outcome type F 
(3, 129) =1.85, p = 0.14 and we fail to reject the null hypothesis.  
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Overall, our results from experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the framing of a competitor’s 
current prices and not a competitor’s past price was more effective at influencing 
consumers’ perceptions of prices.  Although decision makers remained insensitive to frame 
manipulations of mixed losses in both ERPs, they however, showed evidence of framing 
effect when faced with multiple increases in the competitor’s current prices.  These results 
suggest that decision makers are particularly sensitive to the way losses are presented and 
different manipulations of deviations from the reference points could elicit preference 
reversals. 
 
Table 5.11 
Comparison of means from external reference prices 
 
 
Frame 
 
n 
Mean 
(experiment 1: experiment 2) 
 
MAPs experiments 1&2  
Mixed Gains: 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
33:39 
33:39 
33:39 
33:39 
 
5.33: 5.00 
8.12: 7.51 
8.09: 8.43 
9.39: 8.38 
 
Integration/Integration 
Segregation/Integration 
Segregation/ Segregation 
Segregation/ Segregation  
Mixed Losses: 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
33:39 
33:39 
33:39 
33:39 
 
6.69: 7.71 
6.42: 8.20 
7.00: 7.46 
7.96: 7.76 
 
Integration/ Integration  
Integration/Segregation 
Integration/ Integration 
Integration/ Integration 
Multiple Gains: 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
38:44 
38:44 
38:44 
38:44 
 
7.78: 7.57 
8.28: 9.48 
10.36: 9.88 
10.55: 9.75 
 
Integration/ Integration 
Segregation/Segregation 
Segregation /Segregation 
Segregation /Segregation 
Multiple Losses: 
Control 
Absolute 
Dual 
Relative 
 
38:44 
38:44 
38:44 
38:44 
 
  9.63: 10.47 
8.28: 9.43 
9.36: 9.50 
9.97: 9.65 
 
Segregation/ Segregation 
Segregation/ Segregation 
Segregation/ Segregation 
Segregation/ Segregation  
 
 
5.16 COMPARISON OF RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENTS 1 & 2 
An important reason to understand how consumers perceive and cognitively adopt changes 
in brand prices is to enable retailers and product advertisers to set appropriate prices for 
their products and also choose effective pricing strategies in communicating changes in 
prices. 
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Table 5.11 seemingly suggests that both experiments 1 and 2 were consistent with our 
hypotheses that percentage frames would either reverse or reinforce MAPs. We see 
evidence of reversal in the mixed gains outcome, and reinforcements of MAPs in the 
multiple gains outcome of both experiments. The table also indicates that MAPs remained 
consistent in the mixed losses and multiple losses outcome of both experiments.  
The data analysis below further evaluates the differences in consumers' perceptions of 
prices between our 2 samples using the Linear Mixed Model analysis. Drawing from 
experiments 1 and 2 of this current paper, sample 1 represents data from experiment 1 with 
ERP defined as competitor's current prices, while sample 2 comes from experiment 2 
where ERP was conceptualized as competitor's past prices.  We investigate the differences 
in ratings between both sample groups using linear mixed model. For the purpose of this 
analysis, group 1 is identified as 'CCP' and group 2 as 'CPP'. 
 
 
5.17 LINEAR MIXED MODEL ANALYSIS  
Table 5.12 shows that in the mixed gains outcome, there was a significant fixed effect of 
frame on MAPs {F (1, 71) = 6.14, p = 0.016}. We obtained no similar result in the 
between group analysis {F (1, 70) = 1.93, p = 0.17}. Likewise, in the multiple losses 
outcome, there were no significant differences between the two samples {F (1, 80) = 0.64, 
p = 0.43}. Frame on the other hand had a significant impact on mental accounting 
preferences. 
Our results in the mixed losses outcome suggest that mixed losses were immune to framing 
manipulations and external stimuli as both price frames {F (1, 71) = 1.19, p = 0.28} and 
ERPs indicated non-significant fixed effects {F (1, 70) = 1.91, p = 0.17}. 
Results in the multiple gains outcome were similar to those in the mixed gains domains 
with frame {F (1, 81) = 4.23, p = 0.043} rather than between group differences having a 
significant effect on MAPs.    
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Table 5.12 
Mixed model analysis (ERPs) 
 
Outcome Source Estimate Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
Mixed gains Intercept 6.36 1 99.12 92.98 0.00 
 Group 0.80 1 70 1.94 0.16 
 Frame 1.05 1 71 6.14 0.01 
       
Mixed losses Intercept 7.27 1 97.39 93.81 0.00 
 Group -0.79 1 70 1.91 0.17 
 Frame 0.47 1 71 1.19 0.28 
       
Multiple gains Intercept - 1 108.93 180.16 0.00 
 Group - 1 80 0.01 0.90 
 Frame - 1 81 4.23 0.04 
       
Multiple losses Intercept 8.19 1 111.75 156.04 0.00 
 Group -0.41 1 80 0.64 0.42 
 Frame 0.90 1 81 5.37 0.02 
*Numbers rounded off to 2 decimal places 
 
 
5.18 COMPETITORS’ PRICES AS A STANDARD OF COMPARISON 
Table 5.13 presents an overview of the main results from our experiments. Our results 
suggest that mixed losses seem particularly immune to framing manipulations. In 
experiment 2 where we evaluated competitors past prices as a reference point, we also 
found no impact of price framing on multiple losses. These results support findings from 
extant literature that losses hurt more than gains of the same magnitude (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979).   
We propose that the reference point in experiment 2 implies that the subjects infer any 
upward changes in the retailer’s past prices as a huge decrease in value which should be 
minimised regardless of how it is presented. In addition, they do not have to buy from the 
retailer if previous experience indicates they can get a better ‘deal’ from switching brands.  
We can also infer from our findings the possibility that the internal reference points of our 
respondents with regards to preferences were not formed until comparisons were made 
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with the retailer-supplied prices. This behaviour is consistent with the perceptual processes 
of reference prices presented in the literature review chapter.     
 
Table 5.13 
Summary of results 
 
 
Nonetheless, we found that using competitor’s current prices as a standard of comparison 
seems to have more impact on consumers' perceptions of multiple losses compared with 
past prices and suggests a decreasing sensitivity to losses. One possible explanation for this 
is that for decision makers, although the reference point is clearly stated in the decision 
problems faced, a different subjective reference point known only to the decision maker 
could have been applied such that rather than thinking in terms of one huge loss, as a result 
of increases in prices, the lower increase in price (4%) was perceived as negligible and did 
not factor into the overall assessment of losses. 
This shows the importance of price frame manipulation in communicating changes in 
prices. 
 
5.19 RESULTS FROM WILCOXON SIGNED RANK TEST (EXPERIMENT 1) 
A Wilcoxon signed-rank was used to ascertain the impact of price frame on monetary 
outcomes (table 5.13). We hypothesized that frame would have on impact of MAPs as 
follows: 
 Hypothesis and Results 
Outcome Type Competitor’s current price Competitor’s past price 
Mixed gains Evidence of frame dependence. 
Reject null hypothesis. 
Evidence of frame dependence. 
Reject null hypothesis. 
Mixed losses No evidence of frame 
dependence. Cannot reject null 
hypothesis. 
No evidence of frame dependence. 
Cannot reject null hypothesis. 
Multiple gains Evidence of frame dependence. 
Reject null hypothesis. 
Evidence of frame dependence. 
Reject null hypothesis. 
Multiple losses Evidence of frame dependence. 
Reject null hypothesis. 
No evidence of frame dependence. 
Cannot reject null hypothesis. 
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𝐻4𝑎: Percentage frames will reverse MAP for mixed gains and losses. 
𝐻5𝑎: Percentage frames will reinforce MAP for multiple gains and reverse multiple losses. 
From table 5.14, we see in the mixed gains outcome that the mean rank for the dual frame 
suggests the tendency to be better than the relative frame in affecting MAPs with the 
relative frame having a higher result. We also see a significant difference in the mean ranks 
of the price frames (𝑋2 = 8.96 with 𝑝 = 0.011). We conducted post hoc analysis 
(multiple comparisons of price frame) using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and applied a 
Bonferroni correction (0.05 / 3 = p < 0.017). Our results indicate that there were no 
significant differences between the dual and absolute frames (Z = -0.014, p = 0.989); the 
relative and absolute frame (Z = -2.184, p= 0.029) and the relative and dual frames (Z = -
2.316, p = 0.021). We therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
Likewise in mixed losses, we find significant differences in the mean ranks of the price 
frames (𝑋2 = 6.84 with 𝑝 = 0.033). A Bonferroni correction indicates that there were no 
significant differences between the relative and absolute frames (Z = -2.329, p = 0.020), 
the relative and dual frames (Z = -2.170, p = 0.030) and the dual and absolute frames (Z = -
0.826, p = 0.409).  We therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
Similarly, our results show significant differences in the mean ranks of the price frames in 
the multiple gains outcome (𝑋2 = 9.312 with 𝑝 = 0.010) A Bonferroni correction 
indicates that there was a significant difference just between the dual and absolute (Z = -
3.274, p = 0.001) and the relative and absolute frames (Z= -3.067, p= 0.002) only. We 
therefore reject the null hypothesis. 
Lastly, similar to our findings in the multiple gains outcome, the results from the multiple 
losses outcome show a significant difference in the mean ranks of the price frames 
(𝑋2 = 8.000 with 𝑝 = 0.018).  From the Bonferroni correction applied we found 
significant differences only between the relative and absolute frames (Z = -2.628, p = 
0.009).  We can therefore reject the null hypothesis.  
In summary, results from the Wilcoxon signed-rank test across all outcome types indicate 
the impact of price frame on MAPs only in the multiple outcomes of gains and losses. This 
then implies that price framing has a higher impact on consumers' perceptions of multiple 
price changes compared with single price changes and marketing managers/advertisers can 
satisfactorily alter their purchase intentions and preference using percentage frames.  
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Table 5.14 
Outputs from Friedman Test (competitor’s current price) 
 
Mixed gains 
 
 
 
 
Multiple comparisons of frame (Based on negative and positive ranks) 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - Absolute  Relative - Dual 
Z 
Asymp.Sig. (2-tailed) 
−0.01b 
0.98 
−2.18c 
0.02 
−2.31c 
0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple comparisons of frame (Based on negative ranks) 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - Absolute  Relative - Dual 
Z 
Asymp.Sig. (2-tailed) 
−0.82b 
0.40 
−2.32b 
0.02 
−2.17b 
0.03 
 
 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.79 
Dual 1.86 
Relative 2.35 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 33 
Chi-square 8.95 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.01 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.82 
Dual 1.89 
Relative 2.29 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 33 
Chi-square 6.84 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.03 
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Multiple gains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple comparisons of frame (Based on negative ranks) 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - Absolute  Relative – Dual` 
Z 
Asymp.Sig. (2-tailed) 
−3.27b 
0.00 
−3.06b 
0.00 
−0.52b 
0.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple comparisons of frame (Based on negative ranks) 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - Absolute  Relative - Dual 
Z 
Asymp.Sig. (2-tailed) 
−1.92b 
0.05 
−2.628b 
0.00 
−1.308b 
0.19 
 
 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.68 
Dual 2.14 
Relative 2.17 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 38 
Chi-square 9.31 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.01 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.74 
Dual 2.03 
Relative 2.24 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 38 
Chi-square 8.00 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.01 
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5.20 RESULTS FROM WILCOXON SIGNED RANK TEST (EXPERIMENT 2) 
A Wilcoxon signed-rank was used to ascertain the impact of price frame on monetary 
outcomes. We hypothesized that frame would have an impact on MAPs as follows. 
𝐻4𝑎: Percentage-based frames will reverse MAP for mixed gains and losses. 
𝐻5𝑎: Percentage-based frames will reinforce MAP for multiple gains and reverse multiple 
losses. 
From table 5.15, we see in the mixed gains outcome that the mean rank for the dual frame 
suggests the tendency to be better than the relative frame in affecting MAPs with the 
relative frame having a higher result. We also see a significant difference in the mean ranks 
of the price frames (𝑋2 = 6.358 with 𝑝 = 0.042). We conducted post hoc analysis 
(multiple comparisons of price frame) using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and applied a 
Bonferroni correction (0.05 / 3 = p < 0.017). Our results indicate that there were no 
significant differences between the dual and absolute frames (Z = -1.681, p = 0.093), the 
relative and absolute frame (Z = -1.657, p = 0.097) and the relative and dual frames (Z = 
0.000, p = 1.000) and we therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
In the mixed losses outcome on the other hand, we find no significant differences in the 
mean ranks of the price frames (𝑋2 = 3.500 with 𝑝 = 0.174). A Bonferroni correction 
also showed non-significant differences across all frames: relative and absolute frames (Z = 
-1.049, p = 0.294); the relative and dual frames (Z = -0.637, p = 0.524); and the dual and 
absolute frames (Z = -1.270, p = 0.204)}. In light of this, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. 
Similarly, our results show non-significant differences in the mean ranks of the price 
frames in the multiple gains outcome (𝑋2 = 1.847 with 𝑝 = 0.397) A Bonferroni 
correction also indicated non-significant differences across all frames. As such we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis. 
Our findings in the multiple losses outcome are also consistent with results from the 
previous three outcomes reviewed. The results show a non-significant difference in the 
mean ranks of the price frames (𝑋2 = 1.491 with 𝑝 = 0.475).  From the Bonferroni 
correction applied we found no significant differences across all.  We cannot therefore 
reject the null hypothesis.  
In summary, results from the Wilcoxon signed-rank test across all outcome types indicate 
that price framing had no impact on MAPs.  
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Table 5.15 
Outputs from Friedman Test (Competitor’s past price) 
 
Mixed gains 
 
 
 
 
Multiple comparisons of frame (Based on negative and positive ranks) 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - Absolute  Relative - Dual 
Z 
Asymp.Sig. (2-
tailed) 
−1.68b 
.0.93 
−1.657b 
0.09 
0. 00c 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
Mixed losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple comparisons of frame (Based on negative and positive ranks) 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - Absolute  Relative - Dual 
Z 
Asymp.Sig. (2-tailed) 
−1.27b 
0.20 
−1.04b 
0.29 
−0.63c 
0.52 
 
 
 
 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.73 
Dual 2.10 
Relative 2.17 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 39 
Chi-square 6.35 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.04 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 2.19 
Dual 1.87 
Relative 1.94 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 39 
Chi-square 3.50 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.17 
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Multiple gains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple comparisons of frame (Based on negative and positive ranks) 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - Absolute  Relative – Dual` 
Z 
Asymp.Sig. (2-tailed) 
−0.24b 
0.80 
−0.42c 
0.67 
−0.89c 
0.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple comparisons of frame (Based on negative ranks) 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - Absolute  Relative - Dual 
Z 
Asymp.Sig. (2-tailed) 
−0.22b 
0.81 
−1.05b 
0.29 
−0.29b 
0.76 
 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.92 
Dual 1.94 
Relative 2.14 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 44 
Chi-square 1.847 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig .397 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.92 
Dual 1.97 
Relative 2.11 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 44 
Chi-square 1.49 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.47 
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5.21 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Mental accounting principles explain how decision makers evaluate the reference points 
within decision outcomes in terms of gains and losses. Based on these principles, decision 
makers can choose between the option to integrate or segregate combinations of gains and 
losses. Central to the determination of reference dependent preferences is the identification 
and evaluation of the reference point.   
This study examined the impact of price framing on consumer’s perception of changes in 
prices where the reference points are clearly stated as a competitor's current and 
competitor's past prices. Our key findings are summarized as follows. 
1) Our experiments identified the most effective sales promotion strategy given 
consumer behaviour. Of the two reference points investigated in this paper, competitor’s 
current prices had the most significant impact on consumers’ perception of prices. We 
found that while both types of reference states affected MAPs in the mixed gains and 
multiple gains outcome leading to preference reversals, only competitor’s current prices 
affected multiple losses. In other words, the impact of percentage frames as well as the 
influence of making price comparison with current prices as opposed to past prices led to 
changes in consumers’ preferences to integrate when faced with price increases in two or 
more items they planned to purchase. Although it is not standard practise for vendors or 
retailers to communicate to consumers by how much their prices have gone up especially 
for grocery stores or supermarkets, there are notwithstanding a few that carry out this 
practise. For example, those who provide broadband coverage, telephone line rentals, gas 
and/or electricity etc. Viewed from this context, percentage price frames anchored against 
a competitor’s current price is an effective pricing strategy because it is able to mitigate the 
effect of price increases by influencing consumers’ perception of the change in price such 
that it is perceived as less than its absolute value.  
2) Robust results on competitors’ current prices. In addition to the parametric test 
employed in analysing our data, we also used non-parametric tests. We found that in the 
multiple gains and multiple losses outcomes, only results from a competitor’s current 
prices remained consistent across both types of tests. Based on these findings, we propose 
that the results from previous empirical papers which suggest that past prices had a more 
significant impact on consumers’ purchase decisions could be imprecise. We propose, 
subject to further studies to the contrary, that the use of current prices as a standard of 
comparison could have a more significant impact on price perception than past prices. 
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In conclusion, decision makers appear to be more sensitive to the framing of gains than 
they are of losses. These results demonstrate the important influence that price 
manipulations have on consumer preferences especially in the domains of mixed losses and 
multiple losses which we found to be generally immune to price manipulations. In light of 
this, the use of appropriate pricing strategies by retailers is crucial in managing their 
objectives of increased profitability and brand equity.  
 
5.22 LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
Although we replicated Thaler’s (1985) MAPs in the mixed gains, mixed losses and 
multiple losses outcomes of our control conditions,
27
 and they were the same in principle 
as our scenarios with reference states/points evaluated in the treatment conditions, 
nevertheless, the decision frames from Thaler’s (1985) original experiments differed from 
ours in specific content. As such, they do not adequately provide a basis for comparison 
between the questions without reference point used in the control level and those which 
had reference points incorporated, thereby making it difficult to fully evaluate the claim 
that the original experiments from which Thaler's (1985) MAPs were derived lacked 
explicitly stated reference states.  
In the same vein, our treatment questions could have been designed to individually capture 
the varying effects of frame and reference state/point on price perception as opposed to 
both effects. This makes it difficult to isolate reference point effects from price framing 
effects.  
 
5.23 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
In experiment 1 where the inclusion of a competitor’s current prices significantly altered 
the MAP for multiple losses causing a preference reversal, we propose that price framing 
has a more significant impact on multiple outcomes (multiple gains and losses) than on 
single outcomes (mixed gains and losses). This echoes Thaler’s (1985) finding that 
consumers derive more satisfaction from 2 or more gains and find 2 or more losses more 
unrewarding than a single loss.  In addition, although previous studies suggest that past 
prices are the main predictors of reference prices (Kalwani et al. 1990), our results indicate 
that current prices might have a more significant impact on reference prices than had been 
                                                          
27
 Our results in the multiple gains outcome for the control conditions across all experiments conducted (in 
chapters 4 and 5) remained inconsistent with Thaler’s (1985) principle for that outcome. 
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recognised in the literature. This could be linked to the difficulty in recalling past prices as 
opined by Dickson and Sawyer (1990) as opposed to current prices. Building on the 
foregoing, we are of the opinion that consumers’ perceptions of losses in particular could 
be context dependent with the specific context here being reference price. 
A key managerial insight from our findings is in relation to the proposed link between 
regret aversion and loss aversion. Previous studies (for example, Hardie et al. 1993; 
Mayhew and Winer, 1992; Putler, 1992) provide empirical evidence that price increases 
(negative deviations from reference prices perceived as losses) have a more significant 
impact on consumer choice than decreases in prices (positive deviations from reference 
prices perceived as gains). In addition, consumers are able to predict that in retrospect, they 
would feel regret after making a ‘wrong’ purchasing decision or choice. In order to avoid 
these feelings of regret, consumers tend to have established or default choices for most 
decisions which they rarely deviate from (Simonson, 1992). Building on these findings, we 
propose regret aversion as the reason for consumers reduced sensitivity to price frame 
manipulations in the losses outcomes. This is because, an individual will be resistant to 
making any purchase decision which is contrary to his/her default choice. Therefore, if the 
individual’s conventional choice was to proceed with a purchase regardless of its now 
higher price, then such an individual would be impervious to price framing. The take home 
message for managers therefore is the possibility that consumers are able to adapt to higher 
prices holding constant other exogenous influences such as the brand or quality of the 
product. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE IMPACT OF EXPECTATIONS OF PRICE CHANGE ON MENTAL 
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 
In this chapter, we present our final reference point: internal reference prices 
conceptualised as consumers' expectations of retailer's future prices. We discuss the 
impact of consumers’ expectations of changes in prices on purchase decisions. Where 
expected prices are lower (higher) than retailer’s prices, consumers could decide to 
increase or decrease purchase, or completely forgo making any purchase decisions.  This 
study differs completely from the studies discussed in chapters 4 and 5 in that the buyer’s 
expected prices are both explicitly stated as well as implicitly incorporated into the 
experiments. Our aim is to evaluate how consumers prefer to code a decrease (gains) or 
increase (losses) in retailer’s prices based on their expectations of changes in the 
retailer’s prices. In addition, we compare these results with those from the study in chapter 
4 to investigate any differences in consumers' perceptions of prices based on the definition 
of internal reference prices.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
While research on reference price has involved numerous conceptualizations of internal 
reference prices (hereafter IRPs), there is no consensus in literature on how decision 
makers evaluate these various conceptualizations, if these conceptualizations mean the 
same thing to consumers at the time of purchase or whether consumers employ more than 
one IRP in evaluating product prices at any given purchase (Rajendran, 2009).  
One of the associated consequences of this multidimensional aspect to (IRP) is the 
difficulty in correctly matching the researcher’s definition of reference price with how the 
consumer interprets reference price. Rajendran (2009, p. 19) suggests that although 
previous research defined IRP as expected prices using Helson’s (1964) Adaptation Level 
theory
28
, this evaluation of IRP could have been conceptualised by consumers as fair 
prices.  
A fair price is defined as that price a consumer considers just or appropriate for a product. 
As Maxwell (2002) argues, consumers subjectively judge a retail price as fair when that 
price is equal to its reference price. Furthermore, Rajendran (2009, p. 24) found that 
                                                          
28
 See chapter 2 for a review of Adaptation Level theory. 
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consumers differentiate between fair prices and expected prices.   Other researchers who 
support this notion emphasize the link between price fairness, consumers’ willingness to 
buy, and the satisfaction derived from purchase (Dickinson and Dickinson, 2012; Kamen 
and Toman, 1970; Maxwell, 2002; Thaler, 1985; Xia et al. 2004).  
Expected price, on the other hand, is the price consumers predict for a product. In addition 
to the aforementioned, empirical support for the notion that consumers do not interpret IRP 
as expected price, posit that unlike unfair prices, an unexpected price does not result in the 
decision to forgo making a purchase (Boyd & Bhat, 1998; Campbell, 1999; Huppertz et al., 
1978). However, on both sides of the argument there is unanimity that past prices play a 
significant role in the formation of ‘expected’ and ‘fair’ prices. 
Based on the foregoing, this chapter evaluates the impact of price framing on price 
perception by matching our definition of ‘expected price’, or a consumer’s expectation of 
prices, with the consumers’ interpretation. We define expected price as the price a 
consumer imagines he will pay for a product at the next purchase. This conceptualisation is 
consistent with previous studies (Jacobson and Obermiller, 1990; Rajendran, 2009; Winer, 
1988) and differs from the definition of fair prices in that we do not interpret expected 
prices as an appropriate price for a product.  
We propose that these expected prices are implicit and examine two sides of implicit 
expected prices. Firstly, we examine expected prices as a result of recently observed 
retailer’s prices29. We assume a specified time period to convey the impendency of the 
decision maker encountering the retailer’s prices, and further assume that the decision 
maker will have a ‘certain’ implicit expectation of the retailer’s immediate future prices 
based on recently observed current prices. Consequently, the retailer's future prices will be 
expected to be the same at the next purchase. This is investigated in the mixed gains 
outcome. Secondly, we also examine expected prices based on what the consumer thinks 
the price should be. One common feature across these definitions is uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is a key feature of expectations because perfect information is inaccessible 
with regards to consumer products (Georgescu-Roegen, 1958).   Hence, we propose that 
the decision maker is ‘uncertain’ about the retailer’s prices and his expectation that his 
expected prices will be the same as the retailer’s prices will be low. We evaluate this 
aspect in the mixed losses, multiple gains, and multiple losses outcomes.  
                                                          
29
 Note that we do not assume past prices in the strict sense. 
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Our approach is to have the price change post-consumer expectation: that is, the 
consumer’s expectation of the retailer’s prices is not based on an on-going price promotion. 
On the contrary, it is based on either being certain of the prices from recent observation or 
uncertain about the price because there is no actual knowledge of the current product 
prices. So, we investigate price changes after the formation of consumers’ expectations and 
in turn, how the retailer’s prices compare with the consumers’ expected prices. More 
importantly, we examine the impact of price frame manipulation on consumers’ 
perceptions of price.  
 
 
6.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The theory of expectations spans a considerable number of disciplines such as psychology 
and economics. In more recent times, the importance of expectations has been applied to 
the field of behavioural decision theory (Oliver and Winer, 1987). 
There have been several definitions of expectations proposed in literature. Olson and 
Dover (1979) and Oliver (1980) define expectation from a belief perspective, i.e. a 
consumer’s belief about a product. They opined that a consumer’s expectation about a 
product sets in before purchase and is ongoing after appraisal of the product has been 
made.  
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) framework of expectations is utilized in the design of our 
experiments. This framework focuses on expectations from an active/passive perspective. 
Active expectations as defined by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) usually comes into play 
when a decision maker makes price comparisons between future expected prices and 
current observed prices. While this does imply some form of information processing on the 
part of the decision maker, passive expectations on the other hand have to do with little 
processing of information. For example, the fact that prices of goods would generally be 
expected to go up in future due to inflation. 
Kalwani et al. (1990) applied the price expectations hypothesis (PEH) in explaining the 
long-term impact of price promotions on consumer choice. They posit that the expectations 
consumers have of future product prices is shaped by their experiences of past prices of the 
retailer and how often the products undergo sales promotion. Other papers (Dodson, 
Tybout and Sternthal, 1978; Guadagni and Little, 1983, Shoemaker and Shoaf, 1977) 
suggest that the probability of a repeat purchase of a product after a price promotion is 
lower than if the purchase had been made without a price promotion offer.  
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From previous research (Lichtenstein and Bearden, 1988) we understand that external 
reference prices (ERPs) could shift IRPs up or down, thereby influencing consumers' 
perceptions of price. The importance of studying the implications of consumers' 
expectations of prices then lies in the notion that the purchase probability of a product 
could be dependent not only on expectations of future prices of a retailer/brand (IRP) but 
also on context-specific factors such as future prices of other competing products (ERP), or 
the price frame utilized in conveying changes in prices. Studies on price expectation under 
varying conditions of price changes therefore provide additional insights into consumers’ 
price judgements.   
The conceptualisation of expected price as an IRP is not new in the research stream of 
reference prices. Jacobson and Obermiller (1989 and 1990) proposed the notion of 
expected prices being both forward and backward-looking. Prior research had focused on 
the backward-looking perspective with expected prices derived from previous experiences 
of a retailer’s past prices (Kwon and Schumann, 2001). A forward-looking perspective, on 
the other hand, has to do with prices consumers expect to pay for the products in the future 
(Jacobson and Obermiller, 1990; Kalwani and Yim, 1992; Krishna, 1994). While previous 
researchers had investigated expected prices from a price elicitation perspective (Jacobson 
and Obermiller, 1990; Kalwani and Yim, 1992; Rajendran, 2009), our study evaluates the 
impact of consumers’ expectation of changes in prices in relation to actual changes in a 
retailer’s immediate future prices30.  
Building on the framework of expectations developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1982), 
we incorporate consumers’ active and passive expectations into our experiments. Our 
objective is twofold: 1) we examine the effect of expected prices from a price 
certainty/uncertainty perspective within decision outcomes and in relation to Thaler's 
MAPs and 2) we compare the impact of 2 operationalisations of IRPs on consumer 
purchase decisions.    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 This could arguably be considered as current prices. However, we assume that prices have been recently 
observed by the consumer, and allow for some intervening time between the previous purchase and the next. 
In this regard, we propose the retailer’s prices as immediate future.  
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6.3 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON INTERNAL REFERENCE PRICE 
Most studies on reference prices have focused on developing models of consumer choice 
(Briesch et al. 1997; Putler, 1992; Winer, 1986). Others have modelled the effects of 
reference prices on the competitive behaviour of firms (Greenleaf, 1995; Kopalle, Rao, and 
Assunção, 1996).  Researchers such as Hardie, Johnson, and Fader (1993), Lattin and 
Bucklin (1989), and Urbany et al. (1988a and 1988b) investigate the impact of IRPs on 
consumer behaviour and evaluations of price, price promotions and product quality. Other 
researchers have examined reference prices presented in relative versus absolute terms 
(Biswas and Blair, 1991; Jacobson and Obermiller, 1990; Lichtenstein and Bearden, 1989; 
Putler, 1982; Urbany and Dickson, 1991). In few instances, attempts have also been made 
to investigate how reference prices are formed (Biswas and Blair, 1991; Dickinson and 
Dickinson, 2012; Klein and Oglethorpe, 1987; Puto, 1987; Rajendran and Tellis, 1994; 
Rowe and Puto, 1987).  
Another line of research examined the possibility that consumers applied one or more IRPs 
at any given purchase encounter. For example, Chandrashekaran and Jagpal (1995) carried 
out a study of four IRPs (fair price, reservation price, normal price and lowest price seen) 
and found that rather than aggregating the four IRPs into a single IRP used in evaluating 
prices, the use of IRPs by consumers was particular to each product.  
Internal reference prices have been defined using varying price concepts in literature. 
Average price (Bearden et al. 1992; Diamond and Campbell, 1989), lowest market price 
(Biswas and Blair, 1991), reasonable price (Folkes and Wheat, 1995), perceived price 
(Monroe, 1973), evoked price (Rao and Gautschi, 1982), lowest acceptable price (Stoetzel, 
1970) and Winer (1988) who examined five IRPs operationalized as fair price, reservation 
price, lowest acceptable price, expected price and perceived price.  
However, as far as we know, no empirical study has examined IRP experimentally based 
on our approach.   
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6.4 JUSTIFICATION FOR STUDY 
We address a gap and contribute to the literature on reference prices by investigating IRP 
from a contextual perspective not previously reviewed in literature. Also, in comparing the 
differences in consumers’ perceptions of gains and losses where IRP are defined as 
expected prices and as recently observed retailer's past prices (chapter 4), we examine the 
impact different IRP constructs have on price perceptions. This is especially important for 
marketing purposes because as suggested by prior studies, the use of IRPs by consumers is 
product-specific and if marketers can identify and understand the different internal 
reference prices that consumers employ and how they are affected by changes in price, they 
can design pricing strategies that will influence reference prices, affect consumers’ 
perceptions of prices and generate increase in profit.  
 
 
6.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF EXPECTED PRICES  
Working with the assumption that the consumer is faced with 2 reference points: i) the 
actual amount in absolute and relative terms of the change (increases/decreases) in the 
retailer’s prices, and ii) the amount in absolute and relative terms of changes in prices 
based on the consumer’s expectation.  
In the first reference point, we evaluate the price change solely on its individual merits as 
loss or gain while in the second, we compare the two reference points such that where the 
changes in prices are equal it would be perceived as a good deal, if less than, it would be 
perceived as a gain and if greater than, then a loss. Consequently, we propose that the 
perception of changes in prices depends on the final reference point from which the 
consumer evaluates the alternative(s) in a decision problem to determine whether the 
change in price will be coded as a gain or a loss. 
Furthermore, we assume that: a) the consumer has pre-conceived price expectations prior 
to the purchase but has the intention of making a purchase, b) the ‘certain’ consumer has a 
higher level of expectation than the ‘uncertain’ consumer due to having observed the 
retailer’s prices prior to the store visit, c) the uncertain consumer, on the other hand, is 
unsure of what the retailer’s prices are and makes a rough estimate based on his idea of 
what the approximate prices should be and as a result, d) the uncertain consumer has lower 
expectations compared to the other consumer.   
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Another point to note is that we are not evaluating certainty or uncertainty of price 
expectations based on type or classification of consumers. Rather, we assess it from a 
reference point perspective. 
Some of the factors which would be expected to influence the consumer's specific expected 
price are: i) type of retailer, i.e. frequent discounting retailer, high end product retailer, 
everyday-low-prices retailer, etc. ii) consumers’ awareness of the quality of the retailer’s 
product, and iii) market trend, for example expectations that prices will be high versus low. 
However, for this present analysis, these situational factors are held constant and are not 
assumed to influence the decision making process of the consumer mainly because we do 
not assume a strict familiarity with retailer’s prices especially with ‘uncertain’ expected 
prices.  
Nonetheless, the decision scenarios we adopt show that the consumer is aware of the 
market trend and could either have optimistic (prices will decrease) or pessimistic (prices 
will decrease) price expectations in the gains and losses domains. Moreover, we posit that 
overall, the impact of percentage price frames will be neutralised by the consumer’s 
perception of gains and losses subject to the final reference point leading to no reversals in 
Thaler's MAPs.  In other words, MAPs will be consistent across all outcome types.    
It is important to note that the conceptual framework in figure 6.1 is not being suggested as 
a theory. Rather, it guides the reader through our proposed conceptual process of decision 
making using expected prices.   
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Figure 6.1 
Proposed conceptual framework of expectations-based purchase decision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consumer’s price expectation Associated intention Purchase decision 
Consumer encounters initial reference 
point 
 
Influence of contextual factors such as 
purpose of purchase, other prices of 
related products in purchase 
environment 
Final reference point 
(Price perceived as gain or loss) 
Consumer makes purchase 
decision 
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6.6 EXTENSION TO THALER (1985) 
Thaler (1985) identified a type of decision scenario which evaluates gains and losses from 
an expectations perspective. For example, an individual has an expectation regarding an 
outcome (X). However, rather than obtaining X he obtains X+∆X. In this scenario X+∆X: 
X would be a reference outcome. Thaler (1985) suggested that an individual could either 
evaluate his unexpected component alone as segregation or in conjunction with his 
expected component as integration. The example from his study below illustrates the 
concept of a reference outcome where a consumer's expected price differs from the 
retailer's price. 
‘Mr. A expected a Christmas bonus of $300. He received his check and the amount was 
indeed $300. A week later he received a note saying that there had been an error in this 
bonus check. The check was $50 too high. He must return the $50’.  
‘Mr. B expected a Christmas bonus of $300. He received his check and found it was for 
$250’.  
Since Mr. A’s loss came after he had received the check, it would imply segregation and 
would be coded as a loss of $50. On the other hand, Mr. B would evaluate his outcome as 
having his gain reduced (Thaler, 1985). He proposed that where decision scenarios are 
subject to varying interpretations, the four mental accounting principles (MAPs) discussed 
in previous chapters
31
  would hold. The MAPs are shown below:  
a) Mixed Gains (a large gain + a small loss) should be integrated.  
b) Mixed Losses (a large loss + a small gain) should be segregated. 
c) Multiple Gains (2 gains of same or different magnitudes) should be segregated 
d) Multiple Losses (2 losses of same or different magnitudes) should be integrated. 
Building on Thaler’s (1985) MAPs, we carry out analysis in order to investigate how 
monetary gains and losses are evaluated in decision scenarios with reference outcomes, 
and in turn, those without.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 See chapter 2 for a review of mental accounting principles.  
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6.7 THE IMPACT OF BRAND FAMILIARITY AND PRICE FRAME ON 
PURCHASE      
One of the disadvantages associated with frequent discounting of prices by retailers is that 
consumers get used to the lower prices and when these prices return to their ‘normal’ (pre-
frequent discounting prices), they are perceived as increase in prices by the consumers. As 
a result, customers learn to anticipate or expect such changes in prices and make purchase 
decisions based on how the new normal prices compares with their anticipated/expected 
prices.  
Although there is empirical evidence showing that the mental effort required in processing 
price discounts stated in percentage terms greatly reduces consumers’ price expectations 
and influences their purchase decisions at the end of the price promotion (Delvecchio et al. 
2007), we propose that where both price expectations and frame manipulation 
simultaneously influence price perception, one would offset the effect of the other leading 
to no reversals in MAPs across outcomes.  
In essence, we predict that the effect of percentage frames on consumers’ purchasing 
decisions will likely be moderated by consumers having a pre-purchase expectation of 
prices. In other words, although it is possible that a comparison of only a retailer’s 
expected prices with the retailer’s actual prices after the price increase or decrease will 
affect a consumer’s purchase intentions, we propose that the presence of both percentage-
based price frames and a reference outcome in any decision scenario will bring about a less 
significant overall effect on consumers purchasing decisions as proposed by MAPs than 
where both are not present simultaneously.  
Following the discussion above, we propose the following hypothesis: 
𝐻6: Expected prices will have a neutralising effect on percentage frames and MAPs will 
not be significantly affected.  
 
 
 
6.8 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION 
We adopt the decision scenarios used in previous research for evaluating the framing effect 
in multiple events (Chatterjee et al. 2000; Heath et al. 1995; and Thaler, 1985). Our 
experiments are similar to Thaler's (1985) original approach in which 2 hypothetical men 
face financially equivalent situations. However, to ensure that our decision scenarios are 
strictly reference outcome based, we explicitly state that both men expected changes in the 
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retailer’s prices. The expected price change and the actual retailer’s price at the point of 
purchase for both men are equivalent irrespective of their purchase intentions (Mr. A 
intends to buy one item while Mr. B plans on two).  
Post graduate students in the Adam Smith Business School at the University of Glasgow, 
United Kingdom were offered cash-prize incentives to participate in the study. Ninety-two 
post graduate students participated in the survey. We carried out 8 experimental conditions 
in a repeated-measures design. Respondents were randomly assigned to 4 of these 
conditions based on outcome type (Mixed Gains, Mixed Losses, Multiple Gains and 
Multiple Losses). The survey was completely anonymous and no information was 
collected based on name, gender, age or ethnic background. Of the ninety-two respondents 
who participated, only one result was unusable.    
 
 
6.8.1 Design 
Dependent Variables. The outcome types multiple gains, multiple losses, mixed gains and 
mixed losses were the dependent variables.  
Independent Variables. Our hypotheses revolve around how the manipulation of price 
presentation and the inclusion of active price expectations in form of reference outcome 
affect consumer purchase decisions and perceptions of price. To examine this, we present 
changes in price across each outcome type using 2 price frames with “frame” and 
“reference outcome” as our independent variables (see table 6.1).  
 
Figure 6.2 
Specification of variables 
 
 
                        Outcome Type 
 
 
 
 
                         Outcome Type 
 
Frame 
Absolute 
Relative 
Reference Outcome  
Absolute 
Relative 
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Two experimental groups were evaluated in our study: ‘non-expectation’ and 
‘expectations’ groups. Based on our hypothesis that the inclusion of a reference outcome 
will temper the effect of percentage frames on purchase decisions, we compare the results 
from both groups and evaluate based on proposed MAPs. Respondents assigned to the 
‘non-expectations’ conditions had questionnaires where changes in prices were stated in 
percentages as well as absolute terms but with the decision makers involved (Mr. A and 
Mr. B) having no expectations regarding changes in retailer’s prices. In the ‘expectations 
conditions’, changes in prices are stated in percentage terms and the consumer's expected 
prices across all outcomes are clearly indicated.  Although each respondent was randomly 
assigned to both conditions, the questionnaires were counterbalanced to eliminate order 
effects based on outcome type (see table 6.2). 
 
 
Table 6.1 
                                         Assignment of respondents to experiments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the structure in table 6.2, respondents were randomly assigned such that each 
respondent answered questionnaires from 2 outcome types under the ‘expectations’ 
conditions and 2 different outcome types under the ‘non-expectations’ condition.  
 
 
 
 
 
   
No of Respondents Outcome Type 
 
Condition  
47 Multiple Gains  
Multiple Losses 
Expectations 
47 Mixed Gains 
Mixed Losses 
Non-expectations 
44 Mixed Gains 
Mixed Losses 
Expectations 
44 Multiple Gains  
Multiple Losses 
Non-expectations 
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6.8.1.1 Mixed Gains Outcome 
Consumers' explicit expectations of changes in the retailer’s prices were incorporated into 
three of our monetary outcomes (dependent variables). In the mixed gains outcome, we 
investigate the effect of expected prices which, though not clearly stated, are inherent 
within the questionnaire based on the consumer's recent experience at the store. This is 
based on the rationale that, if one visits the store and finds a product of interest but makes 
plans to return the following day to purchase the item, the expectation of that individual, 
given his experience at the store, will be that the product prices will still be the same as 
those from the previous day.  
 
6.8.2 Design of experiments  
We employed a repeated-measures design based on outcome type varied across two price 
frames and with consumers' expectation of a retailer's future prices as the reference point.  
Each outcome type involves four experimental levels two of which represent decision 
scenarios with reference outcomes and the outstanding two are those without. The latter 
two levels also represent the control condition. Changes in prices across all outcomes and 
treatment levels are presented in table 6.3. 
 
 
Table 6.2 
Value of price change across frame and outcome type 
 
Outcome 
Type 
 
Condition  
 
Expected Price 
Change 
Actual Price Change 
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative 
Multiple 
Gains  
 
Multiple 
Losses 
Expectations £70 less 
 
£70 more 
5% less 
 
6% more 
£50 less 
 
£100 more 
4% less 
 
8% more 
Mixed Gains 
Mixed Losses 
Non-
expectations 
- 
- 
- 
- 
£50 less 
£50 more 
4% less 
4% more 
Mixed Gains 
Mixed Losses 
Expectations £50 more 
£30 more 
4% more 
2% more 
£50 less 
£50 more 
4%less 
4% more 
Multiple 
Gains  
 
Multiple 
Losses 
Non-
expectations 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
£100 less 
 
£100 more 
8% less 
 
8% more 
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6.8.3 Questionnaire 
Respondents were asked to determine which of 2 hypothetical men in hypothetical decision 
scenarios they thought would be relatively happier (Gains) or unhappier (Losses) across 
the two conditions. The purchase of the couch alone represents a single outcome indicating 
the MAP of integration while the purchase of the chair and couch represents two outcomes 
indicating segregation. 
The following page illustrates decision scenarios from the two conditions to show the 
inclusion of expectations in our experiments. All decision scenarios used in our 
experiments are presented in detail in Appendix 4.   
 
 
6.8.4 Measures 
Subjects were given booklets containing 8 scenarios. The first four scenarios described the 
mixed gains and losses outcomes from ‘non-expectations’ and while the last four presented 
the multiple gains and losses outcomes from the ‘expectations’ conditions. Subjects were 
asked to indicate on a scale of 1-15 which of two men in hypothetical decision scenarios 
would be relatively happier (Gains) or unhappier (Losses).  
The mean of the scales (1-15) ‘8’ was taken as the indicator of the preference for 
combination of outcomes. Means below 8 suggest the MAPs of integration and means 
above 8 indicate segregation. In addition, in the gains outcomes, higher numbers indicated 
by the subjects on the scale, shows the levels of relative happiness of either Mr. A who 
bought an item or Mr. B who bought two items; and in the losses domains, higher numbers 
show the levels of relative unhappiness of either Mr. A who bought one item or Mr. B who 
bought two. 
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is happier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of happiness).  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is unhappier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
unhappiness).  
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally happy.  
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally unhappy.  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is happier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of happiness). 
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is unhappier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
unhappiness).  
 
135 
 
Scenario A (Absolute frame) ‘Expectations’ Condition 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  At the store, Mr. A 
finds that the £1250 couch now costs £100 more. Although, he had been expecting some 
price increase, he had been estimating a price increase of only £70; Mr. B finds that both 
the £200 chair and the £1050 couch now each cost £50 more. Although, he had been 
expecting some price increase, he had been estimating a combined price increase of only 
£70 in both the couch and the chair.  
 
Scenario B (Relative frame) ‘Expectations’ Condition 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair. At the store, Mr. A 
finds that the £1250 couch now costs 8% more. Although, he had been expecting some 
price increase, he had been estimating a price increase of only 6%; Mr. B finds that the 
£200 chair now costs 25% more and the £1050 couch was now priced 5% more. Although, 
he knew that the combined price increase in both the couch and the chair was 8%, he had 
been estimating a combined price increase of only 6% in both the couch and the chair.  
 
 
 
6.9 RESULTS FROM PILOTS 
We carried out 2 pilot tests prior to the actual study (tables 6.3 and 6.4) to evaluate the 
impact of price frame on consumers' expectation of retailer's future prices. The absolute 
frame presented changes in the retailer's prices and the consumer's expected prices without 
any frame manipulation. Deviations from the consumer's status quo as well as changes in 
the retailer's prices are described in percentages in the relative frame. 
Recall, we tested the hypothesis that expected prices will have a neutralising effect on 
percentage frames and MAPs will not be significantly affected.  
From table 6.3, in the multiple gains outcome we found that as hypothesized, price framing 
did not alter the MAP to segregate multiple price discounts. The absolute frame on the 
other hand presented mixed results and is inconclusive.  
Similarly, the results in the multiple losses outcome for pilots 1 and 2 is consistent with 
MAP since the indicated preference of segregation in the relative frames implies that the 
opposite (integration), is a better way to minimize disutility. In the absolute frame 
however, subjects preferred to segregate. This suggests that reference outcome alone 
altered perception of prices. 
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Table 6.4 shows that in mixed gains, preferences were mixed in both pilot tests while for 
mixed losses, while the results from pilot 2 were consistent with the MAP to segregate, 
they were reversed in pilot test 1.  
 
Table 6.3 
Results from pilot tests (Multiple outcomes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 
Results from pilot tests (Mixed outcomes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Frame Results from tests MAPs hold? 
1 2 1 2 
Multiple gains 
(Segregation) 
Absolute 
 
Segregation Integration Yes No 
 Relative 
 
Segregation Segregation Yes Yes 
 
Multiple losses 
(Integration) 
Absolute 
 
Integration Integration No No 
 Relative 
 
Segregation Segregation Yes Yes 
 Frame Results from tests MAPs hold?  
Mixed gains 
(Integration) 
1        2 1 2 
 Absolute 
 
Segregation Integration No Yes 
 Relative 
 
Segregation Integration No Yes 
 
Mixed losses 
(Segregation) 
Absolute 
 
Segregation Integration No Yes 
 Relative 
 
Segregation Integration No Yes 
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6.10 MAIN RESULTS 
While our results were consistent in some respects with those from chapter 4 where we 
looked at a retailer’s past prices, they are at the same time also comparatively different. We 
begin with a discussion of the modal preferences from both experimental conditions on 
IRPs. Our results confirm the findings by Mazumdar and Jun (1993) that mixed losses 
seem impervious to framing effects and reference point manipulations. 
 
6.10.1 Discussion on modal preferences 
Table 6.5 shows modal preferences from our subjects. The left side represents IRP defined 
as consumers' expectations of a retailer's future price and serves as the standard against 
which the retailer's prices are compared. On the right, we report modal preferences adapted 
from experiment 1 in our fourth chapter where IRPs are described as recently observed 
past prices of a retailer. 
 
Table 6.5  
Comparison of results based on modal preferences 
 
Expectations Condition  Non-expectations Condition 
Outcome 
type 
Frame Proposed MAPs  Outcome 
type 
Frame Proposed MAPs 
I S MAPs 
hold? 
I S MAPs 
hold? 
Multiple 
gains 
(S) 
Absolute 35% 17% No Multiple 
gains  
(S) 
Absolute 11% 40% Yes 
Relative 25% 46% Yes Relative 11% 67% Yes 
Multiple 
losses 
(I) 
Absolute 32% 36% Yes  Multiple 
losses  
(I) 
Absolute 27% 47% Yes 
Relative 23% 47% Yes Relative 13% 69% Yes 
Mixed 
gains 
(I) 
Absolute 30% 41% No  Mixed 
gains 
(I) 
Absolute 33% 40% No 
Relative 27% 59% No Relative 27% 63% No 
Mixed 
losses 
(S) 
Absolute 30% 36% No  Mixed 
losses 
(S) 
Absolute 35% 40% No 
Relative 21% 55% No Relative 27% 60% No 
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Following our hypotheses in chapter 4, we expect the percentage price frame alone to 
cause a reversal of the MAPs for mixed gains, mixed losses and multiple losses, and 
reinforce the MAP for multiple gains in the non-expectations condition (right-hand side of 
table 6.5). However, based on our hypothesis that consumers’ expectations of price will 
counteract the effect of price frame on MAPs, we expect MAPs to remain consistent across 
all outcome types in the relative frame.  
In the ‘non-expectations condition’ for multiple gains, as proposed, we found evidence of 
framing effect indicated by an increase in the number of respondents who preferred 
segregation across both frames (absolute frame (40%), relative frame 67%)  suggesting a 
reinforcement of that MAP.  Similarly, the modal preference in the relative frame of the 
‘expectations condition’ was consistent with our hypothesis, with 25% of respondents 
choosing to integrate and 46% to segregate and which implies that MAPs hold. The 
absolute frame however suggests that expectations of price change alone led to a reversal. 
In the ‘non-expectations condition’ for multiple losses, we found no evidence of framing 
effect in the relative frame. Likewise, in the ‘expectations condition’, modal preferences 
are consistent with MAPs. The same results are observed in the absolute frames of both 
conditions.  
In the mixed gains outcome we found a reversal in the preference to integrate mixed gains 
in the absolute and relative frames of both conditions.  
Finally, in the mixed losses outcome, modal preferences indicate reversals from 
segregation to integration in the absolute and relative frames of both conditions.  
In conclusion, although modal preferences were partly consistent (only multiple gains and 
multiple losses were consistent with MAPs) with our hypothesis that expected prices will 
mitigate the impact of percentage price framing, they nevertheless suggest that reference 
dependence and mental accounting depend on the context from which decision problems 
are presented.  
In the following section we discuss the analysis of our results. 
 
 
6.10.2 Analysis of results 
Table 6.6 shows the means from our experiment. The results are analysed using a frame by 
outcome type repeated measures ANOVA where frame is the independent categorical 
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variable with 2 levels and outcome type is the dependent variable measured on a scale of 1-
15. The means from all conditions are tested against the scale’s mid-point ‘8’ which 
represents indifference between integration and segregation. The computer software used 
carried out the Mauchly’s test of the sphericity and also made corrections where there were 
any violations.  
 
Table 6.6 
Means from all experiments tested against mean 8 
 
 
Monetary Outcome 
 and Price Frame 
 
n 
 
(Expectations) 
Actual
32
mean 
 
MAPs 
hold? 
 
(Non -expectations) 
Actual mean 
 
 
MAPs 
hold? 
Multiple Gains 
(Mr. B is happier) 
Absolute 
Relative 
 
 
47 
47 
 
 
8.13 
8.48 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
9.48 
9.75 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Multiple Losses 
(Mr. B is unhappier,  
Mr. A is preferred) 
Absolute 
Relative 
 
 
 
 
47 
47 
 
 
 
 
8.02 
9.13 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
8.88 
10.04 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Mixed Gains 
(Mr. A is happier)  
Absolute 
Relative 
 
 
44 
44 
 
 
 
7.39 
8.27 
 
 
Yes 
No 
 
 
8.02 
8.85 
 
 
No 
No 
 
Mixed Losses 
(Mr. A is unhappier,  
Mr. B is preferred) 
Absolute 
Relative 
 
 
 
44 
44 
 
 
 
7.95 
8.18 
 
 
 
Yes 
No 
 
 
 
7.70 
8.95 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
No 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 These are means obtained from our experiments and which are tested against the scale's midpoint.  
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Prevailing mental accounting principles suggests that mixed gains will be integrated while 
mixed losses will be segregated. Also, for multiple outcomes, mental accounting principles 
predict segregation of multiple gains and integration of multiple losses. We hypothesize 
that consumers' expectation of the retailer's prices will have a neutralising impact on 
consumers' initial perception of price and will cancel out the effect of frame manipulation 
on consumers' final perception of price.  We therefore expect MAPs to hold in the relative 
frames across all outcomes without any evidence of framing effects.  
In the multiple gains domains, means obtained in the relative frame (8.48) of the 
expectations condition apparently indicate the preference to segregate which is consistent 
with MAPs. We also found that compared with the means from the relative frame in our 
non-expectations condition (9.75), the tendency to segregate is not as strong in the 
expectations condition. Further investigation however shows that there was no statistical 
significance. Mauchly’s test of sphericity from repeated measures ANOVA indicated that 
the assumption had not been violated with (𝑋2(2) = 0.41 with 𝑝 = 0.81). As such, there 
was no need to correct the degrees of freedom. The results show that there was no 
statistically significant effect of our reference point on outcome type F (2, 88) = 2.50, p = 
0.08. Post hoc analysis with Pairwise Comparison was not required. We therefore cannot 
reject the null hypothesis.  
For multiple losses, the means in the relative frame of the expectations condition was 
inconsistent with MAPs. From the table, we also see similar results in the relative frame of 
the non-expectations condition. However, further analysis shows a non-significant effect of 
reference point on MAPs. Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption had 
not been violated (𝑋2(2) = 1.99 with 𝑝 = 0.37) and F (2, 88) = 1.82, p = 0.16. We 
therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
The means from the relative frame of mixed gains (expectations condition), suggests a 
small evidence of framing effect (8.27) which, in turn, indicates reversal of the MAP to 
integrate mixed gains. The same results are not observed in the absolute frame which was 
consistent with MAP. As expected, means from the non-expectations condition indicate 
preference reversals in the relative frame while the absolute frame shows a slight tendency 
towards indifference. Mauchly’s test of sphericity shows that the assumption had been 
violated (𝑋2(2) = 8.74 with 𝑝 = 0.01). Degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (𝜀 = 0.85). Overall, our results show a non-
significant impact of reference point on outcome with F (1.71, 80.13) = 1.11, p = 0.33. We 
therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
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Finally, in the mixed losses outcome, means from the relative frame (8.18) in the 
expectations condition indicate preferences which are inconsistent with the MAP to 
segregate. The same are observed in the treatment frame of the non-expectations condition 
(8.95). Mean results in the absolute frames of both conditions are however consistent with 
MAPs. Mauchly’s test of sphericity from repeated measures ANOVA indicates that the 
assumption had been violated (𝑋2(2) = 6.79 with 𝑝 = 0.034). Degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (𝜀 = 0.88). We found no 
support for our hypothesis as there was no statistically significant effect of frame on 
outcome type with F (1.75, 82.65) = 0.38, p = 0.66.  
Overall, although our results failed to yield significant evidence of the impact of expected 
prices on price perception, two important characteristics are observed: a) MAPs remained 
consistent in the relative frames of multiple outcomes of gains and losses, and b) in the 
absolute frame, MAPs were consistent across all outcome types and confirms Thaler’s 
(1985) MAPs.   
 
 
 
6.11 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Contrary to our hypotheses, we found that consumers' expectations about changes in prices 
do not significantly affect price frame manipulations. Rather than having a neutralising 
effect on percentage frames, our results suggest that price expectations do not significantly 
affect price perception. Table 6.7 provides a summary. 
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Table 6.7 
Summary of results from ANOVA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.12 COMPARISON OF INTERNAL REFERENCE PRICES 
In chapter 4, we looked at IRP from the context of retailer's past prices which are derived 
from the consumer's previous purchase experience and in turn, indicate familiarity with the 
retailer's prices in a non-strict sense. As it relates to this current analysis, the consumer has 
a price estimate for the retailer's product without an expectation of a price change.  
Previous studies suggest that consumers react more favourably to an unexpected decrease 
in prices as opposed to an expected decrease in product prices (Lattin and Bucklin, 1989). 
The data analysis below evaluates differences between 2 samples using a linear mixed 
model. The dataset from sample 1 represents the IRP investigated in this current study and 
with IRP defined as expectation of changes in prices. We denote this group as the 'Exp 
group'. For sample 2, we utilize the data from the experiment in chapter 4. This is 
Study Conceptualization  
of IRP 
Hypothesis  Results 
Non-
expectations 
Recently observed 
past prices of a retailer 
Segregation is 
re-enforced in 
multiple gains 
 
MAP reversed 
to segregation 
in multiple 
losses 
 
MAP reversed 
to segregation 
in mixed 
gains. 
 
MAP reversed 
to integration 
in mixed 
losses 
 
 
 
Segregation is 
re-enforced in 
multiple gains.  
 
Confirmed MAP 
of integrating 
multiple losses.  
 
 
Reversed MAP 
of integrating 
mixed gains. 
 
 
Reversed MAP 
of segregating 
mixed losses. 
 
 
 
Expectations Expectation  of a 
retailer's future prices 
MAPs will 
hold across all 
outcomes. 
Expected prices 
do not have a 
significant effect 
on price 
perception. 
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described in our analysis as 'Nexp group' (non-expectations). We investigate the 
differences in ratings between groups and across frames using linear mixed model. 
From table 6.9, our results suggest that frame has a more significant impact on price 
perception in the mixed gains {F (1, 95) = 4.24, p = 0.042}, mixed losses {F (1, 95) = 4.84, 
p = 0.030} and multiple losses outcomes {F (1, 89) = 9.28, p = 0.003}. There are no 
significant differences between the 'Exp' and 'Nexp' groups as we find no significant 
estimates of fixed effects between the two IRPs. Hence, our results suggest that frame 
manipulation would have a more significant effect in altering MAPs while IRPs might only 
slightly affect perceptions of changes in prices.  
On the contrary, results in the multiple gains outcome were consistent with our hypothesis. 
Our findings indicate significant differences between groups {F (1, 88) = 5.54, p = 0.021} 
suggesting that price expectations had a significant effect on frame manipulation. 
However, although estimates of the effects of parameters indicate that frame is better at 
influencing MAPs, the results are non-significant {F (1, 89) = 0.582, p = 0.45}.  
Possible explanations for our results could be, as suggested by Kalwani and Yim (1992), 
that decision makers are less sensitive to changes in a retailer's prices when these prices are 
slightly lower or higher than the consumers' expected prices. This implies that such price 
changes do not significantly influence consumers' perceptions of price and by extension, 
MAPs, thus, making price signal cues more effective in determining purchase decisions. At 
the same time, consumers could also be sensitive to multiple price discounts regardless of 
what IRP is being applied at the point of purchase (multiple gains outcome). Although this 
is not the focus of this research, our findings provide support for the assimilation contrast 
framework of reference prices and suggests that consumers have a latitude of acceptance 
for prices. This implies that the discrepancy between the consumers' expected prices and 
retailer's prices post-promotion notwithstanding, the retailer's prices are still adjudged 
acceptable when considered from the consumer's final reference point. 
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Table 6.8 
Linear mixed model analysis 
 
Outcome Source Estimate Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
Mixed gains Intercept 7.16 1 124.48 104.76 0.00 
 Group -0.60 1 94 1.48 0.22 
 Frame 0.85 1 95 4.24 0.04 
       
Mixed losses Intercept 7.22 1 145.05 153.96 0.00 
 Group -0.26 1 94 0.23 0.63 
 Frame 0.74 1 95 4.84 0.03 
       
Multiple gains Intercept 9.16 1 124.33 160.01 0.00 
 Group -1.31 1 88 5.54 0.02 
 Frame 0.31 1 89 0.58 0.45 
       
Multiple losses Intercept 7.77 1 127.62 140.13 0.00 
 Group -0.89 1 88 2.77 0.09 
 Frame 1.13 1 89 9.28 0.00 
 
 
 
 
6.13 RESULTS FROM FRIEDMAN AND WILCOXON SIGNED RANK TEST 
Further to the repeated measures ANOVA, a Wilcoxon signed-rank was used to ascertain 
the impacts of price expectation and price framing on monetary outcomes (table 6.11). We 
test the same previously defined hypothesis to see if there are differences in MAPs across 
outcome type based on expected prices and price frame. Here, we review differences 
across two frames: a) absolute and relative frames in the expectations condition, and b) 
absolute and relative frames in the non-expectations condition.   
As in the repeated measures ANOVA, we begin the analysis with the multiple gains 
outcome. The initial Friedman test shows a non-significant effect of our independent 
variable on outcome type (𝑋2 = 1.72 with 𝑝 = 0.42). There was no need to run post hoc 
tests. We therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
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Likewise in multiple losses domains, we found no significant differences in the mean ranks 
of the price frames (𝑋2 = 5.12 with 𝑝 = 0.08). There was no need to run post hoc tests. 
We cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
The results in the mixed gains outcome also do not indicate any significant differences in 
the mean ranks of the price frames (𝑋2 = 3.82 with 𝑝 = 0.15) and a Bonferroni correction 
was not necessary. Accordingly, we cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
In the mixed losses outcome as well, we found no significant difference in the mean ranks 
of the price frames (𝑋2 = 4.45 with 𝑝 = 0.11).  Post hoc tests were not necessary and we 
therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
In summary, results from our non-parametric analysis were consistent with those obtained 
from the parametric tests. Results from both tests did not confirm our research hypotheses. 
We found that where expected prices and percentage frames are included in the same 
decision frame, expected prices do not have any significant impact on how consumers' 
perceive product prices or purchase decisions.  
 
Table 6.9 
Outputs from Friedman Test 
 
Multiple gains 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 
Nexp 
2.12 
Absolute 1.89 
Relative 1.99 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 45 
Chi-square 1.72 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.42 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 
Nexp 
1.99 
Absolute 1.80 
Relative 2.21 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 45 
Chi-square 5.12 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.08 
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Mixed gains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.14 GENERAL DISCUSSION  
Previous research on price promotion and consumer choice points to the fact that 
consumers establish and utilize reference prices in their everyday purchase decisions 
(Monroe, 1979; Winer, 1986).  
In this study, we evaluated expected prices as an internal reference price. Where expected 
prices are greater than actual transaction prices, consumers perceive this as a gain and 
where expected prices are lower, consumers perceive this as a loss. Based on the premise 
that the way price changes are presented could impact consumers’ price perceptions, and 
resulting purchase decisions, we investigate the joint effects of price expectations and price 
framing on consumer behaviour using the underlying concept of mental accounting 
principle as the baseline. Our main findings are summarized as follows. 
The discrepancy between consumers’ expectations of changes in prices and actual 
prices do not significantly affect their perceptions of price. When faced with percentage 
price signals, the consumer’s expectation of the retailer’s prices at the point of purchase 
does not have a significant influence on their purchase decisions. This is consistent with 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 
Nexp 
2.02 
Absolute 1.81 
Relative 2.17 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 48 
Chi-square 3.82 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.15 
𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒂 
N 48 
Chi-square 4.45 
df 2 
Asymp.Sig 0.11 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 
Nexp 
1.82 
Absolute 1.98 
Relative 2.20 
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previous empirical findings (Boyd & Bhat, 1998; Campbell, 1999). We also found that 
‘certain’ expectation of the retailer’s prices also had no significant impact on consumer 
preferences. Indeed, the significant impact of price framing implies that consumers’ 
expectation of future prices have no significant effect on their preferences.  
Consumers interpret internal reference price as 'fair price' and not 'expected price'. 
To the extent that reference prices are posited to affect consumers' purchase decisions in 
terms of willingness to buy and utility derived from the purchase, IRPs are theoretically 
conceptualised and interpreted as fair price by consumers. Furthermore, the concept of 
price introduced into the value function, and which generated Thaler's (1985) MAPs, was 
defined as fair price. Intuitively therefore, it seems more probable based on our findings 
that, fair prices and not expected prices, are employed as the standard of comparison which 
influence consumer choices.  
Similarly, our results provide support for the finding that ERPs have a greater impact on 
consumer price perception when the reference price is defined as expected price 
(Rajendran, 2009), since unfair prices, not unexpected prices, determine the purchase or 
non-purchase of a product (Boyd & Bhat, 1998; Campbell, 1999).   
 
 
6.15 FINAL NOTE ON DATA ANALYSES 
Previous experimental studies evaluating consumer choices based on reference prices, 
framing effect and mental accounting principles (Heath et al. 1995; Gupta and Cooper, 
1992; Frisch, 1993; Darke and Chung, 2005; Biswas, 1992; Chatterjee et al. 2000) carried 
out hypothesis tests of means. In this research, we also analyse our data using ANOVA in 
all three core chapters.  
In addition, we were interested in how the results obtained using mean tests compare with 
those from median tests. This led to the decision to use both parametric and non-parametric 
analysis in this research.   
Unsurprisingly, where we detected significant effects between frame and outcome type 
(chapters 4 and 5), our results from the non-parametric analysis did not always corroborate 
this, since parametric tests have more statistical power than the non-parametric.   
Nevertheless, the means obtained from our data accurately represents our sample 
distribution, and since the size of our samples (see the section on research design and data 
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collection in the 3 chapters) is large enough, we emphasize the findings from our 
parametric analysis. 
  
6.16 MARKETING IMPLICATIONS OF OUR RESEARCH 
This research highlights some important managerial insights with regards to preference 
reversals, and the framing of reference prices.  
Preference reversals: a large number of studies (e.g., Arkes and Blumer, 1985; 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990; Schweitzer, 1994) have provided empirical support 
for the robustness of the concept of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Nevertheless, our study (chapter 5) suggests that it is possible to reverse loss aversion and 
consumer preferences. In a previous study, Harinck et al. (2007) found that for small sums 
of money, individuals tend to discount small losses leading to a reversal of loss aversion. 
Thus, from a managerial perspective, consumers may be able to perceive small price 
increases as temporary and minor inconveniences which, in relation to large losses, would 
have a less significant impact relative to their reference points.  
Price framing and reference prices:  
Managers need to acquire better understanding of the importance of reference prices, and 
how external reference prices affect consumer choices. A key marketing strategy, based on 
our results in chapter 5, is varying current prices relative to competitor current prices. In 
addition, the findings from chapter 6 suggests that their might be some disparity between 
what reference price means to consumers and what it has been generally interpreted as in 
pricing literature. Where consumers’ internal reference prices are correctly defined in 
terms of price fairness, then strategies, such as price framing can be appropriately tailored 
so as to minimize the disutility consumers perceive from increases in prices. For example, 
retailers need to have knowledge of when consumers perceive a price increase as unfair 
and how to frame negative deviations within the right contexts (Kahneman, 1992; Ortmeyer, 
1993). 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
7.1 CONCLUSION 
The research presented here originates from the notion that reference dependence is 
dependent on the frame employed in describing gains and losses as deviations from the 
status quo (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). We evaluate this frame dependence from a 
price related perspective in order to more specifically examine the importance of price 
presentation and reference points on consumers' perceptions of changes in prices. 
Our empirical evidence on price manipulation is derived from the literature on reference 
prices (Chatterjee et al. 2000; Heath et al. 1995). In conformity with extant literature, we 
contribute to the growing body of literature on brand choice and consumer decision 
making (see for example Kalwani et al. 1990; Mayhew and Winer, 1986) by investigating 
the role of retailer’s past prices, competitor’s current prices, competitor's past prices, and 
consumer’s expectations of future prices on consumers’ perceptions of prices.  
Our baseline analysis rests on the principles of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985) and its 
implications for consumer choice. Challenging these mental accounting principles, we 
empirically show that the manipulation of reference points and price frame elicits reversals 
in Thaler’s (1985) proposed principles. In essence, our results provide evidence that mental 
accounting principles are frame dependent.  
This research re-analysed and extended the previous study by Heath et al. (1995) which 
suggested that explicitly stated reference states were omitted in the experiments from 
which Thaler’s (1985) mental accounting principles were derived.  
In the first instance, we evaluated internal reference price conceptualized as recently 
observed past prices of a retailer. We found that price framing significantly altered mental 
accounting principles, consumers’ perceptions of price and their purchase decisions. One 
of the ways percentage price framing filters into perceptions of price, is by making 
consumers more sensitive to the number of times a retailer’s prices change as opposed to 
the magnitude of the change in prices (Buyukkurt, 1986) and thereby, increasing the 
satisfaction derived from the purchase. For example, when percentage frames are utilized 
in signalling multiple price discounts, consumers perceive a greater transaction utility from 
making such a purchase. This in turn, encourages them to buy component products, or 
products related either in terms of their marginal substitutability or complementarity, as 
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seen for example, in the purchase of a chair and couch in our multiple gains scenario 
resulting from the reinforced preference to segregate.  
Second, as an extension, we investigated competitor’s current and competitor's past prices. 
Both are external reference prices, and are conceptualized in this research as prices of other 
competing products in the retailer’s product offerings present within the purchase 
environment. Our findings indicate that external reference prices have a more significant 
impact on consumers’ perceptions of prices relative to internal reference prices and 
emphatically, current prices have a higher impact as a standard of comparison than past 
prices. This is consistent with extant literature which suggests that consumers utilize 
competitive prices more than past prices during purchase decisions (Rajendran, 2009).  
Finally, we examined the impact of consumers’ expectations of a retailer’s future prices 
based on prior purchase experience which served as a benchmark for familiarity with the 
retailer’s previous prices. Expected prices are one of the conceptualizations of internal 
reference prices in price promotion literature and, in comparison with consumers’ recall of 
past prices, we found that price expectations do not have a significant effect on price 
perception. This was particularly evident in the mixed gains outcome where the 
consumer’s expectation of changes in prices was implicit in the decision problem and did 
not have a significant impact on mental accounting principles. Our rationale is that, in 
agreement with empirical findings (Rajendran, 2009), consumers do not interpret reference 
price as expected price (the predicted price of a product). Rather, they define reference 
price as fair prices (the appropriate or just price of a product). Furthermore, in relation to 
our assumption of the consumer's uncertainty about product prices, we propose that ‘brand 
confident’ consumers could be less sensitive to price framing manipulations. Laroche, Kim 
and Zhou (1996) echo this reasoning. Nevertheless, additional research is needed to 
examine the effect of types of decision makers and price framing on purchase decisions.    
 
7.2 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although our study provides some interesting findings on consumer purchase behaviour in 
relation to variations in prices, a few limitations are identified.   
First, our experiments employed questionnaires involving hypothetical decision scenarios. 
While this approach has some empirical support (Kuhberger et al. 2002) and is widely used 
in experimental studies, it is still open to criticism, as the artificial setting may limit the 
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generalizability of the results. In addition, the questionnaires employed in our experiments 
are not error-proof and could have been possibly misleading. 
Second, this study recruited post graduate students as subjects. Although the use of 
student-based samples has been criticized (see for example, Lynch, 1999), Bergmann and 
Grahn (1997) and Calder et al. (1981) argue that homogeneous sampling ameliorates the 
internal validity of research findings.  It is however probable that there could be a 
divergence between student samples and a non-student sample/generalized population due 
to the fact that students may not appropriately represent the market sector investigated 
herein. For example, in our questionnaires, the hypothetical products for purchase (chair 
and couch) are arguably, not everyday items on a typical postgraduate’s shopping list. It 
would be meaningful to cross-validate our findings with a sample more representative of 
the overall population. 
Lastly, we adapted questions from Thaler’s (1985) original experiments from which mental 
accounting principles were derived into our experiments (control) and these represented 
decision scenarios lacking explicit reference states. Although, these questions were similar 
to our treatment questions in context and contained relatively similar financial evaluations 
of the changes in prices as those in the treatment frames, they were not strictly the same in 
content and structure. In addition, while we obtained preferences which were consistent 
with MAPs in the control frame for mixed gains, mixed losses, and multiple losses 
outcomes, we were unable to replicate same in the multiple gains outcome. 
Future research should address the question of how reference prices are formed. One 
possible approach is to look into thought eliciting experiments which could provide better 
insights into the deliberate thought processes of decision makers.  
Another extension would be looking into the link or relationship between regret aversion 
and the formation of reference prices. We are of the opinion that decision makers form 
reference prices in an effort to avoid future regret concerning their purchase decisions. This 
is because consumers may anticipate the feeling of regret as a result of poor purchase 
decisions, (for example, buying a product just because it is on sale), so they attempt to 
rationalize their choices using reference prices, thereby, reducing the possibility of regret. 
Furthermore, because consumer products are many and varied and since our study focused 
on only one of such, it is not exhaustive. Additional insights might be obtained by 
extending this study to other categories of products and across multi-attribute retail 
settings.  
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Finally, most of the empirical work on reference prices have used scanner panel data 
sourced from frequently purchased goods. Therefore, there is further need to evaluate and 
study reference prices from contexts other than that previously studied. 
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APPENDIX 1 (CHAPTER 4) 
Consent form, Questionnaires, Analysis of repeated measures ANOVA, Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test 
Appendix 1-1  
Consent Form 
Title of Project: Evaluating consumer price perception: a mental accounting and frame 
dependent perspective. 
Name of Researcher: Agbato, Oluwadamilola 
  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the Plain Language Statement for the above 
study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time, without giving any reason. 
 
3.  I understand that my participation during this research project is not being audio or 
video recorded in any way.  
 
4.   I understand that participants will not be identified by pseudonym or name in any 
publications arising from the research and that the data will be completely 
anonymised. 
 
5.  I understand that the data from the research will be kept locked in filing cabinets at the 
University of Glasgow.  
 
6.   I understand that the data will not be retained beyond the end of the research project 
and that it would thereafter be completely shredded.  
 
7.  I understand that this research work has been given ethical approval by the College of 
Social Sciences Ethics Committee.  
  
8.  I agree / do not agree (delete as applicable) to take part in the above study.   
    
Name of Participant Date Signature 
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Appendix 1A – Questionnaires (Retailer’s past prices) 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is happier i.e. 
would you rather be Mr. A or Mr. B.   
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate the relative happiness of Mr. A and Mr. B.  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is happier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
happiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally happy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is happier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
happiness)  
 
 
Mixed Gains 
SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A wins £50 in a lottery, whereas Mr. B wins £100 in a lottery but un-expectedly owes 
his landlord £50 for damaging the carpet. 
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
     
 
SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1300 couch has been reduced to £1250; 
Mr. B finds that the originally priced £300 chair has been reduced to £200 while the price 
of the couch which had originally been £1000 had been increased to £1050. 
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 
 
 
155 
 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
SCENARIO 3 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1300 couch has been reduced by 3.84% 
to £1250; Mr. B finds that the originally priced £300 chair has been reduced by 33.3% to 
£200 while the price of the couch which had originally been £1000 had been increased by 
5% to £1050. 
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
SCENARIO 4 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1300 couch has been reduced by 
3.84%; Mr. B finds that the originally priced £300 chair has been reduced by 33.3% while 
the price of the couch which had originally been £1000 had been increased by 5%. 
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
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 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
Mixed Losses 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is unhappier.   
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate the relative unhappiness of Mr. A and Mr. B.  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is unhappier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
unhappiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally unhappy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is unhappier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
unhappiness) 
 
SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A’s car was damaged in a parking lot. He had to spend £150 to repair the damage. Mr. 
B’s car was damaged in a parking lot. He had to spend £200 to repair the damage. The same 
day the car was damaged, he won £50 in the office football pool.  
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
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SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1250 couch has been increased to £1300; 
Mr. B finds that the originally priced £200 chair has been increased to £300 while the price 
of the couch which had originally been £1050 has been reduced to £1000. 
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
SCENARIO 3 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1250 couch has been increased by 4% to 
£1300; Mr. B finds that the originally priced £200 chair has been increased by 50% to £300 
while the price of the couch which had originally been £1050 has been reduced by 4.76% to 
£1000.  
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
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SCENARIO 4 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair. On getting to the 
store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1250 couch has been increased by 4%; Mr. B 
finds that the originally priced £200 chair has been increased by 50% while the price of the 
couch which had originally been £1050 has been reduced by 4.76%. 
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
Multiple Gains 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is happier i.e. 
would you rather be Mr. A or Mr. B.   
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate the relative happiness of Mr. A and Mr. B.  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is happier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
happiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally happy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is happier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
happiness)  
 
 
SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A was given a ticket to a lottery. He won £100. Mr. B was given tickets to 2 lotteries. 
He won £75 in one lottery and £25 in the other.  
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
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SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1300 couch has been reduced to £1200; 
Mr. B finds that the originally priced £300 chair has been reduced to £240 while the price of 
the couch which had originally been £1000 had been reduced to £960. 
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7          8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
SCENARIO 3 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1300 couch has been reduced by 7.69% 
to £1200; Mr. B finds that the originally priced £300 chair has been reduced by 20% to £240 
while the price of the couch which had originally been £1000 had been reduced by 4% to 
£960. 
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B  
 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
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SCENARIO 4 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair. 
At the store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1300 couch has been reduced by 7.69%; 
Mr. B finds that the originally priced £300 chair has been reduced by 20% while the price of 
the couch which had originally been £1000 had been reduced by 4%. 
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B  
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7          8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple Losses 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is unhappier.   
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate the relative unhappiness of Mr. A and Mr. B.  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is unhappier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
unhappiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally unhappy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is unhappier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
unhappiness) 
 
 
 
SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A received a letter from the HM Revenue and Customs saying that he made a minor 
arithmetical mistake on his tax return and owed £100. There was no repercussion from the 
mistake. Mr. B received a letter from the HM Revenue and Customs saying that he made a 
minor arithmetical mistake on his tax return and owed £75 He received a similar letter the 
same day from the Council saying he owed £25 in council taxes. There were no 
repercussions from either mistake.  
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Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7          8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1250 couch has been increased to £1350; 
Mr. B finds that the originally priced £200 chair has been increased to £250 while the price 
of the couch which had originally been £1050 has been increased to £1100.  
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7          8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
SCENARIO 3 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1250 couch has been increased by 8% to 
£1350; Mr. B finds that the originally priced £200 chair has been increased by 25% to £250 
while the price of the couch which had originally been £1050 has been increased by 4.76% 
to £1100.  
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7          8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
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SCENARIO 4 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the originally priced £1250 couch has been increased by 8%; 
Mr. B finds that the originally priced £200 chair has been increased by 25% while the price 
of the couch which had originally been £1050 has been increased by 4.76%.  
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7          8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1B - Analysis of repeated measures ANOVA 
Mixed Gains 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Dependent 
Variable 
1 Control 
2 Absolute 
3 Dual 
4 Relative 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Control 6.1667 3.06201 48 
Absolute 8.0208 3.48547 48 
Dual 8.8125 3.33043 48 
Relative 8.8542 3.87567 48 
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Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df 
Sig. Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power
c
 
Frame 
Pillai's Trace .329 7.341
b
 3.000 45.000 .000 22.023  .976 
Wilks' Lambda .671 7.341
b
 3.000 45.000 .000 22.023  .976 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
.489 7.341
b
 3.000 45.000 .000 22.023  .976 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.489 7.341
b
 3.000 45.000 .000 22.023     .976 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
c. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchly's W Approx. Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .609 22.684 5 .000 .776 .819 .333 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power
a
 
Frame 
Linear 188.151 1 188.151 14.597 .000 14.597 .963 
Quadratic 39.422 1 39.422 5.460 .024 5.460 .629 
Cubic .234 1 .234 .061 .806 .061 .057 
Error 
(Frame) 
Linear 605.799 47 12.889 
    
Quadratic 339.328 47 7.220 
    
Cubic 181.316 47 3.858 
    
a. Computed using alpha = .05 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power
a
 
Intercept 12176.255 1 12176.255 514.415 .000 514.415 1.000 
Error 1112.495 47 23.670 
    
a. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
 
 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
Control .500 
Absolute .500 
Dual .500 
Relative .500 
 
Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable Frame 
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Control -.671 .500 -.224 
Absolute -.224 -.500 .671 
Dual .224 -.500 -.671 
Relative .671 .500 .224 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
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Estimated Marginal Means 
Frame 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable Frame 
1 2 3 4 
Control 1 0 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 0 
Dual 0 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 0 1 
 
Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 6.167 .442 5.278 7.056 
2 8.021 .503 7.009 9.033 
3 8.813 .481 7.845 9.780 
4 8.854 .559 7.729 9.980 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig.
b
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
b
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 -1.854
*
 .513 .004 -3.263 -.445 
3 -2.646
*
 .590 .000 -4.266 -1.026 
4 -2.688
*
 .671 .001 -4.531 -.844 
2 
1 1.854
*
 .513 .004 .445 3.263 
3 -.792 .497 .530 -2.157 .574 
4 -.833 .693 .800 -2.736 1.069 
3 
1 2.646
*
 .590 .000 1.026 4.266 
2 .792 .497 .530 -.574 2.157 
4 -.042 .456 1.000 -1.295 1.212 
4 
1 2.688
*
 .671 .001 .844 4.531 
2 .833 .693 .800 -1.069 2.736 
3 .042 .456 1.000 -1.212 1.295 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed Losses 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Dependent 
Variable 
1 Control 
2 Absolute 
3 Dual 
4 Relative 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Control 7.2708 3.52945 48 
Absolute 7.7083 3.38305 48 
Dual 8.7083 3.47611 48 
Relative 8.9583 3.46998 48 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power
b
 
Pillai's trace .329 7.341
a
 3.000 45.000 .000 22.023 .976 
Wilks' lambda .671 7.341
a
 3.000 45.000 .000 22.023 .976 
Hotelling's trace .489 7.341
a
 3.000 45.000 .000 22.023 .976 
Roy's largest 
root 
.489 7.341
a
 3.000 45.000 .000 22.023 .976 
 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise 
comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
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Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame 
Pillai's Trace .140 2.435
b
 3.000 45.000 .077 
Wilks' Lambda .860 2.435
b
 3.000 45.000 .077 
Hotelling's Trace .162 2.435
b
 3.000 45.000 .077 
Roy's Largest Root .162 2.435
b
 3.000 45.000 .077 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
 
 
 
 
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchly's W Approx. Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .424 39.254 5 .000 .674 .704 .333 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame 
Sphericity Assumed 92.766 3 30.922 4.270 .006 
Greenhouse-Geisser 92.766 2.021 45.896 4.270 .016 
Huynh-Feldt 92.766 2.112 43.913 4.270 .015 
Lower-bound 92.766 1.000 92.766 4.270 .044 
Error (Frame) 
Sphericity Assumed 1020.984 141 7.241   
Greenhouse-Geisser 1020.984 94.996 10.748   
Huynh-Feldt 1020.984 99.287 10.283   
Lower-bound 1020.984 47.000 21.723   
 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame 
Linear 
88.209 1 88.209 6.78
0 
.012 
Quadratic .422 1 .422 .110 .741 
Cubic 4.134 1 4.134 .846 .362 
Error (Frame) 
Linear 611.441 47 13.009   
Quadratic 179.828 47 3.826   
Cubic 229.716 47 4.888   
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 12789.005 1 12789.005 486.217 .000 
Error 1236.245 47 26.303   
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
Control .500 
Absolute .500 
Dual .500 
Relative .500 
 
 
Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable Frame 
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Control -.671 .500 -.224 
Absolute -.224 -.500 .671 
Dual .224 -.500 -.671 
Relative .671 .500 .224 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
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Estimated Marginal Means 
Frame 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable Frame 
1 2 3 4 
Control 1 0 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 0 
Dual 0 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 0 1 
 
 
Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 7.271 .509 6.246 8.296 
2 7.708 .488 6.726 8.691 
3 8.708 .502 7.699 9.718 
4 8.958 .501 7.951 9.966 
 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig.
a
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
a
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 -.438 .544 .964 -1.932 1.057 
3 -1.438 .658 .187 -3.244 .369 
4 -1.688 .689 .104 -3.581 .206 
2 
1 .438 .544 .964 -1.057 1.932 
3 -1.000 .520 .312 -2.428 .428 
4 -1.250 .495 .087 -2.610 .110 
3 
1 1.438 .658 .187 -.369 3.244 
2 1.000 .520 .312 -.428 2.428 
4 -.250 .301 .958 -1.078 .578 
4 
1 1.688 .689 .104 -.206 3.581 
2 1.250 .495 .087 -.110 2.610 
3 .250 .301 .958 -.578 1.078 
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Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .140 2.435
a
 3.000 45.000 .077 
Wilks' lambda .860 2.435
a
 3.000 45.000 .077 
Hotelling's trace .162 2.435
a
 3.000 45.000 .077 
Roy's largest root .162 2.435
a
 3.000 45.000 .077 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
 
 
 
Multiple Gains 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Dependent 
Variable 
1 Control 
2 Absolute 
3 Dual 
4 Relative 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Control 7.5778 2.64995 45 
Absolute 9.4889 2.41795 45 
Dual 9.8889 2.21793 45 
Relative 9.7556 2.64709 45 
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Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame 
Pillai's Trace .304 6.125
b
 3.000 42.000 .001 
Wilks' Lambda .696 6.125
b
 3.000 42.000 .001 
Hotelling's Trace .437 6.125
b
 3.000 42.000 .001 
Roy's Largest Root .437 6.125
b
 3.000 42.000 .001 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
 
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchly's W Approx. Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .445 34.590 5 .000 .738 .779 .333 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame 
Sphericity Assumed 157.333 3 52.444 9.315 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 157.333 2.214 71.053 9.315 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 157.333 2.337 67.329 9.315 .000 
Lower-bound 157.333 1.000 157.333 9.315 .004 
Error (Frame) 
Sphericity Assumed 743.167 132 5.630   
Greenhouse-Geisser 743.167 97.429 7.628   
Huynh-Feldt 743.167 102.818 7.228   
Lower-bound 743.167 44.000 16.890   
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame 
Linear 108.160 1 108.160 13.229 .001 
Quadratic 47.022 1 47.022 9.217 .004 
Cubic 2.151 1 2.151 .595 .444 
Error (Frame) 
Linear 359.740 44 8.176   
Quadratic 224.478 44 5.102   
Cubic 158.949 44 3.612   
 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 15161.689 1 15161.689 1918.036 .000 
Error 347.811 44 7.905   
 
 
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
Control .500 
Absolute .500 
Dual .500 
Relative .500 
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Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable Frame 
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Control -.671 .500 -.224 
Absolute -.224 -.500 .671 
Dual .224 -.500 -.671 
Relative .671 .500 .224 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
 
 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Frame 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable Frame 
1 2 3 4 
Control 1 0 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 0 
Dual 0 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 0 1 
 
 
 
 
Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 7.578 .395 6.782 8.374 
2 9.489 .360 8.762 10.215 
3 9.889 .331 9.223 10.555 
4 9.756 .395 8.960 10.551 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig.
b
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
b
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 -1.911
*
 .610 .018 -3.590 -.232 
3 -2.311
*
 .531 .000 -3.773 -.849 
4 -2.178
*
 .599 .004 -3.828 -.528 
2 
1 1.911
*
 .610 .018 .232 3.590 
3 -.400 .406 .910 -1.519 .719 
4 -.267 .497 .996 -1.635 1.102 
3 
1 2.311
*
 .531 .000 .849 3.773 
2 .400 .406 .910 -.719 1.519 
4 .133 .278 .998 -.633 .900 
4 
1 2.178
*
 .599 .004 .528 3.828 
2 .267 .497 .996 -1.102 1.635 
3 -.133 .278 .998 -.900 .633 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .304 6.125
a
 3.000 42.000 .001 
Wilks' lambda .696 6.125
a
 3.000 42.000 .001 
Hotelling's trace .437 6.125
a
 3.000 42.000 .001 
Roy's largest root .437 6.125
a
 3.000 42.000 .001 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
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Multiple Losses 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Dependent 
Variable 
1 Control 
2 Absolute 
3 Dual 
4 Relative 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Control 9.2444 3.05373 45 
Absolute 8.8889 3.09855 45 
Dual 9.8000 3.01963 45 
Relative 10.0444 2.75479 45 
 
 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame 
Pillai's Trace .116 1.837
b
 3.000 42.000 .155 
Wilks' Lambda .884 1.837
b
 3.000 42.000 .155 
Hotelling's Trace .131 1.837
b
 3.000 42.000 .155 
Roy's Largest Root .131 1.837
b
 3.000 42.000 .155 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
 
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchly's W Approx. Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .582 23.144 5 .000 .814 .865 .333 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
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a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame 
Sphericity Assumed 37.128 3 12.376 2.376 .073 
Greenhouse-Geisser 37.128 2.441 15.210 2.376 .087 
Huynh-Feldt 37.128 2.595 14.307 2.376 .083 
Lower-bound 37.128 1.000 37.128 2.376 .130 
Error (Frame) 
Sphericity Assumed 687.622 132 5.209   
Greenhouse-Geisser 687.622 107.405 6.402   
Huynh-Feldt 687.622 114.180 6.022   
Lower-bound 687.622 44.000 15.628   
 
 
 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame 
Linear 24.668 1 24.668 3.769 .059 
Quadratic 4.050 1 4.050 .918 .343 
Cubic 8.410 1 8.410 1.801 .186 
Error (Frame) 
Linear 287.982 44 6.545   
Quadratic 194.200 44 4.414   
Cubic 205.440 44 4.669   
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 16226.006 1 16226.006 811.075 .000 
Error 880.244 44 20.006   
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
Control .500 
Absolute .500 
Dual .500 
Relative .500 
 
Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable Frame 
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Control -.671 .500 -.224 
Absolute -.224 -.500 .671 
Dual .224 -.500 -.671 
Relative .671 .500 .224 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
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Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Frame 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable Frame 
1 2 3 4 
Control 1 0 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 0 
Dual 0 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 0 1 
Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 9.244 .455 8.327 10.162 
2 8.889 .462 7.958 9.820 
3 9.800 .450 8.893 10.707 
4 10.044 .411 9.217 10.872 
 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig.
a
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
a
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 .356 .545 .987 -1.146 1.857 
3 -.556 .511 .864 -1.963 .852 
4 -.800 .497 .518 -2.169 .569 
2 
1 -.356 .545 .987 -1.857 1.146 
3 -.911 .501 .378 -2.292 .470 
4 -1.156 .506 .154 -2.551 .240 
3 
1 .556 .511 .864 -.852 1.963 
2 .911 .501 .378 -.470 2.292 
4 -.244 .276 .943 -1.003 .515 
4 
1 .800 .497 .518 -.569 2.169 
2 1.156 .506 .154 -.240 2.551 
3 .244 .276 .943 -.515 1.003 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
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Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .116 1.837
a
 3.000 42.000 .155 
Wilks' lambda .884 1.837
a
 3.000 42.000 .155 
Hotelling's trace .131 1.837
a
 3.000 42.000 .155 
Roy's largest root .131 1.837
a
 3.000 42.000 .155 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
 
 
 
Appendix 1C - Wilcoxon signed-rank tests 
Mixed Gains 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 48 5.0000 8.0000 11.0000 
Dual 48 7.2500 9.0000 11.0000 
Relative 48 6.2500 9.5000 12.0000 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.76 
Dual 2.04 
Relative 2.20 
 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 48 
Chi-Square 7.248 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .027 
a. Friedman Test 
 
181 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 48 8.0208 3.48547 2.00 15.00 5.0000 8.0000 11.0000 
Dual 48 8.8125 3.33043 2.00 14.00 7.2500 9.0000 11.0000 
Relative 48 8.8542 3.87567 1.00 15.00 6.2500 9.5000 12.0000 
 
 
 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Dual - Absolute 
Negative Ranks 9
a
 16.11 145.00 
Positive Ranks 21
b
 15.24 320.00 
Ties 18
c
   
Total 48   
Relative - Dual 
Negative Ranks 8
d
 13.31 106.50 
Positive Ranks 16
e
 12.09 193.50 
Ties 24
f
   
Total 48   
Relative - Absolute 
Negative Ranks 12
g
 19.21 230.50 
Positive Ranks 23
h
 17.37 399.50 
Ties 13
i
   
Total 48   
a. Dual < Absolute 
b. Dual > Absolute 
c. Dual = Absolute 
d. Relative < Dual 
e. Relative > Dual 
f. Relative = Dual 
g. Relative < Absolute 
h. Relative > Absolute 
i. Relative = Absolute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
182 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - Dual Relative - 
Absolute 
Z -1.808
b
 -1.258
b
 -1.387
b
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .071 .208 .166 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on negative ranks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed Losses 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 48 5.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
Dual 48 6.0000 9.0000 12.0000 
Relative 48 6.2500 9.0000 11.7500 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.70 
Dual 2.06 
Relative 2.24 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 48 
Chi-Square 10.493 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .005 
a. Friedman Test 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 48 7.7083 3.38305 1.00 14.00 5.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
Dual 48 8.7083 3.47611 2.00 15.00 6.0000 9.0000 12.0000 
Relative 48 8.9583 3.46998 2.00 15.00 6.2500 9.0000 11.7500 
 
 
 
 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Dual - Absolute 
Negative Ranks 10
a
 15.50 155.00 
Positive Ranks 21
b
 16.24 341.00 
Ties 17
c
   
Total 48   
Relative - Absolute 
Negative Ranks 9
d
 16.89 152.00 
Positive Ranks 27
e
 19.04 514.00 
Ties 12
f
   
Total 48   
Relative - Dual 
Negative Ranks 12
g
 13.92 167.00 
Positive Ranks 17
h
 15.76 268.00 
Ties 19
i
   
Total 48   
a. Dual < Absolute 
b. Dual > Absolute 
c. Dual = Absolute 
d. Relative < Absolute 
e. Relative > Absolute 
f. Relative = Absolute 
g. Relative < Dual 
h. Relative > Dual 
i. Relative = Dual 
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Test Statistics
a
 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - 
Absolute 
Relative - Dual 
Z -1.830
b
 -2.873
b
 -1.109
b
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .067 .004 .267 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on negative ranks. 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple Gains 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 45 8.0000 9.0000 11.0000 
Dual 45 8.0000 10.0000 11.5000 
Relative 45 8.0000 10.0000 12.0000 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.84 
Dual 2.02 
Relative 2.13 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 45 
Chi-Square 3.185 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .203 
a. Friedman Test 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 45 9.4889 2.41795 3.00 14.00 8.0000 9.0000 11.0000 
Dual 45 9.8889 2.21793 5.00 15.00 8.0000 10.0000 11.5000 
Relative 45 9.7556 2.64709 3.00 15.00 8.0000 10.0000 12.0000 
 
 
 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Dual - Absolute 
Negative Ranks 9
a
 11.22 101.00 
Positive Ranks 14
b
 12.50 175.00 
Ties 22
c
   
Total 45   
Relative - Absolute 
Negative Ranks 11
d
 20.36 224.00 
Positive Ranks 20
e
 13.60 272.00 
Ties 14
f
   
Total 45   
Relative - Dual 
Negative Ranks 10
g
 14.25 142.50 
Positive Ranks 13
h
 10.27 133.50 
Ties 22
i
   
Total 45   
a. Dual < Absolute 
b. Dual > Absolute 
c. Dual = Absolute 
d. Relative < Absolute 
e. Relative > Absolute 
f. Relative = Absolute 
g. Relative < Dual 
h. Relative > Dual 
i. Relative = Dual 
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Test Statistics
a
 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - 
Absolute 
Relative - Dual 
Z -1.133
b
 -.473
b
 -.139
c
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .257 .636 .890 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on negative ranks. 
c. Based on positive ranks. 
 
 
 
 
Multiple Losses 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 45 7.0000 8.0000 12.0000 
Dual 45 8.0000 10.0000 12.0000 
Relative 45 8.0000 10.0000 11.5000 
 
 
 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.71 
Dual 2.10 
Relative 2.19 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 45 
Chi-Square 9.596 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .008 
a. Friedman Test 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 45 8.8889 3.09855 1.00 15.00 7.0000 8.0000 12.0000 
Dual 45 9.8000 3.01963 2.00 15.00 8.0000 10.0000 12.0000 
Relative 45 10.0444 2.75479 4.00 15.00 8.0000 10.0000 11.5000 
 
 
 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Dual - Absolute 
Negative Ranks 7
a
 14.79 103.50 
Positive Ranks 19
b
 13.03 247.50 
Ties 19
c
   
Total 45   
Relative - Absolute 
Negative Ranks 9
d
 15.33 138.00 
Positive Ranks 23
e
 16.96 390.00 
Ties 13
f
   
Total 45   
Relative - Dual 
Negative Ranks 8
g
 10.38 83.00 
Positive Ranks 11
h
 9.73 107.00 
Ties 26
i
   
Total 45   
a. Dual < Absolute 
b. Dual > Absolute 
c. Dual = Absolute 
d. Relative < Absolute 
e. Relative > Absolute 
f. Relative = Absolute 
g. Relative < Dual 
h. Relative > Dual 
i. Relative = Dual 
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Test Statistics
a
 
 Dual - Absolute Relative - 
Absolute 
Relative - Dual 
Z -1.836
b
 -2.373
b
 -.491
b
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .066 .018 .623 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on negative ranks. 
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APPENDIXES 2 & 3 (CHAPTER 5) 
Questionnaires, Analysis of repeated measures ANOVA, Linear mixed model and 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
 
Appendix 2A - Questionnaires (Competitor’s current prices) 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is happier i.e. 
would you rather be Mr. A or Mr. B.   
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate the relative happiness of Mr. A and Mr. B.  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is happier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
happiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally happy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is happier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
happiness)  
 
Mixed Gains 
SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A expected a Christmas bonus of £300. He received his check and found it was for 
£250. Mr. B expected a Christmas bonus of $300. He received his check and the amount 
was indeed £300. A week later he received a note saying that there had been an error in 
this bonus check. The check was £50 too high. He must return the £50.   
 
Who is happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been 
reduced to £1250; a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same store is 
priced at £1250. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set out to 
buy have been reduced to £100 and increased to £1150 respectively. A competitor’s chair 
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and couch of the same quality and within the same store goes for £100 and £1150 
respectively.   
Who is happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
SCENARIO 3 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been 
reduced by 3.84% to £1250; a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same 
store is priced at £1250. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set 
out to buy have been reduced by 50% to £100 and increased by 4.5% to £1150 respectively. 
A competitor’s chair and couch of the same quality and within the same store goes for £100 
and £1150 respectively.   
 
Who is happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
SCENARIO 4 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been 
reduced by 3.84%; a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same store is 
priced at £1250. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set out to 
buy have been reduced by 50% and increased by 4.5% respectively. A competitor’s chair 
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and couch of the same quality and within the same store goes for £100 and £1150 
respectively.   
 
Who is happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
Mixed Losses 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is unhappier.   
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate the relative unhappiness of Mr. A and Mr. B.  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is unhappier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
unhappiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally unhappy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is unhappier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
unhappiness 
 
SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A’s car was damaged in a parking lot. He had to spend £150 to repair the damage. Mr. 
B’s car was damaged in a parking lot. He had to spend £200 to repair the damage. The same 
day the car was damaged, he won £50 in the office football pool.  
 
Who is unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
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SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1250 couch he set out to buy has been 
increased to £1300; a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same store is 
priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1050 couch he set out to 
buy have been reduced to £150 and increased to £1150 respectively. A competitor’s chair 
and couch of the same quality and within the same store goes for £150 and £1150 
respectively.   
 
Who is unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
SCENARIO 3 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1250 couch he set out to buy has been 
increased by 4% to £1300; a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same 
store is priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1050 couch he set 
out to buy have been reduced by 25% to £150 and increased by 9.5% to £1150 respectively. 
A competitor’s chair and couch of the same quality and within the same store goes for £150 
and £1150 respectively.   
 
Who is unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
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SCENARIO 4 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1250 couch he set out to buy has been 
increased by 4%; a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same store is 
priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1050 couch he set out to 
buy have been reduced by 25% and increased by 9.5% respectively. A competitor’s chair 
and couch of the same quality and within the same store goes for £150 and £1150 
respectively.   
 
Who is unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
 
Multiple Gains 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is happier i.e. 
would you rather be Mr. A or Mr. B.   
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate the relative happiness of Mr. A and Mr. B.  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is happier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
happiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally happy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is happier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
happiness)  
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SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A was given a ticket to a lottery. He won £100. Mr. B was given tickets. He won £75 in 
one lottery and £25 in the other.  
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been 
reduced to £1200; a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same store is 
priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set out to 
buy have been reduced to £150 and £1050 respectively. A competitor’s chair and couch of 
the same quality and within the same store goes for £200 and £1100 respectively.   
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
SCENARIO 3 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been 
reduced by 7.69% to £1200; a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same 
store is priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set 
out to buy have been reduced by 25% and 4.54% to £150 and £1050 respectively. A 
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competitor’s chair and couch of the same quality and within the same store goes for £200 
and £1100 respectively.   
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
SCENARIO 4 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been 
reduced by 7.69%; a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same store is 
priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set out to 
buy have been reduced by 25% and 4.54% respectively. A competitor’s chair and couch of 
the same quality and within the same store goes for £200 and £1100 respectively.   
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
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Multiple Losses 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is unhappier.   
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate the relative unhappiness of Mr. A and Mr. B.  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is unhappier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
unhappiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally unhappy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is unhappier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
unhappiness 
 
SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A received a letter from the HM Revenue and Customs saying that he made a minor 
arithmetical mistake on his tax return and owed £100. There was no repercussion from the 
mistake. Mr. B received a letter from the HM Revenue and Customs saying that he made a 
minor arithmetical mistake on his tax return and owed £75. He received a similar letter the 
same day from the Council saying he owed £25 in council taxes. There were no 
repercussions from either mistake.   
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1200 couch he set out to buy has been 
increased to £1300; a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same store is 
priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1000 couch he set out to 
buy have been increased to £250 and £1050 respectively. A competitor’s chair and couch of 
the same quality and within the same store goes for £250 and £1050 respectively.   
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Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7          8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
SCENARIO 3 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1200 couch he set out to buy has been 
increased by 8.33% to £1300; a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same 
store is priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1000 couch he set 
out to buy have been increased by 25% and 5% to £250 and £1050 respectively. A 
competitor’s chair and couch of the same quality and within the same store goes for £250 
and £1050 respectively.   
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
SCENARIO 4 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1200 couch he set out to buy has been 
increased by 8.33%; a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same store is 
priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the prices of the £200 chair and £1000 couch he set out to 
buy have been increased by 25% and 5% respectively. A competitor’s chair and couch of the 
same quality and within the same store goes for £250 and £1050 respectively.   
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
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 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2B - Analysis of repeated measures ANOVA (Competitor’s current prices)  
 
Mixed Gains 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 Control 
2 Absolute 
3 Dual 
4 Relative 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Control 5.3333 2.93329 33 
Absolute 8.1212 3.29543 33 
Dual 8.0909 3.68581 33 
Relative 9.3939 3.05102 33 
 
 
 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame Pillai's Trace .542 11.815
b
 3.000 30.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .458 11.815
b
 3.000 30.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace 1.181 11.815
b
 3.000 30.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root 1.181 11.815
b
 3.000 30.000 .000 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
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Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .827 5.825 5 .324 .900 .991 .333 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Sphericity Assumed 290.265 3 96.755 14.010 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 290.265 2.700 107.507 14.010 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 290.265 2.973 97.645 14.010 .000 
Lower-bound 290.265 1.000 290.265 14.010 .001 
Error (Frame) Sphericity Assumed 662.985 96 6.906   
Greenhouse-Geisser 662.985 86.399 7.674   
Huynh-Feldt 662.985 95.125 6.970   
Lower-bound 662.985 32.000 20.718   
 
 
 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Linear 243.638 1 243.638 30.276 .000 
Quadratic 18.189 1 18.189 2.471 .126 
Cubic 28.438 1 28.438 5.356 .027 
Error (Frame) Linear 257.512 32 8.047   
Quadratic 235.561 32 7.361   
Cubic 169.912 32 5.310   
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 7897.280 1 7897.280 364.944 .000 
Error 692.470 32 21.640   
 
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
 
Average 
Measure:   
MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
Control .500 
Absolute .500 
Dual .500 
Relative .500 
 
 
Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Control -.671 .500 -.224 
Absolute -.224 -.500 .671 
Dual .224 -.500 -.671 
Relative .671 .500 .224 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
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Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Frame 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
1 2 3 4 
Control 1 0 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 0 
Dual 0 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 0 1 
 
 
Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 5.333 .511 4.293 6.373 
2 8.121 .574 6.953 9.290 
3 8.091 .642 6.784 9.398 
4 9.394 .531 8.312 10.476 
 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
b
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
b
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -2.788
*
 .725 .003 -4.828 -.748 
3 -2.758
*
 .714 .003 -4.765 -.750 
4 -4.061
*
 .674 .000 -5.956 -2.165 
2 1 2.788
*
 .725 .003 .748 4.828 
3 .030 .596 1.000 -1.646 1.706 
4 -1.273 .643 .339 -3.081 .535 
3 1 2.758
*
 .714 .003 .750 4.765 
2 -.030 .596 1.000 -1.706 1.646 
4 -1.303 .503 .086 -2.717 .111 
4 1 4.061
*
 .674 .000 2.165 5.956 
2 1.273 .643 .339 -.535 3.081 
3 1.303 .503 .086 -.111 2.717 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
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Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .542 11.815
a
 3.000 30.000 .000 
Wilks' lambda .458 11.815
a
 3.000 30.000 .000 
Hotelling's trace 1.181 11.815
a
 3.000 30.000 .000 
Roy's largest root 1.181 11.815
a
 3.000 30.000 .000 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
 
 
 
 
Mixed Losses 
 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 Control 
2 Absolute 
3 Dual 
4 Relative 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Control 6.6970 3.28334 33 
Absolute 6.4242 2.98988 33 
Dual 7.0000 2.64575 33 
Relative 7.9697 2.84479 33 
 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame Pillai's Trace .193 2.386
b
 3.000 30.000 .089 
Wilks' Lambda .807 2.386
b
 3.000 30.000 .089 
Hotelling's Trace .239 2.386
b
 3.000 30.000 .089 
Roy's Largest Root .239 2.386
b
 3.000 30.000 .089 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
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Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .749 8.889 5 .114 .850 .929 .333 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Sphericity Assumed 44.932 3 14.977 2.158 .098 
Greenhouse-Geisser 44.932 2.549 17.627 2.158 .109 
Huynh-Feldt 44.932 2.788 16.115 2.158 .103 
Lower-bound 44.932 1.000 44.932 2.158 .152 
Error (Frame) Sphericity Assumed 666.318 96 6.941   
Greenhouse-Geisser 666.318 81.568 8.169   
Huynh-Feldt 666.318 89.224 7.468   
Lower-bound 666.318 32.000 20.822   
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Linear 31.856 1 31.856 3.075 .089 
Quadratic 12.735 1 12.735 2.931 .097 
Cubic .341 1 .341 .056 .815 
Error (Frame) Linear 331.494 32 10.359   
Quadratic 139.015 32 4.344   
Cubic 195.809 32 6.119   
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 6510.068 1 6510.068 465.335 .000 
Error 447.682 32 13.990   
 
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
Control .500 
Absolute .500 
Dual .500 
Relative .500 
 
 
 
Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Control -.671 .500 -.224 
Absolute -.224 -.500 .671 
Dual .224 -.500 -.671 
Relative .671 .500 .224 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
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Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Frame 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
1 2 3 4 
Control 1 0 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 0 
Dual 0 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 0 1 
 
 
 
Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 6.697 .572 5.533 7.861 
2 6.424 .520 5.364 7.484 
3 7.000 .461 6.062 7.938 
4 7.970 .495 6.961 8.978 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
a
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
a
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .273 .666 1.000 -1.601 2.146 
3 -.303 .680 1.000 -2.217 1.611 
4 -1.273 .778 .669 -3.460 .914 
2 1 -.273 .666 1.000 -2.146 1.601 
3 -.576 .628 1.000 -2.341 1.190 
4 -1.545 .611 .099 -3.264 .173 
3 1 .303 .680 1.000 -1.611 2.217 
2 .576 .628 1.000 -1.190 2.341 
4 -.970 .495 .354 -2.362 .423 
4 1 1.273 .778 .669 -.914 3.460 
2 1.545 .611 .099 -.173 3.264 
3 .970 .495 .354 -.423 2.362 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
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Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .193 2.386
a
 3.000 30.000 .089 
Wilks' lambda .807 2.386
a
 3.000 30.000 .089 
Hotelling's trace .239 2.386
a
 3.000 30.000 .089 
Roy's largest root .239 2.386
a
 3.000 30.000 .089 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
 
 
 
Multiple Gains 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 Control 
2 Absolute 
3 Dual 
4 Relative 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Control 7.7895 3.37044 38 
Absolute 8.2895 2.85608 38 
Dual 10.3684 2.40968 38 
Relative 10.5526 2.84460 38 
 
 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame Pillai's Trace .388 7.406
b
 3.000 35.000 .001 
Wilks' Lambda .612 7.406
b
 3.000 35.000 .001 
Hotelling's Trace .635 7.406
b
 3.000 35.000 .001 
Roy's Largest Root .635 7.406
b
 3.000 35.000 .001 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
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Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .452 28.390 5 .000 .740 .789 .333 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
 
 
 
  
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Sphericity Assumed 228.132 3 76.044 9.874 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 228.132 2.219 102.820 9.874 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 228.132 2.367 96.397 9.874 .000 
Lower-bound 228.132 1.000 228.132 9.874 .003 
Error(Frame) Sphericity Assumed 854.868 111 7.702   
Greenhouse-Geisser 854.868 82.094 10.413   
Huynh-Feldt 854.868 87.563 9.763   
Lower-bound 854.868 37.000 23.105   
 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Linear 204.258 1 204.258 16.410 .000 
Quadratic .947 1 .947 .177 .676 
Cubic 22.926 1 22.926 4.322 .045 
Error (Frame) Linear 460.542 37 12.447   
Quadratic 198.053 37 5.353   
Cubic 196.274 37 5.305   
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 13005.500 1 13005.500 1261.346 .000 
Error 381.500 37 10.311   
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
Control .500 
Absolute .500 
Dual .500 
Relative .500 
 
 
Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Control -.671 .500 -.224 
Absolute -.224 -.500 .671 
Dual .224 -.500 -.671 
Relative .671 .500 .224 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Frame 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
1 2 3 4 
Control 1 0 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 0 
Dual 0 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 0 1 
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Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 7.789 .547 6.682 8.897 
2 8.289 .463 7.351 9.228 
3 10.368 .391 9.576 11.160 
4 10.553 .461 9.618 11.488 
 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
b
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
b
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -.500 .726 1.000 -2.524 1.524 
3 -2.579
*
 .654 .002 -4.402 -.756 
4 -2.763
*
 .797 .008 -4.985 -.542 
2 1 .500 .726 1.000 -1.524 2.524 
3 -2.079
*
 .547 .003 -3.604 -.554 
4 -2.263
*
 .641 .007 -4.050 -.477 
3 1 2.579
*
 .654 .002 .756 4.402 
2 2.079
*
 .547 .003 .554 3.604 
4 -.184 .363 1.000 -1.197 .829 
4 1 2.763
*
 .797 .008 .542 4.985 
2 2.263
*
 .641 .007 .477 4.050 
3 .184 .363 1.000 -.829 1.197 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .388 7.406
a
 3.000 35.000 .001 
Wilks' lambda .612 7.406
a
 3.000 35.000 .001 
Hotelling's trace .635 7.406
a
 3.000 35.000 .001 
Roy's largest root .635 7.406
a
 3.000 35.000 .001 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
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Multiple Losses 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 Control 
2 Absolute 
3 Dual 
4 Relative 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Control 9.6316 3.06172 38 
Absolute 8.2895 2.85608 38 
Dual 9.3684 3.02620 38 
Relative 9.9737 3.06230 38 
 
 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame Pillai's Trace .259 4.084
b
 3.000 35.000 .014 
Wilks' Lambda .741 4.084
b
 3.000 35.000 .014 
Hotelling's Trace .350 4.084
b
 3.000 35.000 .014 
Roy's Largest Root .350 4.084
b
 3.000 35.000 .014 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchly's 
W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .678 13.896 5 .016 .783 .839 .333 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Sphericity Assumed 60.368 3 20.123 3.476 .018 
Greenhouse-Geisser 60.368 2.349 25.702 3.476 .029 
Huynh-Feldt 60.368 2.518 23.975 3.476 .025 
Lower-bound 60.368 1.000 60.368 3.476 .070 
Error (Frame) Sphericity Assumed 642.632 111 5.789   
Greenhouse-Geisser 642.632 86.904 7.395   
Huynh-Feldt 642.632 93.167 6.898   
Lower-bound 642.632 37.000 17.368   
 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Linear 8.421 1 8.421 .871 .357 
Quadratic 36.026 1 36.026 9.592 .004 
Cubic 15.921 1 15.921 4.038 .052 
Error (Frame) Linear 357.779 37 9.670   
Quadratic 138.974 37 3.756   
Cubic 145.879 37 3.943   
 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 13191.158 1 13191.158 705.469 .000 
Error 691.842 37 18.698   
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Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
Control .500 
Absolute .500 
Dual .500 
Relative .500 
 
 
 
Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Control -.671 .500 -.224 
Absolute -.224 -.500 .671 
Dual .224 -.500 -.671 
Relative .671 .500 .224 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Frame 
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
1 2 3 4 
Control 1 0 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 0 
Dual 0 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 0 1 
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Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 9.632 .497 8.625 10.638 
2 8.289 .463 7.351 9.228 
3 9.368 .491 8.374 10.363 
4 9.974 .497 8.967 10.980 
 
 
 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
b
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
b
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 1.342 .482 .050 -.001 2.686 
3 .263 .604 1.000 -1.421 1.948 
4 -.342 .657 1.000 -2.173 1.489 
2 1 -1.342 .482 .050 -2.686 .001 
3 -1.079 .534 .303 -2.567 .409 
4 -1.684
*
 .587 .040 -3.320 -.048 
3 1 -.263 .604 1.000 -1.948 1.421 
2 1.079 .534 .303 -.409 2.567 
4 -.605 .412 .904 -1.755 .544 
4 1 .342 .657 1.000 -1.489 2.173 
2 1.684
*
 .587 .040 .048 3.320 
3 .605 .412 .904 -.544 1.755 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
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Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .259 4.084
a
 3.000 35.000 .014 
Wilks' lambda .741 4.084
a
 3.000 35.000 .014 
Hotelling's trace .350 4.084
a
 3.000 35.000 .014 
Roy's largest root .350 4.084
a
 3.000 35.000 .014 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
 
 
 
Appendix 2C - Wilcoxon signed-rank tests 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 33 6.0000 8.0000 11.0000 
Dual 33 6.0000 8.0000 10.5000 
Relative 33 8.0000 9.0000 11.5000 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.79 
Dual 1.86 
Relative 2.35 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 33 
Chi-Square 8.956 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .011 
a. Friedman Test 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 33 8.1212 3.29543 1.00 15.00 6.0000 8.0000 11.0000 
Dual 33 8.0909 3.68581 1.00 15.00 6.0000 8.0000 10.5000 
Relative 33 9.3939 3.05102 1.00 15.00 8.0000 9.0000 11.5000 
 
 
 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Dual - Absolute Negative Ranks 12
a
 12.54 150.50 
Positive Ranks 12
b
 12.46 149.50 
Ties 9
c
   
Total 33   
Relative - Absolute Negative Ranks 4
d
 14.88 59.50 
Positive Ranks 18
e
 10.75 193.50 
Ties 11
f
   
Total 33   
Relative - Dual Negative Ranks 4
g
 7.00 28.00 
Positive Ranks 13
h
 9.62 125.00 
Ties 16
i
   
Total 33   
a. Dual < Absolute 
b. Dual > Absolute 
c. Dual = Absolute 
d. Relative < Absolute 
e. Relative > Absolute 
f. Relative = Absolute 
g. Relative < Dual 
h. Relative > Dual 
i. Relative = Dual 
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Test Statistics
a
 
 Dual - Absolute 
Relative - 
Absolute Relative - Dual 
Z -.014
b
 -2.184
c
 -2.316
c
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .989 .029 .021 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on positive ranks. 
c. Based on negative ranks. 
 
 
 
Mixed Losses 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 33 4.0000 8.0000 8.0000 
Dual 33 5.0000 8.0000 8.0000 
Relative 33 6.0000 8.0000 9.5000 
 
 
 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.82 
Dual 1.89 
Relative 2.29 
 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 33 
Chi-Square 6.840 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .033 
a. Friedman Test 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 33 6.4242 2.98988 1.00 12.00 4.0000 8.0000 8.0000 
Dual 33 7.0000 2.64575 2.00 15.00 5.0000 8.0000 8.0000 
Relative 33 7.9697 2.84479 2.00 15.00 6.0000 8.0000 9.5000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Dual - Absolute Negative Ranks 9
a
 9.22 83.00 
Positive Ranks 11
b
 11.55 127.00 
Ties 13
c
   
Total 33   
Relative - Absolute Negative Ranks 6
d
 9.17 55.00 
Positive Ranks 16
e
 12.38 198.00 
Ties 11
f
   
Total 33   
Relative - Dual Negative Ranks 3
g
 7.33 22.00 
Positive Ranks 12
h
 8.17 98.00 
Ties 18
i
   
Total 33   
a. Dual < Absolute 
b. Dual > Absolute 
c. Dual = Absolute 
d. Relative < Absolute 
e. Relative > Absolute 
f. Relative = Absolute 
g. Relative < Dual 
h. Relative > Dual 
i. Relative = Dual 
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Test Statistics
a
 
 Dual - Absolute 
Relative - 
Absolute Relative - Dual 
Z -.826
b
 -2.329
b
 -2.170
b
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .409 .020 .030 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on negative ranks. 
 
 
 
 
Multiple Gains 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 38 8.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
Dual 38 8.0000 10.0000 12.0000 
Relative 38 8.0000 10.0000 13.0000 
 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.68 
Dual 2.14 
Relative 2.17 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 38 
Chi-Square 9.312 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .010 
a. Friedman Test 
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Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Dual - Absolute Negative Ranks 3
a
 5.83 17.50 
Positive Ranks 17
b
 11.32 192.50 
Ties 18
c
   
Total 38   
Relative - Absolute Negative Ranks 8
d
 6.88 55.00 
Positive Ranks 18
e
 16.44 296.00 
Ties 12
f
   
Total 38   
Relative - Dual Negative Ranks 8
g
 10.25 82.00 
Positive Ranks 11
h
 9.82 108.00 
Ties 19
i
   
Total 38   
a. Dual < Absolute 
b. Dual > Absolute 
c. Dual = Absolute 
d. Relative < Absolute 
e. Relative > Absolute 
f. Relative = Absolute 
g. Relative < Dual 
h. Relative > Dual 
i. Relative = Dual 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
 Dual - Absolute 
Relative - 
Absolute Relative - Dual 
Z -3.274
b
 -3.067
b
 -.527
b
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .002 .598 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 38 8.2895 2.85608 1.00 15.00 8.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
Dual 38 10.3684 2.40968 7.00 15.00 8.0000 10.0000 12.0000 
Relative 38 10.5526 2.84460 3.00 15.00 8.0000 10.0000 13.0000 
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b. Based on negative ranks. 
 
 
Multiple Losses 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 38 7.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
Dual 38 8.0000 9.0000 11.0000 
Relative 38 8.0000 10.0000 12.2500 
 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.74 
Dual 2.03 
Relative 2.24 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 38 
Chi-Square 8.000 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .018 
a. Friedman Test 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 38 8.2895 2.85608 2.00 14.00 7.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
Dual 38 9.3684 3.02620 2.00 15.00 8.0000 9.0000 11.0000 
Relative 38 9.9737 3.06230 3.00 15.00 8.0000 10.0000 12.2500 
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Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Dual - Absolute Negative Ranks 5
a
 8.30 41.50 
Positive Ranks 13
b
 9.96 129.50 
Ties 20
c
   
Total 38   
Relative - Absolute Negative Ranks 6
d
 9.75 58.50 
Positive Ranks 18
e
 13.42 241.50 
Ties 14
f
   
Total 38   
Relative - Dual Negative Ranks 8
g
 10.81 86.50 
Positive Ranks 14
h
 11.89 166.50 
Ties 16
i
   
Total 38   
a. Dual < Absolute 
b. Dual > Absolute 
c. Dual = Absolute 
d. Relative < Absolute 
e. Relative > Absolute 
f. Relative = Absolute 
g. Relative < Dual 
h. Relative > Dual 
i. Relative = Dual 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
 Dual - Absolute 
Relative - 
Absolute Relative - Dual 
Z -1.924
b
 -2.628
b
 -1.308
b
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .054 .009 .191 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on negative ranks. 
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Appendix 3A - Questionnaires (Competitor’s past prices) 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is happier i.e. 
would you rather be Mr. A or Mr. B.   
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate the relative happiness of Mr. A and Mr. B.  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is happier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
happiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally happy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is happier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
happiness)  
 
Mixed Gains 
 
SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A expected a Christmas bonus of £300. He received his check and found it was for 
£250. 
Mr. B expected a Christmas bonus of £300. He received his check and the amount was 
indeed £300. A week later he received a note saying that there had been an error in this 
bonus check. The check was £50 too high. He must return the £50.   
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair. 
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been 
reduced to £1250. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of 
the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the 
prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set out to buy have been reduced to £100 and 
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increased to £1150 respectively. He had visited the store the previous week and a 
competitor’s chair and couch of the same quality and within the same store had been priced 
at £200 and £1100 respectively. 
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
SCENARIO 3 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been 
reduced by 3.84% to £1250. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s 
couch of the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £1300. Mr. B finds 
that the prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set out to buy have been reduced by 
50% to £100 and increased by 4.54% to £1150 respectively. He had visited the store the 
previous week and a competitor’s chair and couch of the same quality and within the same 
store had been priced at £200 and £1100 respectively.   
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7          8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
SCENARIO 4 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been 
reduced by 3.84%. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of 
the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the 
prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set out to buy have been reduced respectively 
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by 50% and increased by 4.54%. He had visited the store the previous week and a 
competitor’s chair and couch of the same quality and within the same store had been priced 
at £200 and £1100 respectively.   
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7          8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
Mixed Losses 
 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is unhappier.   
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate the relative unhappiness of Mr. A and Mr. B.  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is unhappier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
unhappiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally unhappy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is unhappier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
unhappiness 
 
SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A’s car was damaged in a parking lot. He had to spend £150 to repair the damage. Mr. 
B’s car was damaged in a parking lot. He had to spend £200 to repair the damage. The same 
day the car was damaged, he won £50 in the office football pool.  
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
 
225 
 
 
SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1250 couch he set out to buy has been 
increased to £1300. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of 
the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £1250. Mr. B finds that the 
prices of the £200 chair and £1050 couch he set out to buy have been reduced to £150 and 
increased to £1150 respectively. He had visited the store the previous week and a 
competitor’s chair and couch of the same quality and within the same store had been priced 
at £200 and £1050 respectively.   
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
 
SCENARIO 3 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1250 couch he set out to buy has been 
increased by 4% to £1300. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s 
couch of the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £1250. Mr. B finds 
that the prices of the £200 chair and £1050 couch he set out to buy have been reduced by 
25% to £150 and increased by 9.52% to £1150 respectively. He had visited the store the 
previous week and a competitor’s chair and couch of the same quality and within the same 
store had been priced at £200 and £1050 respectively.   
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
226 
 
 
 
SCENARIO 4 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1250 couch he set out to buy has been 
increased by 4%. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of the 
same quality and within the same store had been priced at £1250. Mr. B finds that the prices 
of the £200 chair and £1050 couch he set out to buy have been reduced by 25% and 
increased by 9.52% respectively. He had visited the store the previous week and a 
competitor’s chair and couch of the same quality and within the same store had been priced 
at £200 and £1050 respectively.   
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
 
Multiple Gains 
 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is happier i.e. would 
you rather be Mr. A or Mr. B.   
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate the relative happiness of Mr. A and Mr. B.  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is happier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of happiness)  
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally happy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is happier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
happiness)  
 
 
SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A was given a ticket to a lottery. He won £100. Mr. B was given tickets to 2 lotteries. 
He won £75 in one lottery and £25 in the other.  
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
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 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been 
reduced to £1200. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of 
the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the 
prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set out to buy have been reduced to £150 and 
£1050 respectively. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of 
the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £200 and £1100 respectively.   
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
SCENARIO 3 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been 
reduced by 7.69% to £1200. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s 
couch of the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £1300. Mr. B finds 
that the prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set out to buy have been reduced by 
25% and 4.54% to £150 and £1050 respectively. He had visited the store the previous week 
and a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same store had been priced at 
£200 and £1100 respectively.   
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
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 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
SCENARIO 4 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1300 couch he set out to buy has been 
reduced by 7.69%. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of 
the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £1300. Mr. B finds that the 
prices of the £200 chair and £1100 couch he set out to buy have been reduced by 25% and 
4.54% respectively. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of 
the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £200 and £1100 respectively.   
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
 
Multiple Losses 
 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is unhappier.   
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate the relative unhappiness of Mr. A and Mr. B.  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is unhappier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
unhappiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally unhappy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is unhappier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
unhappiness 
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SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A received a letter from the HM Revenue and Customs saying that he made a minor 
arithmetical mistake on his tax return and owed £100. There was no repercussion from the 
mistake. Mr. B received a letter from the HM Revenue and Customs saying that he made a 
minor arithmetical mistake on his tax return and owed £75. He received a similar letter the 
same day from the Council saying he owed £25 in council taxes. There were no 
repercussions from either mistake. 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1200 couch he set out to buy has been 
increased to £1300. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of 
the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £1200. Mr. B finds that the 
prices of the £200 chair and £1000 couch he set out to buy have been increased to £250 and 
£1050 respectively. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of 
the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £200 and £1000 respectively.   
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
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SCENARIO 3 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1200 couch he set out to buy has been 
increased by 8.33% to £1300. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s 
couch of the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £1200. Mr. B finds 
that the prices of the £200 chair and £1000 couch he set out to buy have been increased by 
25% and 5% to £250 and £1050 respectively. He had visited the store the previous week and 
a competitor’s couch of the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £200 
and £1000 respectively. 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7          8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
SCENARIO 4 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the price of the £1200 couch he set out to buy has been 
increased by 8.33%. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of 
the same quality and within the same store had been priced at £1200. Mr. B finds that the 
prices of the £200 chair and £1000 couch he set out to buy have been increased by 25% and 
5% respectively. He had visited the store the previous week and a competitor’s couch of the 
same quality and within the same store had been priced at £200 and £1000 respectively 
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7          8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
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Appendix 3B - Analysis of repeated measures ANOVA (Competitor’s past prices) 
 
Mixed Gains 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 Control 
2 Absolute 
3 Dual 
4 Relative 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Control 5.0000 3.59092 39 
Absolute 7.5128 2.92783 39 
Dual 8.4359 3.54516 39 
Relative 8.3846 2.97901 39 
 
 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame Pillai's Trace .418 8.616
b
 3.000 36.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .582 8.616
b
 3.000 36.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace .718 8.616
b
 3.000 36.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root .718 8.616
b
 3.000 36.000 .000 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchly's 
W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .771 9.530 5 .090 .857 .924 .333 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
232 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Sphericity Assumed 304.103 3 101.368 12.576 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 304.103 2.571 118.296 12.576 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 304.103 2.773 109.653 12.576 .000 
Lower-bound 304.103 1.000 304.103 12.576 .001 
Error (Frame) Sphericity Assumed 918.897 114 8.061   
Greenhouse-Geisser 918.897 97.686 9.407   
Huynh-Feldt 918.897 105.386 8.719   
Lower-bound 918.897 38.000 24.182   
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Linear 239.262 1 239.262 21.796 .000 
Quadratic 64.103 1 64.103 8.260 .007 
Cubic .738 1 .738 .136 .715 
Error (Frame) Linear 417.138 38 10.977   
Quadratic 294.897 38 7.760   
Cubic 206.862 38 5.444   
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 8389.333 1 8389.333 447.955 .000 
Error 711.667 38 18.728   
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
Control .500 
Absolute .500 
Dual .500 
Relative .500 
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Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Control -.671 .500 -.224 
Absolute -.224 -.500 .671 
Dual .224 -.500 -.671 
Relative .671 .500 .224 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Frame 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
1 2 3 4 
Control 1 0 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 0 
Dual 0 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 0 1 
 
 
 
Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 5.000 .575 3.836 6.164 
2 7.513 .469 6.564 8.462 
3 8.436 .568 7.287 9.585 
4 8.385 .477 7.419 9.350 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
b
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
b
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -2.513
*
 .676 .004 -4.395 -.630 
3 -3.436
*
 .689 .000 -5.354 -1.518 
4 -3.385
*
 .781 .001 -5.558 -1.212 
2 1 2.513
*
 .676 .004 .630 4.395 
3 -.923 .482 .379 -2.266 .419 
4 -.872 .574 .823 -2.470 .726 
3 1 3.436
*
 .689 .000 1.518 5.354 
2 .923 .482 .379 -.419 2.266 
4 .051 .614 1.000 -1.657 1.759 
4 1 3.385
*
 .781 .001 1.212 5.558 
2 .872 .574 .823 -.726 2.470 
3 -.051 .614 1.000 -1.759 1.657 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .418 8.616
a
 3.000 36.000 .000 
Wilks' lambda .582 8.616
a
 3.000 36.000 .000 
Hotelling's trace .718 8.616
a
 3.000 36.000 .000 
Roy's largest root .718 8.616
a
 3.000 36.000 .000 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
 
Mixed Losses 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 Control 
2 Absolute 
3 Dual 
4 Relative 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Control 7.7179 3.60518 39 
Absolute 8.2051 3.23777 39 
Dual 7.4615 2.40445 39 
Relative 7.7692 2.90609 39 
 
 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame Pillai's Trace .044 .559
b
 3.000 36.000 .646 
Wilks' Lambda .956 .559
b
 3.000 36.000 .646 
Hotelling's Trace .047 .559
b
 3.000 36.000 .646 
Roy's Largest Root .047 .559
b
 3.000 36.000 .646 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .737 11.193 5 .048 .852 .918 .333 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Sphericity Assumed 11.147 3 3.716 .514 .674 
Greenhouse-Geisser 11.147 2.555 4.364 .514 .645 
Huynh-Feldt 11.147 2.754 4.047 .514 .658 
Lower-bound 11.147 1.000 11.147 .514 .478 
Error (Frame) Sphericity Assumed 824.603 114 7.233   
Greenhouse-Geisser 824.603 97.077 8.494   
Huynh-Feldt 824.603 104.668 7.878   
Lower-bound 824.603 38.000 21.700   
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Linear .678 1 .678 .071 .792 
Quadratic .314 1 .314 .057 .813 
Cubic 10.155 1 10.155 1.550 .221 
Error (Frame) Linear 364.772 38 9.599   
Quadratic 210.936 38 5.551   
Cubic 248.895 38 6.550   
 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 9462.981 1 9462.981 591.175 .000 
Error 608.269 38 16.007   
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
Control .500 
Absolute .500 
Dual .500 
Relative .500 
 
Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Control -.671 .500 -.224 
Absolute -.224 -.500 .671 
Dual .224 -.500 -.671 
Relative .671 .500 .224 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
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Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Frame 
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
1 2 3 4 
Control 1 0 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 0 
Dual 0 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 0 1 
 
 
Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 7.718 .577 6.549 8.887 
2 8.205 .518 7.156 9.255 
3 7.462 .385 6.682 8.241 
4 7.769 .465 6.827 8.711 
 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
a
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
a
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -.487 .702 1.000 -2.440 1.466 
3 .256 .609 1.000 -1.438 1.951 
4 -.051 .711 1.000 -2.031 1.929 
2 1 .487 .702 1.000 -1.466 2.440 
3 .744 .568 1.000 -.836 2.323 
4 .436 .579 1.000 -1.177 2.049 
3 1 -.256 .609 1.000 -1.951 1.438 
2 -.744 .568 1.000 -2.323 .836 
4 -.308 .446 1.000 -1.548 .933 
4 1 .051 .711 1.000 -1.929 2.031 
2 -.436 .579 1.000 -2.049 1.177 
3 .308 .446 1.000 -.933 1.548 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
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Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .044 .559
a
 3.000 36.000 .646 
Wilks' lambda .956 .559
a
 3.000 36.000 .646 
Hotelling's trace .047 .559
a
 3.000 36.000 .646 
Roy's largest root .047 .559
a
 3.000 36.000 .646 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
 
 
Multiple Gains 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 Control 
2 Absolute 
3 Dual 
4 Relative 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Control 7.9091 3.20478 44 
Absolute 9.6364 3.18493 44 
Dual 9.4318 3.30889 44 
Relative 9.8182 3.04442 44 
 
 
 
 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame Pillai's Trace .211 3.658
b
 3.000 41.000 .020 
Wilks' Lambda .789 3.658
b
 3.000 41.000 .020 
Hotelling's Trace .268 3.658
b
 3.000 41.000 .020 
Roy's Largest Root .268 3.658
b
 3.000 41.000 .020 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
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Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .725 13.427 5 .020 .813 .865 .333 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Sphericity Assumed 100.881 3 33.627 4.405 .006 
Greenhouse-Geisser 100.881 2.438 41.375 4.405 .010 
Huynh-Feldt 100.881 2.596 38.866 4.405 .008 
Lower-bound 100.881 1.000 100.881 4.405 .042 
Error (Frame) Sphericity Assumed 984.869 129 7.635   
Greenhouse-Geisser 984.869 104.843 9.394   
Huynh-Feldt 984.869 111.610 8.824   
Lower-bound 984.869 43.000 22.904   
 
 
 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Linear 67.101 1 67.101 10.594 .002 
Quadratic 19.778 1 19.778 1.763 .191 
Cubic 14.001 1 14.001 2.617 .113 
Error (Frame) Linear 272.349 43 6.334   
Quadratic 482.472 43 11.220   
Cubic 230.049 43 5.350   
 
 
240 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 14892.960 1 14892.960 840.097 .000 
Error 762.290 43 17.728   
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
Control .500 
Absolute .500 
Dual .500 
Relative .500 
 
 
Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Control -.671 .500 -.224 
Absolute -.224 -.500 .671 
Dual .224 -.500 -.671 
Relative .671 .500 .224 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Frame 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
1 2 3 4 
Control 1 0 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 0 
Dual 0 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 0 1 
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Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 7.909 .483 6.935 8.883 
2 9.636 .480 8.668 10.605 
3 9.432 .499 8.426 10.438 
4 9.818 .459 8.893 10.744 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
b
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
b
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -1.727 .712 .117 -3.696 .242 
3 -1.523 .676 .177 -3.393 .347 
4 -1.909
*
 .564 .009 -3.469 -.349 
2 1 1.727 .712 .117 -.242 3.696 
3 .205 .462 1.000 -1.072 1.481 
4 -.182 .535 1.000 -1.660 1.297 
3 1 1.523 .676 .177 -.347 3.393 
2 -.205 .462 1.000 -1.481 1.072 
4 -.386 .549 1.000 -1.905 1.132 
4 1 1.909
*
 .564 .009 .349 3.469 
2 .182 .535 1.000 -1.297 1.660 
3 .386 .549 1.000 -1.132 1.905 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .211 3.658
a
 3.000 41.000 .020 
Wilks' lambda .789 3.658
a
 3.000 41.000 .020 
Hotelling's trace .268 3.658
a
 3.000 41.000 .020 
Roy's largest root .268 3.658
a
 3.000 41.000 .020 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
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Multiple Losses 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 Control 
2 Absolute 
3 Dual 
4 Relative 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Control 10.4773 2.67189 44 
Absolute 9.4318 2.78198 44 
Dual 9.5000 2.88944 44 
Relative 9.6591 2.97230 44 
 
 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame Pillai's Trace .130 2.038
b
 3.000 41.000 .124 
Wilks' Lambda .870 2.038
b
 3.000 41.000 .124 
Hotelling's Trace .149 2.038
b
 3.000 41.000 .124 
Roy's Largest Root .149 2.038
b
 3.000 41.000 .124 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
 
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .850 6.774 5 .238 .908 .975 .333 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Sphericity Assumed 30.790 3 10.263 1.848 .142 
Greenhouse-Geisser 30.790 2.724 11.303 1.848 .148 
Huynh-Feldt 30.790 2.926 10.522 1.848 .143 
Lower-bound 30.790 1.000 30.790 1.848 .181 
Error (Frame) Sphericity Assumed 716.460 129 5.554   
Greenhouse-Geisser 716.460 117.134 6.117   
Huynh-Feldt 716.460 125.830 5.694   
Lower-bound 716.460 43.000 16.662   
 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Linear 12.528 1 12.528 1.682 .202 
Quadratic 15.960 1 15.960 4.551 .039 
Cubic 2.301 1 2.301 .403 .529 
Error (Frame) Linear 320.222 43 7.447   
Quadratic 150.790 43 3.507   
Cubic 245.449 43 5.708   
 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 16789.551 1 16789.551 1090.232 .000 
Error 662.199 43 15.400   
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Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
Control .500 
Absolute .500 
Dual .500 
Relative .500 
 
 
Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Control -.671 .500 -.224 
Absolute -.224 -.500 .671 
Dual .224 -.500 -.671 
Relative .671 .500 .224 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Frame 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
1 2 3 4 
Control 1 0 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 0 
Dual 0 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 0 1 
 
Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 10.477 .403 9.665 11.290 
2 9.432 .419 8.586 10.278 
3 9.500 .436 8.622 10.378 
4 9.659 .448 8.755 10.563 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
a
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
a
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 1.045 .470 .189 -.254 2.345 
3 .977 .507 .364 -.426 2.380 
4 .818 .556 .890 -.719 2.356 
2 1 -1.045 .470 .189 -2.345 .254 
3 -.068 .538 1.000 -1.555 1.419 
4 -.227 .504 1.000 -1.620 1.165 
3 1 -.977 .507 .364 -2.380 .426 
2 .068 .538 1.000 -1.419 1.555 
4 -.159 .430 1.000 -1.348 1.030 
4 1 -.818 .556 .890 -2.356 .719 
2 .227 .504 1.000 -1.165 1.620 
3 .159 .430 1.000 -1.030 1.348 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .130 2.038
a
 3.000 41.000 .124 
Wilks' lambda .870 2.038
a
 3.000 41.000 .124 
Hotelling's trace .149 2.038
a
 3.000 41.000 .124 
Roy's largest root .149 2.038
a
 3.000 41.000 .124 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
246 
 
Appendix 3C - Wilcoxon signed-rank tests 
 
Mixed Gains 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 39 5.0000 8.0000 9.0000 
Dual 39 6.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
Relative 39 7.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.73 
Dual 2.10 
Relative 2.17 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 39 
Chi-Square 6.358 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .042 
a. Friedman Test 
 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Dual - Absolute Negative Ranks 7
a
 11.86 83.00 
Positive Ranks 16
b
 12.06 193.00 
Ties 16
c
   
Total 39   
Relative - Absolute Negative Ranks 8
d
 16.31 130.50 
Positive Ranks 20
e
 13.78 275.50 
Ties 11
f
   
Total 39   
Relative - Dual Negative Ranks 11
g
 12.55 138.00 
Positive Ranks 12
h
 11.50 138.00 
Ties 16
i
   
Total 39   
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a. Dual < Absolute 
b. Dual > Absolute 
c. Dual = Absolute 
d. Relative < Absolute 
e. Relative > Absolute 
f. Relative = Absolute 
g. Relative < Dual 
h. Relative > Dual 
i. Relative = Dual 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
 Dual - Absolute 
Relative - 
Absolute Relative - Dual 
Z -1.681
b
 -1.657
b
 .000
c
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .093 .097 1.000 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on negative ranks. 
c. The sum of negative ranks equals the sum of positive ranks. 
 
 
 
Mixed Losses 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 39 6.0000 8.0000 11.0000 
Dual 39 5.0000 8.0000 9.0000 
Relative 39 5.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 2.19 
Dual 1.87 
Relative 1.94 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 39 
Chi-Square 3.500 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .174 
a. Friedman Test 
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Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Dual - Absolute Negative Ranks 15
a
 11.03 165.50 
Positive Ranks 7
b
 12.50 87.50 
Ties 17
c
   
Total 39   
Relative - Absolute Negative Ranks 17
d
 13.68 232.50 
Positive Ranks 10
e
 14.55 145.50 
Ties 12
f
   
Total 39   
Relative - Dual Negative Ranks 10
g
 10.70 107.00 
Positive Ranks 12
h
 12.17 146.00 
Ties 17
i
   
Total 39   
a. Dual < Absolute 
b. Dual > Absolute 
c. Dual = Absolute 
d. Relative < Absolute 
e. Relative > Absolute 
f. Relative = Absolute 
g. Relative < Dual 
h. Relative > Dual 
i. Relative = Dual 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
 Dual - Absolute 
Relative - 
Absolute Relative - Dual 
Z -1.270
b
 -1.049
b
 -.637
c
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .204 .294 .524 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on positive ranks. 
c. Based on negative ranks. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 39 8.2051 3.23777 2.00 15.00 6.0000 8.0000 11.0000 
Dual 39 7.4615 2.40445 2.00 12.00 5.0000 8.0000 9.0000 
Relative 39 7.7692 2.90609 2.00 13.00 5.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
249 
 
Multiple Gains 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 44 8.0000 9.0000 11.7500 
Dual 44 8.0000 9.0000 12.0000 
Relative 44 8.0000 9.0000 12.0000 
 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.92 
Dual 1.94 
Relative 2.14 
 
 
 
Test Statisticsa 
N 44 
Chi-Square 1.847 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .397 
a. Friedman Test 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 44 9.6364 3.18493 3.00 15.00 8.0000 9.0000 11.7500 
Dual 44 9.4318 3.30889 2.00 15.00 8.0000 9.0000 12.0000 
Relative 44 9.8182 3.04442 2.00 15.00 8.0000 9.0000 12.0000 
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Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Dual - Absolute Negative Ranks 11
a
 16.82 185.00 
Positive Ranks 15
b
 11.07 166.00 
Ties 18
c
   
Total 44   
Relative - Absolute Negative Ranks 14
d
 16.18 226.50 
Positive Ranks 17
e
 15.85 269.50 
Ties 13
f
   
Total 44   
Relative - Dual Negative Ranks 9
g
 16.89 152.00 
Positive Ranks 18
h
 12.56 226.00 
Ties 17
i
   
Total 44   
a. Dual < Absolute 
b. Dual > Absolute 
c. Dual = Absolute 
d. Relative < Absolute 
e. Relative > Absolute 
f. Relative = Absolute 
g. Relative < Dual 
h. Relative > Dual 
i. Relative = Dual 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
 Dual - Absolute 
Relative - 
Absolute Relative - Dual 
Z -.243
b
 -.424
c
 -.895
c
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .808 .672 .371 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on positive ranks. 
c. Based on negative ranks. 
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Multiple Losses 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 44 8.0000 8.0000 11.7500 
Dual 44 8.0000 9.0000 11.7500 
Relative 44 8.0000 9.0000 12.0000 
 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Absolute 1.92 
Dual 1.97 
Relative 2.11 
 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 44 
Chi-Square 1.491 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .475 
a. Friedman Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
Absolute 44 9.4318 2.78198 3.00 15.00 8.0000 8.0000 11.7500 
Dual 44 9.5000 2.88944 3.00 15.00 8.0000 9.0000 11.7500 
Relative 44 9.6591 2.97230 1.00 15.00 8.0000 9.0000 12.0000 
252 
 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Dual - Absolute Negative Ranks 14
a
 13.79 193.00 
Positive Ranks 14
b
 15.21 213.00 
Ties 16
c
   
Total 44   
Relative - Absolute Negative Ranks 9
d
 13.78 124.00 
Positive Ranks 16
e
 12.56 201.00 
Ties 19
f
   
Total 44   
Relative - Dual Negative Ranks 9
g
 11.89 107.00 
Positive Ranks 12
h
 10.33 124.00 
Ties 23
i
   
Total 44   
a. Dual < Absolute 
b. Dual > Absolute 
c. Dual = Absolute 
d. Relative < Absolute 
e. Relative > Absolute 
f. Relative = Absolute 
g. Relative < Dual 
h. Relative > Dual 
i. Relative = Dual 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
 Dual - Absolute 
Relative - 
Absolute Relative - Dual 
Z -.229
b
 -1.054
b
 -.298
b
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .819 .292 .765 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on negative ranks. 
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Appendix 3D – Linear mixed model analysis (Comparison of competitor’s current 
and past prices) 
 
Mixed gains 
 
Model Dimension
a
 
 
Number of 
Levels 
Covariance 
Structure 
Number of 
Parameters 
Subject 
Variables 
Number of 
Subjects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Intercept 1 
 
1 
  
Group 2 
 
1 
  
Frame 1 
 
1 
  
Repeated 
Effects 
Frame 
2 Compound 
Symmetry 
2 Subject 72 
Total 6 
 
5 
  
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
Information Criteria
a
 
-2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood 
719.970 
Akaike's Information 
Criterion (AIC) 
723.970 
Hurvich and Tsai's Criterion 
(AICC) 
724.057 
Bozdogan's Criterion 
(CAIC) 
731.867 
Schwarz's Bayesian 
Criterion (BIC) 
729.867 
The information criteria are displayed in 
smaller-is-better form. 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effects
a
 
Source Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
Intercept 1 99.121 92.989 .000 
Group 1 70 1.935 .169 
Frame 1 71.000 6.139 .016 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
254 
 
 
 
 
Estimates of Fixed Effects
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept 6.365385 .750522 117.884 8.481 .000 4.879132 7.851637 
[Group=ComCu] .808858 .581402 70 1.391 .169 -.350712 1.968428 
[Group=ComPP] 0
b
 0 . . . . . 
Frame 1.055556 .426017 71.000 2.478 .016 .206103 1.905009 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
 
 
Covariance Parameters 
 
 
Estimates of Covariance Parameters
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. 
Error 
Wald 
Z 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Repeated 
Measures 
CS diagonal 
offset 
6.533646 1.096583 5.958 .000 4.702114 9.078584 
CS covariance 2.775435 1.159196 2.394 .017 .503453 5.047416 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Group 
 
 
 
Estimates
a
 
Group Mean Std. Error df 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ComCu 8.758
b
 .428 70 7.904 9.611 
ComPP 7.949
b
 .394 70 7.164 8.734 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: Frame 
= 1.50. 
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Pairwise Comparisons
a
 
(I) 
Group 
(J) 
Group 
Mean Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
df Sig.
b
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
b
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ComCu ComPP .809 .581 70 .169 -.351 1.968 
ComPP ComCu -.809 .581 70 .169 -1.968 .351 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments). 
 
 
Univariate Tests
a
 
Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
1 70 1.935 .169 
The F tests the effect of Group. This test is based on the 
linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the 
estimated marginal means.
a
 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed losses 
 
Model Dimension
a
 
 
Number of 
Levels 
Covariance 
Structure 
Number of 
Parameters 
Subject 
Variables 
Number of 
Subjects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Intercept 1 
 
1 
  
Group 2 
 
1 
  
Frame 1 
 
1 
  
Repeated 
Effects 
Frame 
2 Compound 
Symmetry 
2 Subject 72 
Total 6 
 
5 
  
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
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Information Criteria
a
 
-2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood 
720.225 
Akaike's Information 
Criterion (AIC) 
724.225 
Hurvich and Tsai's Criterion 
(AICC) 
724.312 
Bozdogan's Criterion 
(CAIC) 
732.122 
Schwarz's Bayesian 
Criterion (BIC) 
730.122 
The information criteria are displayed in 
smaller-is-better form. 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effects
a
 
Source Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
Intercept 1 97.386 93.805 .000 
Group 1 70.000 1.909 .171 
Frame 1 71 1.185 .280 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
 
 
Estimates of Fixed Effects
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept 7.278846 .757157 115.490 9.613 .000 5.779132 8.778560 
[Group=ComCu] -.790210 .571877 70.000 -1.382 .171 -1.930783 .350363 
[Group=ComPP] 0
b
 0 . . . . . 
Frame .472222 .433790 71 1.089 .280 -.392731 1.337175 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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Covariance Parameters 
 
Estimates of Covariance Parameters
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. 
Error 
Wald 
Z 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Repeated 
Measures 
CS diagonal 
offset 
6.774257 1.136966 5.958 .000 4.875275 9.412915 
CS covariance 2.458776 1.139996 2.157 .031 .224426 4.693126 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Group 
 
 
Estimates
a
 
Group Mean Std. Error df 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ComCu 7.197
b
 .421 70.000 6.358 8.036 
ComPP 7.987
b
 .387 70.000 7.215 8.759 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: Frame 
= 1.50. 
 
 
Pairwise Comparisons
a
 
(I) 
Group 
(J) 
Group 
Mean Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
df Sig.
b
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
b
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ComCu ComPP -.790 .572 70.000 .171 -1.931 .350 
ComPP ComCu .790 .572 70.000 .171 -.350 1.931 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
Univariate Tests
a
 
Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
1 70.000 1.909 .171 
The F tests the effect of Group. This test is based on the 
linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the 
estimated marginal means.
a
 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
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Multiple gains 
 
 
Model Dimension
a
 
 
Number of 
Levels 
Covariance 
Structure 
Number of 
Parameters 
Subject 
Variables 
Number of 
Subjects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Intercept 1 
 
1 
  
Group 2 
 
1 
  
Frame 1 
 
1 
  
Repeated 
Effects 
Frame 
2 Compound 
Symmetry 
2 Subject 82 
Total 6 
 
5 
  
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
Information Criteria
a
 
-2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood 
802.524 
Akaike's Information 
Criterion (AIC) 
806.524 
Hurvich and Tsai's Criterion 
(AICC) 
806.600 
Bozdogan's Criterion 
(CAIC) 
814.687 
Schwarz's Bayesian 
Criterion (BIC) 
812.687 
The information criteria are displayed in 
smaller-is-better form. 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effects
a
 
Source Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
Intercept 1 108.939 180.163 .000 
Group 1 80.000 .016 .900 
Frame 1 81.000 4.231 .043 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
259 
 
Covariance Parameters 
 
Estimates of Covariance Parameters
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 
Repeated Measures 
CS diagonal offset 6.277025 .986339 
CS covariance 1.868276 .932692 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Group 
 
 
Estimates
a
 
Group Mean Std. Error df 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ComCu 9.789
b
 .363 80.000 9.067 10.512 
ComPP 9.727
b
 .337 80.000 9.056 10.399 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: Frame 
= 1.50. 
 
 
Pairwise Comparisons
a
 
(I) 
Group 
(J) 
Group 
Mean Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
df Sig.
b
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
b
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ComCu ComPP .062 .496 80.000 .900 -.924 1.048 
ComPP ComCu -.062 .496 80.000 .900 -1.048 .924 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
Univariate Tests
a
 
Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
1 80.000 .016 .900 
The F tests the effect of Group. This test is based on the 
linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the 
estimated marginal means.
a
 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
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Multiple losses 
 
Model Dimension
a
 
 
Number of 
Levels 
Covariance 
Structure 
Number of 
Parameters 
Subject 
Variables 
Number of 
Subjects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Intercept 1 
 
1 
  
Group 2 
 
1 
  
Frame 1 
 
1 
  
Repeated 
Effects 
Frame 
2 Compound 
Symmetry 
2 Subject 82 
Total 6 
 
5 
  
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
Information Criteria
a
 
-2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood 
809.222 
Akaike's Information 
Criterion (AIC) 
813.222 
Hurvich and Tsai's Criterion 
(AICC) 
813.298 
Bozdogan's Criterion 
(CAIC) 
821.385 
Schwarz's Bayesian 
Criterion (BIC) 
819.385 
The information criteria are displayed in 
smaller-is-better form. 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effects
a
 
Source Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
Intercept 1 111.745 156.042 .000 
Group 1 80.000 .635 .428 
Frame 1 81 5.370 .023 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
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Estimates of Fixed Effects
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept 8.191796 .682736 133.107 11.998 .000 6.841381 9.542211 
[Group=ComCu] -.413876 .519215 80.000 -.797 .428 -1.447147 .619395 
[Group=ComPP] 0
b
 0 . . . . . 
Frame .902439 .389415 81 2.317 .023 .127625 1.677253 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
 
 
Covariance Parameters 
 
 
Estimates of Covariance Parameters
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. 
Error 
Wald 
Z 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Repeated 
Measures 
CS diagonal 
offset 
6.217404 .976971 6.364 .000 4.569363 8.459848 
CS covariance 2.388188 .997002 2.395 .017 .434100 4.342276 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
 
Group 
 
 
Estimates
a
 
Group Mean Std. Error df 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ComCu 9.132
b
 .380 80.000 8.375 9.888 
ComPP 9.545
b
 .353 80.000 8.842 10.249 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: Frame 
= 1.50. 
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Pairwise Comparisons
a
 
(I) 
Group 
(J) 
Group 
Mean Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
df Sig.
b
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
b
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ComCu ComPP -.414 .519 80.000 .428 -1.447 .619 
ComPP ComCu .414 .519 80.000 .428 -.619 1.447 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
Univariate Tests
a
 
Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
1 80.000 .635 .428 
The F tests the effect of Group. This test is based on the 
linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the 
estimated marginal means.
a
 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
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APPENDIX 4 (CHAPTER 6) 
Questionnaires, Analysis of repeated measures ANOVA, Linear mixed 
model and Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
 
Appendix 4A - Questionnaires (Expectations of retailer’s future prices) 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is happier i.e. 
would you rather be Mr. A or Mr. B.   
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate how happy you think Mr. A or Mr. B.  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is happier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
happiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally happy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is happier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
happiness)  
 
Multiple Gains 
SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the £1300 couch now costs £50 less. He had however been 
expecting a discount of £70; Mr. B finds that the £300 chair now costs £40 less while 
the £1000 couch was £10 less. He had however been expecting to spend £70 less on 
both the couch and the chair. 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the £1300 couch now costs 3.84% less. He had however 
been expecting a discount of 5.38%; Mr. B finds that the £300 chair now costs 13.33% 
less while the £1000 couch was 1% less. He knew that the combined discount on both 
the couch and the chair was 3.84%. He had however been expecting a total discount of 
5.38% on both the couch and the chair. 
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Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
Multiple Losses 
 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is unhappier. On 
a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate how unhappy you think Mr. A or Mr. B. 
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is unhappier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
unhappiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally unhappy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is unhappier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
unhappiness) 
 
 
SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the £1250 couch now costs £100 more. Although, he had 
been expecting some price increase, he had been estimating a price increase of only 
£70; Mr. B finds that both the £200 chair and the £1050 couch now each cost £50 more. 
Although, he had been expecting some price increase, he had been estimating a 
combined price increase of only £70 in both the couch and the chair.  
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 
 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
 
 
265 
 
SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds that the £1250 couch now costs 8% more. Although, he had 
been expecting some price increase, he had been estimating a price increase of only 
5.6%; Mr. B finds that the £200 chair now costs 25% more and the £1050 couch was 
now priced 4.76% more. Although, he knew that the combined price increase in both 
the couch and the chair was 8%, he had been estimating a combined price increase of 
only 5.6% in both the couch and the chair.  
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed Gains 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is happier i.e. 
would you rather be Mr. A or Mr. B.   
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate how happy you think Mr. A or Mr. B.  
Scale of 1 to 7 – Mr. A is happier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
happiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally happy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is happier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
happiness)  
 
SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds the couch priced at £1250. The previous day when he had been 
at the store, it had been priced £50 more. Mr. B finds the couch priced at £1050 and the 
chair priced at £200. The previous day when he had been at the store, the chair had been 
priced £100 less and the couch priced £50 more. 
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
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 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds the couch priced at £1250, but it had cost 3.84% more the 
previous day; Mr. B finds the couch priced at £1050, but it had cost 5% less the 
previous day. However, the chair was priced 33.3% less than its original £300 price. 
 
Who was happier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is happier Both are 
equally 
happy 
Mr. B is happier 
Scale of 
happiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed Losses 
 
In the scenarios below, you are asked to judge whether Mr. A or Mr. B is unhappier.  
On a scale of 1 to 15, kindly rate how unhappy you think Mr. A or Mr. B. 
Scale of 7 to 8 – Mr. A is unhappier than Mr. B (with 7 being highest level of 
unhappiness) 
At midpoint 8 – Mr. A and Mr. B are equally unhappy  
Scale of 9 to 15 – Mr. B is unhappier than Mr. A (with 15 being highest level of 
unhappiness) 
 
SCENARIO 1 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair.  
At the store, Mr. A finds the couch priced at £1300. The price had been increased by 
£50. He had been expecting some increase in prices at the store. He had however been 
estimating a £30 increase in the price of the couch. Mr. B finds the chair priced at £300 
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and the couch priced at £1000. The chair had been increased by £100 and the couch 
reduced by £50. He had been expecting some increase in prices at the store. He had 
however been estimating a combined price increase of only £30 in both the couch and 
the chair.   
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
 
 
 
SCENARIO 2 
Mr. A wishes to buy a couch, Mr. B wishes to buy a couch and a chair. At the store, Mr. 
A finds the couch now priced 4% more than its original £1250 price. He had been 
estimating a price increase of only 2.4% increase. Mr. B finds the chair priced 50% 
more than its original price of £200 and the couch priced 4.76% less than its original 
price of £1050. He had however been estimating a combined price increase of only 
2.4% increase in both the chair and the couch. 
 
Who was unhappier? Mr. A or Mr. B 
 Mr. A is unhappier Both are 
equally 
unhappy 
Mr. B is unhappier 
Scale of 
unhappiness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
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Appendix 4B - Analysis of repeated measures ANOVA (Expectations of retailer’s 
current prices 
 
Multiple Gains 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 ControlFR 
2 Absolute 
3 Relative 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
ControlFR 9.4889 2.41795 45 
Absolute 8.1333 3.88821 45 
Relative 8.4889 3.88249 45 
 
 
 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame Pillai's Trace .106 2.544
b
 2.000 43.000 .090 
Wilks' Lambda .894 2.544
b
 2.000 43.000 .090 
Hotelling's Trace .118 2.544
b
 2.000 43.000 .090 
Roy's Largest Root .118 2.544
b
 2.000 43.000 .090 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
 
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .990 .412 2 .814 .991 1.000 .500 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
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b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
 
 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Sphericity Assumed 44.459 2 22.230 2.495 .088 
Greenhouse-Geisser 44.459 1.981 22.441 2.495 .089 
Huynh-Feldt 44.459 2.000 22.230 2.495 .088 
Lower-bound 44.459 1.000 44.459 2.495 .121 
Error (Frame) Sphericity Assumed 784.207 88 8.911   
Greenhouse-Geisser 784.207 87.169 8.996   
Huynh-Feldt 784.207 88.000 8.911   
Lower-bound 784.207 44.000 17.823   
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Linear 22.500 1 22.500 2.781 .102 
Quadratic 21.959 1 21.959 2.256 .140 
Error (Frame) Linear 356.000 44 8.091   
Quadratic 428.207 44 9.732   
 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 10226.852 1 10226.852 561.437 .000 
Error 801.481 44 18.215   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
270 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
ControlFR .577 
Absolute .577 
Relative .577 
 
 
Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
Linear Quadratic 
ControlFR -.707 .408 
Absolute .000 -.816 
Relative .707 .408 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors 
are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Frame 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
1 2 3 
ControlFR 1 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 1 
 
Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 9.489 .360 8.762 10.215 
2 8.133 .580 6.965 9.301 
3 8.489 .579 7.322 9.655 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
a
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
a
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 1.356 .635 .115 -.225 2.936 
3 1.000 .600 .307 -.493 2.493 
2 1 -1.356 .635 .115 -2.936 .225 
3 -.356 .652 1.000 -1.979 1.268 
3 1 -1.000 .600 .307 -2.493 .493 
2 .356 .652 1.000 -1.268 1.979 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .106 2.544
a
 2.000 43.000 .090 
Wilks' lambda .894 2.544
a
 2.000 43.000 .090 
Hotelling's trace .118 2.544
a
 2.000 43.000 .090 
Roy's largest root .118 2.544
a
 2.000 43.000 .090 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
 
 
 
 
Multiple Losses 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 ControlFR 
2 Absolute 
3 Relative 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
ControlFR 8.8889 3.09855 45 
Absolute 8.0222 3.20148 45 
Relative 9.1333 3.28634 45 
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Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame Pillai's Trace .087 2.045
b
 2.000 43.000 .142 
Wilks' Lambda .913 2.045
b
 2.000 43.000 .142 
Hotelling's Trace .095 2.045
b
 2.000 43.000 .142 
Roy's Largest Root .095 2.045
b
 2.000 43.000 .142 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
 
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .955 1.996 2 .369 .957 .999 .500 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Sphericity Assumed 30.681 2 15.341 1.824 .167 
Greenhouse-Geisser 30.681 1.913 16.037 1.824 .169 
Huynh-Feldt 30.681 1.998 15.355 1.824 .167 
Lower-bound 30.681 1.000 30.681 1.824 .184 
Error(Frame) Sphericity Assumed 739.985 88 8.409   
Greenhouse-Geisser 739.985 84.181 8.790   
Huynh-Feldt 739.985 87.918 8.417   
Lower-bound 739.985 44.000 16.818   
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Linear 1.344 1 1.344 .159 .692 
Quadratic 29.337 1 29.337 3.519 .067 
Error(Frame) Linear 373.156 44 8.481   
Quadratic 366.830 44 8.337   
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 10174.696 1 10174.696 735.556 .000 
Error 608.637 44 13.833   
 
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
 
 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
ControlFR .577 
Absolute .577 
Relative .577 
 
 
Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
Linear Quadratic 
ControlFR -.707 .408 
Absolute .000 -.816 
Relative .707 .408 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors 
are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
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Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Frame 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
1 2 3 
ControlFR 1 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 1 
 
 
Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 8.889 .462 7.958 9.820 
2 8.022 .477 7.060 8.984 
3 9.133 .490 8.146 10.121 
 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
a
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
a
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .867 .664 .596 -.786 2.520 
3 -.244 .614 1.000 -1.773 1.284 
2 1 -.867 .664 .596 -2.520 .786 
3 -1.111 .551 .149 -2.482 .260 
3 1 .244 .614 1.000 -1.284 1.773 
2 1.111 .551 .149 -.260 2.482 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .087 2.045
a
 2.000 43.000 .142 
Wilks' lambda .913 2.045
a
 2.000 43.000 .142 
Hotelling's trace .095 2.045
a
 2.000 43.000 .142 
Roy's largest root .095 2.045
a
 2.000 43.000 .142 
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Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
 
 
 
 
Mixed Gains 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 ControlFR 
2 Absolute 
3 Relative 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
ControlFR 8.0208 3.48547 48 
Absolute 7.3958 2.88606 48 
Relative 8.2708 2.20000 48 
 
 
 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame Pillai's Trace .073 1.812
b
 2.000 46.000 .175 
Wilks' Lambda .927 1.812
b
 2.000 46.000 .175 
Hotelling's Trace .079 1.812
b
 2.000 46.000 .175 
Roy's Largest Root .079 1.812
b
 2.000 46.000 .175 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
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Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .827 8.741 2 .013 .852 .881 .500 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Sphericity Assumed 19.500 2 9.750 1.106 .335 
Greenhouse-Geisser 19.500 1.705 11.437 1.106 .328 
Huynh-Feldt 19.500 1.763 11.063 1.106 .330 
Lower-bound 19.500 1.000 19.500 1.106 .298 
Error(Frame) Sphericity Assumed 828.500 94 8.814   
Greenhouse-Geisser 828.500 80.133 10.339   
Huynh-Feldt 828.500 82.843 10.001   
Lower-bound 828.500 47.000 17.628   
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Linear 1.500 1 1.500 .137 .713 
Quadratic 18.000 1 18.000 2.686 .108 
Error(Frame) Linear 513.500 47 10.926   
Quadratic 315.000 47 6.702   
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 8977.563 1 8977.563 1167.409 .000 
Error 361.438 47 7.690   
 
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
 
 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
ControlFR .577 
Absolute .577 
Relative .577 
 
 
Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
Linear Quadratic 
ControlFR -.707 .408 
Absolute .000 -.816 
Relative .707 .408 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors 
are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Frame 
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
1 2 3 
ControlFR 1 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 1 
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Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 8.021 .503 7.009 9.033 
2 7.396 .417 6.558 8.234 
3 8.271 .318 7.632 8.910 
 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
a
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
a
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .625 .657 1.000 -1.006 2.256 
3 -.250 .675 1.000 -1.925 1.425 
2 1 -.625 .657 1.000 -2.256 1.006 
3 -.875 .464 .196 -2.026 .276 
3 1 .250 .675 1.000 -1.425 1.925 
2 .875 .464 .196 -.276 2.026 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .073 1.812
a
 2.000 46.000 .175 
Wilks' lambda .927 1.812
a
 2.000 46.000 .175 
Hotelling's trace .079 1.812
a
 2.000 46.000 .175 
Roy's largest root .079 1.812
a
 2.000 46.000 .175 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
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Mixed Losses 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 ControlFR 
2 Absolute 
3 Relative 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
ControlFR 7.7083 3.38305 48 
Absolute 7.9583 2.81303 48 
Relative 8.1875 2.67897 48 
 
 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Frame Pillai's Trace .018 .413
b
 2.000 46.000 .664 
Wilks' Lambda .982 .413
b
 2.000 46.000 .664 
Hotelling's Trace .018 .413
b
 2.000 46.000 .664 
Roy's Largest Root .018 .413
b
 2.000 46.000 .664 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. Exact statistic 
 
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilon
b
 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
Frame .863 6.789 2 .034 .879 .911 .500 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Frame 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Sphericity Assumed 5.514 2 2.757 .382 .684 
Greenhouse-Geisser 5.514 1.759 3.135 .382 .657 
Huynh-Feldt 5.514 1.822 3.027 .382 .664 
Lower-bound 5.514 1.000 5.514 .382 .540 
Error(Frame) Sphericity Assumed 679.153 94 7.225   
Greenhouse-Geisser 679.153 82.658 8.216   
Huynh-Feldt 679.153 85.621 7.932   
Lower-bound 679.153 47.000 14.450   
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Frame 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Frame Linear 5.510 1 5.510 .742 .393 
Quadratic .003 1 .003 .000 .982 
Error(Frame) Linear 348.990 47 7.425   
Quadratic 330.163 47 7.025   
 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 9104.340 1 9104.340 753.361 .000 
Error 567.993 47 12.085   
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Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
 
 
Average 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   
AVERAGE   
ControlFR .577 
Absolute .577 
Relative .577 
 
 
Frame
a
 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
Linear Quadratic 
ControlFR -.707 .408 
Absolute .000 -.816 
Relative .707 .408 
a. The contrasts for the within subjects factors 
are: 
Frame: Polynomial contrast 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Frame 
 
 
Transformation Coefficients (M Matrix) 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Dependent Variable 
Frame 
1 2 3 
ControlFR 1 0 0 
Absolute 0 1 0 
Relative 0 0 1 
 
 
Estimates 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Frame Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 7.708 .488 6.726 8.691 
2 7.958 .406 7.142 8.775 
3 8.188 .387 7.410 8.965 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Frame (J) Frame 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
a
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
a
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -.250 .627 1.000 -1.807 1.307 
3 -.479 .556 1.000 -1.860 .902 
2 1 .250 .627 1.000 -1.307 1.807 
3 -.229 .448 1.000 -1.341 .883 
3 1 .479 .556 1.000 -.902 1.860 
2 .229 .448 1.000 -.883 1.341 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillai's trace .018 .413
a
 2.000 46.000 .664 
Wilks' lambda .982 .413
a
 2.000 46.000 .664 
Hotelling's trace .018 .413
a
 2.000 46.000 .664 
Roy's largest root .018 .413
a
 2.000 46.000 .664 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frame. These tests are based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
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Appendix 4C - Linear mixed model analysis (Expectations of retailer’s current 
prices) 
 
Multiple gains 
 
 
Model Dimension
a
 
 
Number of 
Levels 
Covariance 
Structure 
Number of 
Parameters 
Subject 
Variables 
Number of 
Subjects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Intercept 1 
 
1 
  
Group 2 
 
1 
  
Frame 1 
 
1 
  
Repeated 
Effects 
Frame 
2 Compound 
Symmetry 
2 Subject 90 
Total 6 
 
5 
  
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
Information Criteria
a
 
-2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood 
926.172 
Akaike's Information 
Criterion (AIC) 
930.172 
Hurvich and Tsai's Criterion 
(AICC) 
930.241 
Bozdogan's Criterion 
(CAIC) 
938.524 
Schwarz's Bayesian 
Criterion (BIC) 
936.524 
The information criteria are displayed in 
smaller-is-better form. 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effects
a
 
Source Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
Intercept 1 124.334 160.018 .000 
Group 1 88 5.541 .021 
Frame 1 89 .582 .447 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
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Estimates of Fixed Effects
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept 9.155556 .727368 151.739 12.587 .000 7.718479 10.592632 
[Group=Exp] -1.311111 .556968 88 -2.354 .021 -2.417968 -.204254 
[Group=Nexp] 0
b
 0 . . . . . 
Frame .311111 .407680 89 .763 .447 -.498941 1.121163 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
 
 
Covariance Parameters 
 
 
Estimates of Covariance Parameters
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. 
Error 
Wald 
Z 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Repeated 
Measures 
CS diagonal 
offset 
7.479151 1.121172 6.671 .000 5.575089 10.033508 
CS covariance 3.240222 1.192256 2.718 .007 .903444 5.577001 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Group 
 
 
Estimates
a
 
Group Mean Std. Error df 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Exp 8.311
b
 .394 88 7.528 9.094 
Nexp 9.622
b
 .394 88 8.840 10.405 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: 
Frame = 1.50. 
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Pairwise Comparisons
a
 
(I) 
Group 
(J) 
Group 
Mean Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
df Sig.
c
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
c
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Exp Nexp -1.311
*
 .557 88 .021 -2.418 -.204 
Nexp Exp 1.311
*
 .557 88 .021 .204 2.418 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
c. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
 
Univariate Tests
a
 
Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
1 88 5.541 .021 
The F tests the effect of Group. This test is based on the 
linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the 
estimated marginal means.
a
 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple losses 
 
Model Dimension
a
 
 
Number of 
Levels 
Covariance 
Structure 
Number of 
Parameters 
Subject 
Variables 
Number of 
Subjects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Intercept 1 
 
1 
  
Group 2 
 
1 
  
Frame 1 
 
1 
  
Repeated 
Effects 
Frame 
2 Compound 
Symmetry 
2 Subject 90 
Total 6 
 
5 
  
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
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Information Criteria
a
 
-2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood 
902.385 
Akaike's Information 
Criterion (AIC) 
906.385 
Hurvich and Tsai's Criterion 
(AICC) 
906.454 
Bozdogan's Criterion 
(CAIC) 
914.738 
Schwarz's Bayesian 
Criterion (BIC) 
912.738 
The information criteria are displayed in 
smaller-is-better form. 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effects
a
 
Source Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
Intercept 1 127.627 140.139 .000 
Group 1 88.000 2.773 .099 
Frame 1 89.000 9.282 .003 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
 
Estimates of Fixed Effects
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept 7.766667 .673660 156.042 11.529 .000 6.435998 9.097336 
[Group=Exp] -.888889 .533796 88.000 -1.665 .099 -1.949696 .171919 
[Group=Nexp] 0
b
 0 . . . . . 
Frame 1.133333 .371991 89.000 3.047 .003 .394196 1.872471 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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Covariance Parameters 
 
Estimates of Covariance Parameters
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. 
Error 
Wald 
Z 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Repeated 
Measures 
CS diagonal 
offset 
6.226966 .933462 6.671 .000 4.641689 8.353664 
CS covariance 3.297628 1.073304 3.072 .002 1.193990 5.401266 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Group 
 
Estimates
a
 
Group Mean Std. Error df 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Exp 8.578
b
 .377 88.000 7.828 9.328 
Nexp 9.467
b
 .377 88.000 8.717 10.217 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: 
Frame = 1.50. 
 
 
Pairwise Comparisons
a
 
(I) 
Group 
(J) 
Group 
Mean Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
df Sig.
b
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
b
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Exp Nexp -.889 .534 88.000 .099 -1.950 .172 
Nexp Exp .889 .534 88.000 .099 -.172 1.950 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
Univariate Tests
a
 
Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
1 88.000 2.773 .099 
The F tests the effect of Group. This test is based on the 
linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the 
estimated marginal means.
a
 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
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Mixed gains 
 
 
Model Dimension
a
 
 
Number of 
Levels 
Covariance 
Structure 
Number of 
Parameters 
Subject 
Variables 
Number of 
Subjects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Intercept 1 
 
1 
  
Group 2 
 
1 
  
Frame 1 
 
1 
  
Repeated 
Effects 
Frame 
2 Compound 
Symmetry 
2 Subject 96 
Total 6 
 
5 
  
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
Information Criteria
a
 
-2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood 
982.092 
Akaike's Information 
Criterion (AIC) 
986.092 
Hurvich and Tsai's Criterion 
(AICC) 
986.156 
Bozdogan's Criterion 
(CAIC) 
994.575 
Schwarz's Bayesian 
Criterion (BIC) 
992.575 
The information criteria are displayed in 
smaller-is-better form. 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effects
a
 
Source Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
Intercept 1 124.480 104.762 .000 
Group 1 94 1.481 .227 
Frame 1 95.000 4.244 .042 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
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Estimates of Fixed Effects
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept 7.156250 .714181 149.801 10.020 .000 5.745081 8.567419 
[Group=Exp] -.604167 .496432 94 -1.217 .227 -1.589844 .381511 
[Group=Nexp] 0
b
 0 . . . . . 
Frame .854167 .414639 95.000 2.060 .042 .031005 1.677329 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
 
 
 
Covariance Parameters 
 
 
Estimates of Covariance Parameters
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. 
Error 
Wald 
Z 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Repeated 
Measures 
CS diagonal 
offset 
8.252412 1.197386 6.892 .000 6.209771 10.966959 
CS covariance 1.788466 1.050124 1.703 .089 -.269739 3.846670 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Group 
 
 
Estimates
a
 
Group Mean Std. Error df 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Exp 7.833
b
 .351 94 7.136 8.530 
Nexp 8.438
b
 .351 94 7.741 9.134 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: 
Frame = 1.50. 
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Pairwise Comparisons
a
 
(I) 
Group 
(J) 
Group 
Mean Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
df Sig.
b
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
b
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Exp Nexp -.604 .496 94 .227 -1.590 .382 
Nexp Exp .604 .496 94 .227 -.382 1.590 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
 
 
 
Univariate Tests
a
 
Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
1 94 1.481 .227 
The F tests the effect of Group. This test is based on the 
linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the 
estimated marginal means.
a
 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed losses 
 
Model Dimension
a
 
 
Number of 
Levels 
Covariance 
Structure 
Number of 
Parameters 
Subject 
Variables 
Number of 
Subjects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Intercept 1 
 
1 
  
Group 2 
 
1 
  
Frame 1 
 
1 
  
Repeated 
Effects 
Frame 
2 Compound 
Symmetry 
2 Subject 96 
Total 6 
 
5 
  
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
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Information Criteria
a
 
-2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood 
957.646 
Akaike's Information 
Criterion (AIC) 
961.646 
Hurvich and Tsai's Criterion 
(AICC) 
961.711 
Bozdogan's Criterion 
(CAIC) 
970.130 
Schwarz's Bayesian 
Criterion (BIC) 
968.130 
The information criteria are displayed in 
smaller-is-better form. 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effects
a
 
Source Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
Intercept 1 145.051 153.966 .000 
Group 1 94 .234 .630 
Frame 1 95.000 4.841 .030 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
Estimates of Fixed Effects
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept 7.223958 .632010 176.364 11.430 .000 5.976682 8.471234 
[Group=Exp] -.260417 .538896 94 -.483 .630 -1.330406 .809573 
[Group=Nexp] 0
b
 0 . . . . . 
Frame .739583 .336143 95.000 2.200 .030 .072255 1.406912 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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Covariance Parameters 
 
Estimates of Covariance Parameters
a
 
Parameter Estimate Std. 
Error 
Wald 
Z 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Repeated 
Measures 
CS diagonal 
offset 
5.423629 .786943 6.892 .000 4.081170 7.207677 
CS covariance 4.257988 1.090136 3.906 .000 2.121360 6.394616 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Group 
 
Estimates
a
 
Group Mean Std. Error df 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Exp 8.073
b
 .381 94.000 7.316 8.830 
Nexp 8.333
b
 .381 94 7.577 9.090 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: 
Frame = 1.50. 
 
 
Pairwise Comparisons
a
 
(I) 
Group 
(J) 
Group 
Mean Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
df Sig.
b
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
b
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Exp Nexp -.260 .539 94 .630 -1.330 .810 
Nexp Exp .260 .539 94 .630 -.810 1.330 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
 
Univariate Tests
a
 
Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
1 94 .234 .630 
The F tests the effect of Group. This test is based on the 
linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the 
estimated marginal means.
a
 
a. Dependent Variable: Ratings. 
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Appendix 4D - Analysis of Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
 
Multiple Gains 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
ControlFR 45 8.0000 9.0000 11.0000 
Absolute 45 5.0000 8.0000 11.0000 
Relative 45 5.5000 9.0000 11.0000 
 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
ControlFR 2.12 
Absolute 1.89 
Relative 1.99 
 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 45 
Chi-Square 1.721 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .423 
a. Friedman Test 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
ControlFR 45 9.4889 2.41795 3.00 14.00 8.0000 9.0000 11.0000 
Absolute 45 8.1333 3.88821 1.00 15.00 5.0000 8.0000 11.0000 
Relative 45 8.4889 3.88249 1.00 15.00 5.5000 9.0000 11.0000 
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Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Absolute - ControlFR Negative Ranks 20
a
 18.75 375.00 
Positive Ranks 12
b
 12.75 153.00 
Ties 13
c
   
Total 45   
Relative - ControlFR Negative Ranks 18
d
 20.28 365.00 
Positive Ranks 15
e
 13.07 196.00 
Ties 12
f
   
Total 45   
Relative - Absolute Negative Ranks 12
g
 12.83 154.00 
Positive Ranks 14
h
 14.07 197.00 
Ties 19
i
   
Total 45   
a. Absolute < ControlFR 
b. Absolute > ControlFR 
c. Absolute = ControlFR 
d. Relative < ControlFR 
e. Relative > ControlFR 
f. Relative = ControlFR 
g. Relative < Absolute 
h. Relative > Absolute 
i. Relative = Absolute 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
 
Absolute - 
ControlFR 
Relative - 
ControlFR 
Relative - 
Absolute 
Z -2.081
b
 -1.514
b
 -.548
c
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .037 .130 .583 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on positive ranks. 
c. Based on negative ranks. 
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Multiple Losses 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
ControlFR 45 7.0000 8.0000 12.0000 
Absolute 45 6.0000 8.0000 9.0000 
Relative 45 8.0000 10.0000 11.0000 
 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
ControlFR 1.99 
Absolute 1.80 
Relative 2.21 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 45 
Chi-Square 5.119 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .077 
a. Friedman Test 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
ControlFR 45 8.8889 3.09855 1.00 15.00 7.0000 8.0000 12.0000 
Absolute 45 8.0222 3.20148 1.00 15.00 6.0000 8.0000 9.0000 
Relative 45 9.1333 3.28634 1.00 15.00 8.0000 10.0000 11.0000 
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Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Absolute - ControlFR Negative Ranks 18
a
 19.14 344.50 
Positive Ranks 15
b
 14.43 216.50 
Ties 12
c
   
Total 45   
Relative - ControlFR Negative Ranks 18
d
 20.89 376.00 
Positive Ranks 22
e
 20.18 444.00 
Ties 5
f
   
Total 45   
Relative - Absolute Negative Ranks 3
g
 16.00 48.00 
Positive Ranks 18
h
 10.17 183.00 
Ties 24
i
   
Total 45   
a. Absolute < ControlFR 
b. Absolute > ControlFR 
c. Absolute = ControlFR 
d. Relative < ControlFR 
e. Relative > ControlFR 
f. Relative = ControlFR 
g. Relative < Absolute 
h. Relative > Absolute 
i. Relative = Absolute 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
 
Absolute - 
ControlFR 
Relative - 
ControlFR 
Relative - 
Absolute 
Z -1.148
b
 -.460
c
 -2.355
c
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .251 .646 .019 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on positive ranks. 
c. Based on negative ranks. 
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Mixed Gains 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
ControlFR 48 5.0000 8.0000 11.0000 
Absolute 48 6.0000 8.0000 8.0000 
Relative 48 7.2500 8.0000 10.0000 
 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
ControlFR 2.02 
Absolute 1.81 
Relative 2.17 
 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 48 
Chi-Square 3.817 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .148 
a. Friedman Test 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
ControlFR 48 8.0208 3.48547 2.00 15.00 5.0000 8.0000 11.0000 
Absolute 48 7.3958 2.88606 1.00 15.00 6.0000 8.0000 8.0000 
Relative 48 8.2708 2.20000 3.00 14.00 7.2500 8.0000 10.0000 
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Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Absolute - ControlFR Negative Ranks 21
a
 21.05 442.00 
Positive Ranks 17
b
 17.59 299.00 
Ties 10
c
   
Total 48   
Relative - ControlFR Negative Ranks 20
d
 21.98 439.50 
Positive Ranks 22
e
 21.07 463.50 
Ties 6
f
   
Total 48   
Relative - Absolute Negative Ranks 8
g
 16.88 135.00 
Positive Ranks 22
h
 15.00 330.00 
Ties 18
i
   
Total 48   
a. Absolute < ControlFR 
b. Absolute > ControlFR 
c. Absolute = ControlFR 
d. Relative < ControlFR 
e. Relative > ControlFR 
f. Relative = ControlFR 
g. Relative < Absolute 
h. Relative > Absolute 
i. Relative = Absolute 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
 
Absolute - 
ControlFR 
Relative - 
ControlFR 
Relative - 
Absolute 
Z -1.039
b
 -.151
c
 -2.023
c
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .299 .880 .043 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on positive ranks. 
c. Based on negative ranks. 
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Mixed Losses 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
ControlFR 48 5.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
Absolute 48 6.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
Relative 48 8.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
 
 
 
 
Friedman Test 
 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
ControlFR 1.82 
Absolute 1.98 
Relative 2.20 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
N 48 
Chi-Square 4.449 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .108 
a. Friedman Test 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
ControlFR 48 7.7083 3.38305 1.00 14.00 5.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
Absolute 48 7.9583 2.81303 2.00 14.00 6.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
Relative 48 8.1875 2.67897 2.00 15.00 8.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
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Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Absolute - ControlFR Negative Ranks 13
a
 20.92 272.00 
Positive Ranks 21
b
 15.38 323.00 
Ties 14
c
   
Total 48   
Relative - ControlFR Negative Ranks 15
d
 20.77 311.50 
Positive Ranks 24
e
 19.52 468.50 
Ties 9
f
   
Total 48   
Relative - Absolute Negative Ranks 10
g
 17.85 178.50 
Positive Ranks 20
h
 14.33 286.50 
Ties 18
i
   
Total 48   
a. Absolute < ControlFR 
b. Absolute > ControlFR 
c. Absolute = ControlFR 
d. Relative < ControlFR 
e. Relative > ControlFR 
f. Relative = ControlFR 
g. Relative < Absolute 
h. Relative > Absolute 
i. Relative = Absolute 
 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
 
Absolute - 
ControlFR 
Relative - 
ControlFR 
Relative - 
Absolute 
Z -.437
b
 -1.100
b
 -1.122
b
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .662 .271 .262 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on negative ranks. 
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